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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation constitutes a rhetorical criticism of the discourse surrounding Edward 
Snowden. Through ideographic analysis, it analyzes public exchanges between media outlets and 
U.S. governmental officials during the two years following Snowden’s revelations of illegal and 
unethical U.S. government surveillance programs. The Snowden narrative begins on June 5, 
2013 with the public exposure of classified government information. This analysis engages all 
media exchanges with U.S. officials where Snowden is directly referenced until June 15, 2015, 
two weeks after the expiration of Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT ACT authorized the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) to collect mass 
communication data, like phone and email records, of U.S. citizens. The analysis allows for two 
weeks of discourse after the expiration of Section 215 for any retroactive remarks. In sum, 126 
artifacts are analyzed within this study. 
Snowden’s disclosures publicized dozens of NSA practices that were disconcerting to 
U.S. allies and citizens of democracy, both in the U.S. and around the world. It was revealed that 
the NSA was tracking internet activity of U.S. citizens through sites like Google and Facebook, 
and that, through a loophole, the NSA was able to view communication data of U.S. citizens 
without obtaining a warrant. The NSA also regularly utilized its capabilities to electronically 
surveil citizens of other countries. The NSA regularly hacked into the communication, security, 
and information systems of other countries, including U.S. allies, and the NSA bugged multiple 
European Union offices domestically and abroad. It was also published that an internal audit 
revealed that the NSA violated privacy laws over a thousand times annually. With a multitude of 
other revelations relevant to discussions on surveillance and democracy, Snowden’s disclosures 




Prior to May of 2013, Snowden was an unknown figure. His anonymity disappeared 
when he identified himself as the person responsible for leaking classified data on U.S. 
government surveillance practices. Employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a subcontractor of the 
NSA, Snowden had access to extensive intelligence databases. Snowden flew from Hawaii to 
Hong Kong on May 20, 2013 and met with journalists from The Guardian with the hope of 
publishing documents he deemed vital information for the citizens of a democracy. Snowden 
also sent the classified information to The Washington Post. This information was an extensive 
collection of data detailing government surveillance practices. The documents were highly 
classified and included phone and email records the U.S. government had illegally obtained. 
While not officially authorized to obtain, review, and collect such information, Snowden did so, 
citing concerns of governmental malfeasance as they related to the public. Rather than releasing 
any information directly to the public, Snowden had all information vetted by The Guardian and 
The Washington Post. The involved parties have maintained that appropriate due diligence was 
upheld in the release of the information. As well, The Washington Post and The Guardian 
contended that a significant amount of information was not publicly released, citing journalistic 
ethics. As per both news outlets, all information was carefully reviewed and publicly released 
only if it exposed illegal or unethical governmental surveillance. Snowden contended that 
government transparency should be of the utmost importance in a democracy. He charged that 
the civil liberties of U.S. citizens, as well as the citizens of foreign countries, were being severely 
violated by American surveillance programs. 
 The Guardian began releasing the information on June 5, 2013. First released was the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court, demand that Verizon 




both The Guardian and The Washington Post published information on the Planning Tool for 
Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) security program that 
collected real-time data on American citizens. A barrage of information then followed, sparking 
an ongoing, intense public debate on governmental measures of surveillance in the name of 
national security. Given their journalistic efforts in consciously reporting on Snowden’s 
information, The Washington Post and The Guardian were both awarded a Pulitzer Prize for 
public service on April 14, 2014. 
 U.S. officials were stunned by the revelations. On June 14, 2013 the United States 
government charged Edward Snowden with theft of government property, willful 
communication of classified intelligence with an unauthorized person, and unauthorized 
communication of national defense information. As a legal matter, Snowden’s charges were 
extensions of the Espionage Act of 1917. Snowden sought clemency from the United States 
government and was denied. He was eventually granted asylum in Russia, where he has 
remained since his departure from Hong Kong. Despite the threats and demands of the United 
States government that Snowden returns to face criminal charges for three felonies, Snowden 
refuses to comply and remains in exile. Government officials argued that Snowden’s actions 
were breaches of national security and seriously damaged U.S. intelligence capabilities. Citing 
concerns for national security, U.S. officials maintained that Snowden’s revelations threatened 
the U.S. citizenry and abetted U.S. enemies. While Snowden garnered international support, 
from organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, U.S. officials adamantly denied Snowden’s importance and repeatedly 




 Informed by contemporary theories of democracy, this dissertation addresses three 
primary research questions: 
 Research Question 1: Within the Snowden narrative, how are established ideographs 
utilized by U.S. government officials to maintain power imbalance? 
 Research Question 2: Are there any terms within the Snowden discourse that can be 
theorized as ideographs, and, if so, how do they interact with other ideographs within the 
discourse? 
 Research Question 3: In accordance with contemporary ideographic theory, how does the 
Snowden narrative engage the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy? 
 The second chapter constitutes a review of literature on the relevant topics and theories 
related to the Snowden discourse. Within this section, there are two primary tracts: democratic 
theories and whistleblowing. Snowden’s revelations put contemporary democracies at a 
proverbial crossroads. In a post-9/11 world, the classic inherent tensions of democratic theory, 
namely liberty and security, are primed for public discussion. It is argued here that the situation 
regarding Snowden’s release of U.S. surveillance information was pivotal in the historical 
narrative of democracy and its theorization. The progression from historical democratic theory 
through modern and postmodern conceptions provides the context in which to position the 
discourse regarding Snowden. 
 As a form of freedom of expression, whistleblowing, especially against institutions of 
power within a <democracy>, creates some unique challenges, since whistleblowing is protected 
under the liberal conceptions of freedom of expression. Using whistleblowing techniques, 
Snowden’s disclosures criticized the surveillance practices of the U.S. government. 




situation and others like it, most notably WikiLeaks, open the channels for rigorous debate as to 
the implications that whistleblowing has on democracy. The second chapter explores these 
implications, focusing on the relationship between whistleblowing and democratic theory.  
 The third chapter identifies and explains ideographic criticism, the methodological 
approach employed in the dissertation. This chapter examines the specificities of ideographic 
criticism, discussing its history, theoretical formulations, and applications. The chapter outlines 
the purposes of the method and how the method is applied in the dissertation. Using traditional 
and contemporary approaches to ideographic criticism, this dissertation analyzes media 
engagements with U.S. officials on the topic of Snowden. 
 The fourth chapter analyzes noted ideographs within a synchronic schema. Ideographs 
can be measured and evaluated diachronically or synchronically. Diachronic studies examine 
ideographic interplay and progression over time. A synchronic analysis of ideographs is done 
when ideographs are examined within a stated context as they relate to, and interact with, each 
other. In conducting a synchronic analysis of the political discourse surrounding Snowden, this 
project assists in developing an overarching critical rhetorical project in which scholars are 
working to map societal ideologies. Analyzing the appropriate ideographs within the framework 
of Snowden provides deeper understanding of the language and symbolism of U.S. hegemony. 
The ideographs studied within the dissertation are as follows: <liberty>, <privacy>, <security>, 
<terrorism>, <equality>, <justice>, <democracy>, <citizenship>, and <patriotism>. An 
understanding of the relationship among these ideographs informs an understanding of how 
power relations are maintained and perpetuated within the context of Snowden. 
 As well, chapter four develops ideographic theory and provides a methodological 




ideographically within the examined exchanges. Over time, it is demonstrated how U.S. officials 
obfuscated the concept of Snowden through rhetorical processes of abstraction. As a term, 
Snowden became more than a simple referent to a person, but was operationalized ideologically 
for statist purposes. The synchronic analysis of this chapter engages the aforementioned 
ideographs in conjunction with <Snowden>, as a newly formulated ideograph. 
 Taking the ideographic criticism forward, the fifth chapter of this dissertation specifically 
examines the term “whistleblowing” within the Snowden narrative. This chapter delves into a 
rigorous explanation of the conceptualizations of whistleblowers from the perspectives of the 
state, media, and citizenry. This chapter explores the synchronic relationship between 
whistleblowing and the aforementioned ideographs. It is recognized that U.S. officials 
approached the relationship between Snowden and whistleblowing in three distinct phases. In the 
first phase, officials generally refrained from public commentary on Snowden’s status as a 
whistleblower. In the second phase, officials outwardly denied Snowden of legal whistleblower 
status, contending that Snowden failed to follow government whistleblower protocol. In the third 
phase, the term whistleblowing is almost entirely absent from the discourse, despite the 
regularity of discussions on Snowden. Critical valuations are made regarding these three postures 
by U.S. officials. Of primary importance to the analysis is the recognition that government 
officials labored to purge whistleblowing from the Snowden narrative. This is read as an 
antidemocratic measure by U.S. officials. It is antithetical to theories of democracy for state 
officials to dictate the rules of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is a tool of a democratic 
populace and, while paradoxical, it is productive for democratic discourse. Informed by 




institutions controlled the discourse surrounding Snowden and disarmed the public of 
whistleblowing, a fundamental democratic instrument of dissent. 
 Lastly, through the information gathered in this ideographic analysis, the dissertation 
draws critical conclusions regarding the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy 
within the parameters of the Snowden narrative. The sixth and final chapter concludes the 









 This chapter begins by discussing the history of democracy. Secondly, it explains the 
fundamental tenets of democratic theory. Given these tenets, this chapter then explores the 
literature surrounding the inherent paradoxicality of democracy. To follow, this chapter moves 
into a discussion on radical democracy, a post-structural response to democracy’s innate 
tensions. The chapter then engages the concepts of security and surveillance as they relate to 
democracy. Lastly, this chapter discusses the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy, with 
considerable attention paid to relevant cases studies. While the concept of democracy is 
paramount within contemporary discussions on governance, its definitional existence is 
nevertheless fluid.  
2. History of Democracy 
 Although recent scholarship posits the earliest democracy to be in the Mycenaean period, 
it is with Cleisthenes and Athenian democracy that the West typically associates (Keane. 2009). 
Around 508 BCE, the Athenian constitution forwarded a system of government unlike that of 
other nations (Keane, 2009). It granted the power of governance to the polis. Such a move 
required a different conception of identity within the body of the state. Historically, controlled 
lands had a very small ruling class while the vast majority of the population lived as subjects. 
The conceptualization of democracy was an overt move to notate the citizen as a member of the 
governing body.  While persons in feudal, tyrannical, monarchical, and other such societies were 
subjugated, the citizen, in its theoretical formulation, moves out of subjugation and into the 
ruling class. Within this newly established ruling class, members of the citizenry each shares 




 Sustained democratic states were few in number for the centuries following these origins. 
The inception of U.S. democracy, representative in form, formally began with the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776. While U.S. democracy has changed over the years, the concepts of 
citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been at the core of political discourse. In particular, 
the idea of political equality has been paramount since the origination of the U.S. (Tocqueville, 
2003). Upon these core concepts, U.S democracy has found its salience, both as at the domestic 
level, and in international ventures. While citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been 
essential to democratic theory, these principles have been further accentuated by the American 
mythos. Such an assertion is not to say that such ideals exist or are implemented in practice; 
indeed it is easy to build an argument to the contrary. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy has 
found a way to gain traction. 
3. Democracy Conceptualized 
 Democracy is a multi-faceted phenomenon with considerable variability in its 
theorization and application (Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). There is no singular democracy, but 
rather different and competing democracies (Kaul, 2012). Common to all democratic theories 
however, are the principles of citizenship, equality, and liberty, though their applications vary. At 
its core, as it moves from theory to praxis, democracy functions as a decision making process 
(Cohen, 1998). Decisions affecting the polis are made by the polis. By their nature, democracies 
must be committed to governance by the populace, wherein concerns of the public are decided 
collectively (Shapiro, 1999). By allowing free and full discussion on public issues, democracy 
can be exacted (Pennock, 1979). Democracy is a system of governance practiced by the whole of 




understood as a form of government in which the decision making process rests in the hands of 
the people (Rousseau, 1893). 
 As the democratic process unfolds, the populace is charged with the task of upholding the 
ideals of citizenship, liberty, and equality to the greatest possible degree (Pennock 1979). Within 
the democratic paradigm, citizens must recognize and uphold the shared social interests of their 
counterparts (Dewey, 1922). Decisions should be made to benefit the greater social order, rather 
than individuals themselves. In this, democracies are not set up to be static societies. To the 
contrary, they can often be impulsive, flowing with the will of the people (Tocqueville, 2003). 
The democratic process is most productive, Dewey (1922) argues, through public discourse. The 
undertaking of the public deliberative process presumes that opinions can be revised through 
discourse (Rawls, 1993). Healthy democracy exists when ideas are exchanged freely within the 
political realm amongst equal participants (Habermas, 1991). Within this discourse, equality of 
political voice must be protected as it correlates with civil liberties and free thought (Rawls, 
1971). 
3.1 Elements of Democracy 
3.1.1 Citizenship 
 Democratic citizenship is the defined relationship between an individual and the concept 
of the state (Heater, 2004). Citizenship works to distinguish a member of a state from those 
existing externally from its borders. Traditionally, citizens are classified in a manner that 
intentionally excludes outsiders (Cammaerts & Audenhove, 2005). Certain definitional factors 
differentiate between members and non-members of the decision-making class. The demos, 
based out of homogeneity, is the governing body for itself and that which it controls (Schmitt, 




including that of engaging in the political sphere, without state intervention (Yashar, 2005). 
Within an effective democratic order, all those who maintain the status of citizen have equal 
access to the political sphere (Dahl, 2007). 
3.1.2 Equality 
 As a member of the democratic collective, the citizen is of equal standing with the rest of 
the citizenry. Equality within the political sphere is vital in the realization of democracy (Dahl, 
2007). Democratic citizens are equal to their counterparts, but are also able to think freely as 
individuals within the political process (Schmitt, 1985). Although democratic theorists agree that 
citizenship, equality, and liberty are all integral for democratic societies, but differ on whether 
equality or liberty should be more highly regarded. 
 Many democratic theorists, like Rousseau (1893), place an emphasis on equality as the 
most important democratic principle. Stressing the necessity of social equality in the public 
sphere, Rousseau (1893) asserts that nothing is more detrimental than private interests 
controlling the fate of the public. It is up to the citizenry to ensure that each member of the polis 
is granted equal voice within the political sphere (Rawls, 1993). Democratic equality in this 
context strictly covers the political sphere, which necessitates the equality be monitored due to 
innate human differences (Dewey, 1937). Maintenance of political equality is of the utmost 
importance in the actualization of democracy (Rawls, 1993).  
3.1.3 Liberty 
 Much like citizenship and equality, liberty is difficult to define. Generally, it is the ability 
for members of the polis to have some qualified existence without state interference. Citizens 
decide for themselves what liberties they shall afford themselves. Largely, democratic 




(Rawls, 1971). The liberty to express oneself and be free from arbitrary obstructions has become 
highly regarded as an inalienable human right, elemental to the practice of democracy (Diamond, 
2003).  
 Unlike Tocqueville (2003) and Rousseau (1893) who equate democracy with equality, 
Aristotle (1998) contended that liberty is the most basic element of democracy. Furthermore, 
while theorists like Rawls (1993) and Rousseau (1893) unequivocally favor the principle of 
equality, theorists like Mill (1961) and Habermas (1991) argue that democracy should seek more 
fervently to espouse liberty. Mill (1961) theorized that individual liberty is essential to protect 
the minority from the majority. Systems of majority rule lend themselves to subjugate the 
minority if liberty is sacrificed for the sake of equality. Such tyranny functions to the demise of 
democracy (Mill, 1861). Habermas (1991), a proponent of deliberative democracy where social 
agents convene freely to discuss political issues, also advocated for the preservation of liberty 
through a differentiation between the public and private spheres. Citizens must be able to enter 
the public sphere uninhibited. Productive civil discourse occurs when private liberties are 
protected and social agents are able to freely express themselves (Habermas, 1991). 
3.3 Paradoxes of Democracy 
 The explanation of democracy and its principles does more than simply inform; it 
elucidates the inherent tensions of democratic institutions. The fluidity of democratic theory, 
coupled with the elusiveness of its ideals, makes the actualization of democracy intrinsically 
problematic. Mouffe (2000) argued that while the concepts of liberty and equality are both 
integral to democracy, they exist in stark contrast with each other. Equality and liberty, while 
both fundamental values of democracy, cannot be fully realized in accordance with each other. 




great amount of discordance between the ideas of democratic equality and ideas of liberty 
(Lefort, 2007). Tocqueville (2003) went so far as to say that democratic states will sacrifice their 
most basic civil liberties for sake of equality. Engel (2006) agreed, stating that equality in 
principle inherently restricts liberty, and that liberty undermines formulations of equality. 
Democracy then as an ideology, suffers the struggles of its own contradiction, falling victim to 
its own paradoxes (Mastropaolo, 2012). The polysemic nature of democracy is both its strength 
and its weakness. As democracy takes ownership of the ethics equality and liberty, it also 
harbors the inherent confliction of democracy. 
 Within democratic societies, the state and the polis are conflated in a way that counters 
adequate governance (Burckhardt, 1943). The citizenry, based out of a specified relationship, is 
the governing body for itself and that which it controls. Schmitt (1985) explained how 
democracy, as a political enterprise, faces two options, both of which are paradoxical. First, a 
structured democracy, while maintaining its stance on homogeneity, ultimately denies political 
voice to those on the outside. In this, democracy promotes equality among its citizens, but 
requires inequality in denying those outside its political borders. Secondly, should democracies 
attempt to alleviate this division and accept heterogeneity, they would be in violation of the ethic 
which binds together democracy: that of equality. Universal heterogeneity here lacks all 
practicality. Even in envisaging the abolition of such borders and accepting a global community 
to create equality for humanity, democracy would subject itself to utter incompetence. The 
vastness of such a project would only further produce the inequality and oppression it set out to 
eliminate (Schmitt, 1985). Any attempt at actualizing democracy counters as a means of 




 Derrida (2005) contemplated “in what sense may one still speak of equality – indeed of 
symmetry – in the dissymmetry and boundlessness of infinite alterity? What right does one have 
to speak still of the political, of law, and of democracy?” (p.233). This deconstructionist take on 
democratic theory illuminates the inherent contradiction of the concept of democracy. Theorized 
as a double movement, democracy cannot live up to its own standards (Thomson, 2005).  
 Democracy does not have any means of protecting itself against totalitarianism or 
complete social apathy (Blackell, 2006). Innately then, democracy must afford itself its own 
means of destruction (Keane, 2009). The primary elements which uphold democracy 
paradoxically stand as tools of self-destruction. For instance, freedom of speech can be used to 
the detriment of democracy if invoked in a counterproductive manner (Foucault, 1983). In 
essence, the citizenry can use its freedom of choice to choose tyrannical oppression, or even to 
completely abstain from the democratic process. Fundamentally, democracy must allow itself to 
be destroyed by itself (Chou, 2012). Indeed, it would be anti-democratic for democracy to 
structure itself in a manner that prohibits failure. “The very structure of the concept of 
democracy implies that there can be no full democracy in the terms of the ideal which determines 
the concept, there will be no democracy which does not sustain an anti-democratic current, no 
democracy worthy of the name” (Thomson, 2005, p. 25). 
 In order for this system of self-governance to function, the citizenry must be kept 
informed. As technology has progressed, so too have the means by which the populace is 
informed on issues of merit. The advent and evolution of the internet further complicate the 
actualization of democracy. Individual agency and the consummation of political voice online 
seem to suggest that internet communities, while not able to replace physical communities, foster 




like other mass media, the realization of democracy online is significantly hindered by corporate 
interests and institutional control of content, bandwidth, software, and management, which limit 
the freedom of expression and access to information (Feenberg, 2009). Undoubtedly the internet 
increases the layers of paradoxicality of a democratic society. Greater access to media allows for 
a greater presence of dissenting voices, but solidarity is far more difficult to attain (Mancini, 
2013). The existence of an online political space allows for a larger number of political agents, 
but the increased nuances constrain political efficacy (Davis, 2010). New media also sanction 
more nuanced opinions, but foster greater polarization. As well, while the internet is conducive 
for mobilization on social issues, it lacks structure, making whatever benefits that accessibility 
provides nearly moot (Mancini, 2013). Increased attention to the paradoxes contemporary 
democracies face, critical scholars have attempted to theorize democracy in a manner that 
accepts these inevitabilities while still maintaining democratic principles. 
3.4 Radical Democracy 
 In response to the difficulties democratic institutions face, post-structural scholars have 
theorized more radical conceptions of democracy. This move is an attempt to salvage the ethics 
of democracy in the face of uncertainty. Radical democratic theory posits that while democracy 
may be inherently difficult, if not impossible, this decision-making process is still more desirable 
than any other alternative. 
 Understanding the inherent tensions existent within democratic theory, Dahl (1989) 
posits that democracy, though integral, is not the ultimate end. Instead, democracy is an element 
of a greater purpose toward that which is for the social good. Democracy as a process does not 
seek finality; it is a process which assists in the creation of the favorable society. Democracy 




as a singular, overt socio-political theory. It is an ever expanding, ever adapting ideology (Dahl, 
1989). The shift in theory toward a more radicalized democracy is in large part due to the 
theoretical conceptions of Lefort (Inston, 2010). In shifting the power of governance to the 
citizenry, a central space became necessary for the decisions relevant to the public. Yet, the 
people can never actually govern themselves directly, so the place of power must always remain 
where political decisions are made (Inston, 2010). Lefort conceptualized this as an empty 
medium wherein the political discourse of a democracy takes place. In this, the democratic 
political process is never static, and is in an ongoing method of contestation and reformulation 
(Inston, 2010). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) built off of this conception of democracy to postulate 
the sheer impossibility of the realization of democracy. Democracy then, being structurally 
incomplete and impossible, becomes radicalized (Inston, 2010). Democracy is more than 
government; it is a state of being. Democracy should not seek to eradicate antagonism, but 
rather, embrace it (Inston, 2010). Butler agreed, rejecting the realizability of democracy (Lloyd, 
2007). Democracy’s inability to actualize itself should not be seen as a deterrent, and the 
impossibility should be celebrated. Democracy’s impossible nature is its strength (Lloyd, 2007). 
Democracy is necessarily open-ended. It is the unending contestation over democratic ideals, like 
liberty, equality, and justice that makes democracy radical (Lloyd, 2007). 
 Contemporary democratic theorists Agamben (1998), Mouffe (2005), and Derrida (2005), 
have articulated ideas of a radical democracy that supports democracy writ large while admitting 
its unrealizability. They recognized that the ideals of democracy necessarily inhibit the 
realization of democracy. Mouffe (2005) theorized that it is impossible for a political actor to 
concurrently enjoy absolute liberty and absolute equality. Liberty and equality counter each other 




each individual citizen, while posited as a unique form, is a vital element of the collective. 
Unending human uniqueness contradicts the very premise upon which equality operates 
(Derrida, 2005). Likewise, Agamben (1998) explained how the citizen is both the subject and the 
object of political power. In this, democracy is both liberating and oppressive at the same time. 
The basic tenets of democracy, including freedom, citizenship, liberty, and equality, all force 
political actors and democratic societies writ large into an ongoing paradox. 
 Connolly (2005) contended that this radicalized democracy exists in three parts. First, it 
solicits a regime of deep, multidimensional pluralism. Second, and more critically, radical 
democracy envisions a society in which the whole operates to reduce social inequity. Last, it 
recognizes humanity’s interdependent relationship with the greater natural world (Connolly, 
2005). Radical democracy cannot be exercised in the contemporary bourgeois conception of the 
public sphere (Fraser, 1990). Inadequate for a critical formulation of democracy, this bourgeois 
conception must be abandoned in favor of a posture without distinction between the state and 
civil society (Fraser, 1990). Seeking a more fluid approach, Fraser (1990) posited that greater 
public discourse among equal entities is possible if the public sphere is reconceptualized. In this, 
it is not the realization of democracy that becomes important, but rather the expansive 
possibilities of the democratic process. 
 The birth of radical democratic theory recognizes the self-destructive nature of 
democracy as being its greatest strength. In this, democracy does not function through its 
actualization, but rather through the processes that seek its actualization. This is Derrida’s (2005) 
idea of “democracy-to-come”. Although a new conceptualization of democracy, Derrida (2005) 
argued that this has been the strength of democracy since its inception. Radical democratic 




democratic process helps reduce social inequity. Thus, while paradoxical, it is in this that 
democracy justifies itself. 
 Despite this paradoxicality, theorists contend that democracy and democratic theory 
should not be abandoned. While admitting that pure democracy is unreachable, scholars have 
argued that democracy should not be intent on finding a solution for itself. As Mouffe (2005) 
discussed, while liberty and equality may be inherently disharmonious, the discourse which takes 
place as a result of this tension is the true essence of democracy. Radical democracy is one way 
to deal with the inherent tensions of democracy in theory and practice. Contestation and conflict 
are inherent within democratic discourse and are the driving force of democracy (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001). 
 However, in order for the citizen to be engaged with the democratic state, there must be 
some type of boundary. The state cannot be a universal entity which creates fundamental 
paradoxes. Blackell (2006) likened democracy to totalitarianism in that both refuse “all certain 
external metaphysical markers, or transcendent sources, of authority” (p.56). A state defines 
itself, in theory, by submitting itself to no other external entity. In this, democracies and 
autocracies seek the same end, to be ruled by no one. Thus, all humanitarian ethics of democracy 
become ancillary to the survival of the state.  The democratic citizen is placed into a 
contradiction. In its immediate practice, citizenship functions as an internal decision making 
process, but in its full application, it serves the totalitarian interests of a state’s survival. 
Democracies stand to lose the social elements of citizenship when classes and groups can no 
longer be resolved within the political sphere (Blackell, 2006). Statist ideology thus, remains at 





4. Surveillance and Security 
 Contemporary theorists are now tasked with rationalizing democracy in a world of 
rapidly increasing measures of security. “In a surveillance society privacy is political” (Fiske, 
1998, p.75). Technological advancements, coupled with threats of mass destruction, have rapidly 
moved the world into a state of constant surveillance. Citizens in the digital age are constantly 
monitored by corporations for marketing purposes, by means linked to growing American 
militarism (McChesney, 2015). Whereas the domestic sphere once existed as a space of privacy, 
contemporary surveillance mechanisms boast an intrusive, yet covert capacity (Prior, 2015). 
Operating upon Bentham’s concept of the panopticon, where prison cells are constructed around 
a singular guard watchtower, Foucault (2012) forwards the argument that society has 
metamorphosed into a state of constant visibility where people are able to be monitored at all 
times. The panopticon creates the continuous and inevitable exposure of the individual (Prior, 
2015). This state of existence informs not only the practices of the populace, but also of the state. 
As a means of managing and controlling people, surveillance, particularly at the domestic level, 
has seen a significant evolution since 9/11. With the advent of new technologies, people are 
inescapably visible, subjugated to state and corporate interests (Prior, 2015). 
 Citizens within a mediated world are now constant subjects of data monitoring. This is 
done predominantly without the knowledge or consent of the citizenry (Lyon, 2002). In 
technologically progressive societies, the watchperson in the panopticon has been replaced with 
a multiplicity of watchpersons within media, the state, and the corporatized world (Prior, 2015). 
Biopower is actualized in the visibility of seemingly every activity of members of a mediated 
society (Prior, 2015). The security state is present and observant at all times, but also exists as a 




Fontana, 2009). This reduction of privacy is disempowering as it transforms dead information 
into live knowledge (Fiske, 1998). Operating under the guise of security, constant surveillance is 
altogether inevitable, covert, and controlling. Such practices have stealthily pervaded democratic 
society writ large, creating yet another tension between the theorization and actualization of 
democracy. 
4.1 Security, Surveillance, and Democracy 
 The central principles of democracy are fundamentally in opposition to state and 
corporate sponsored surveillance. Continuous surveillance, while operating in the name of 
national security, infringes not only upon the liberties of every individual, it also detracts from 
the equity of political voice. Mill argued that citizens should enjoy their liberties freely and 
uncoerced (Mill, 1869). In a society where surveillance invades all public and private spaces, 
individuals, knowing they are being watched, are likely to refrain from exercising their liberties 
(Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). With everything act in cyberspace virtually trackable, 
surveillance is inevitable (Schwartz, 1999). The identifiability of social actors within the 
mediated realm by institutions of power dismantles the connective tissue of democracy. The 
systems and techniques for data collection are the same for both the state and the greater 
corporate conglomerate (De Zwart, 2014). The absence of a sense of privacy serves to inhibit the 
citizenry from engaging in democratic discourse (Schwartz, 1999). 
 Surveillance systems showcase the paradoxicality of democracy (Prior, 2015). When the 
privacy of the citizenry is counterposed with the necessity to keep the citizenry safe, democratic 
states fundamentally self-destruct (Prior, 2015). Democratic societies are further problematized 
when media sources, the only viable means by which the populace can be informed, are 




interests of the public, as a democratic voice, are grossly superseded by the interests of 
neoliberalism (McChesney, 2015). Thus, not only are the tenets of a mediated society structured 
to benefit the state, they are structured to benefit hypercommercialism, further widening the 
chasm between the citizenry and the actualization of democratic principles. Within a democratic 
society, everything should be held accountable by the demos, including surveillance (de Zwart, 
Humphreys, and Van Dissel, 2014). Democratic governments nevertheless have transformed 
expediently into security states, particularly since 9/11. 
4.2 Legalism 
 Threats to national security have long been used to justify increased state surveillance, 
but these arguments have experienced the greatest salience in the wake of 9/11 (Simone, 2009). 
The idea of national identity is a driving force in creating the “other” from which the U.S. needs 
secured. The ideas of communism and terrorism are two of the more recent fears planted upon 
the American citizenry. The political discourse surrounding these fears promotes state sponsored 
surveillance (Simone, 2009). Institutions of power use discourse to create a state of fear, which 
in turn expedites political change in favor of state and corporate interests (Collins and Glover, 
2002). The discourse of fear is integral in the development of U.S. legislation that restricts the 
liberties of the citizenry. 
 Much of what is examined today within security studies can be traced back to 1947 when 
the U.S. passed the National Security Act. This piece of legislation vastly increased the power of 
the armed services in the name of national security, establishing the National Security Council 
(NSG) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Prior, 2015). To follow in 1952, President 
Truman instituted the Armed Forces Security Agency, since renamed the National Security 




monitoring systems (Prior, 2015). The NSG, CIA, and NSA were made possible by the 
Espionage Act, and were further cultivated by fears of national security threats, accentuated by 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
4.2.1 Espionage Act 
 In 1791, the newly formed United States of America ratified the initial amendments to 
the Constitution, starting first with the freedom of expression. This First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States prohibits the restriction of the freedoms of speech, press, 
assembly, religion, and petition. The freedom of speech, unchallenged for over 125 years 
thereafter, saw its first formal contestation in the United States Supreme Court when fears of 
obstruction of wartime efforts manifested at the governmental levels (Hall and Patrick, 2006).  
Entering World War I on April 6, 1917, President Wilson contended that new legislation was 
required to protect national security, and the Espionage Act of 1917 was passed soon thereafter. 
 Approved by Congress in 1917, and enacted on June 15 of that year, the Espionage Act 
did little to address actual domestic or international espionage. Rather, it was formulated and 
initially exercised primarily to quell anti-war efforts (Howlett, 2011). The 1917 Espionage Act 
was a response to the backlash from the Selective Service Act, which was approved by Congress 
on May 18 of that same year which allowed the U.S. government to draft American men into the 
military. Government officials, in an effort to curb criticism of the war and silence war critics, 
threatened the public with fines and imprisonment for obstructing wartime efforts. With the 
enactment of the Espionage Act, it became felonious to show any level of public disloyalty to the 
military, or obstruct military enlistment in any way (Howlett, 2011). 
 Despite President Wilson’s urging, Congress voted down the portion of the bill that 




the bill which directly affected democratic citizenship. It became illegal, to “cause or attempt to 
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the 
United States” (Caso, 2008, p. 25). As well, Congress passed the provision which authorized the 
censorship of mailings that worked against the war effort (Caso, 2008). In the first few months 
after the bill’s passing, over 900 people were sent to prison, and countless more hindered from 
expressing their anti-war sentiments (Ball, 2004). 
 The coming years would see many more people arrested and numerous court trials as 
legal limitations on free speech were being imposed. In the Supreme Court case U.S. v. Debs 
(1919), Eugene V. Debs, was convicted under the Espionage Act for delivering an anti-war 
speech in Canton, Ohio (Howlett, 2011). In arguably the most famous case surrounding the 
Espionage Act, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that free speech was not absolute in the case of 
U.S. v. Schenk (1919) (Howlett, 2011). At this Supreme Court trial, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes delivered the legal opinion which reads “The most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater, and causing a panic” 
(Caso, 2008, p.26). Leftist activists such as Emma Goldman, Bill Haywood, Philip Randolph, 
Victor Berger, John Reed, Max Eastman, were imprisoned during this time in accordance to the 
stipulations of the Espionage Act (Ball, 2004). By the end of World War I, over 2000 Americans 
were tried as a consequence of the Espionage Act, with more than 1,000 of them being convicted 
(Hall and Patrick, 2006). 
 Anti-war groups vehemently opposed to World War I (WWI) communicated primarily 
through mass mailings during the early 20
th
 century. The Espionage Act gave the United States 
Postmaster the ability to pursue groups distributing disloyal flyers. Albert Burleson, postmaster 




advocated treason, insurrection, or resistance to United States law (Howlett, 2011). In 1918, 
Congress passed the Sedition Act, which levied heavier fines and lengthier prison sentences for 
those convicted of hampering wartime efforts (Howlett, 2011). While the Sedition Act was short 
lived, repealed by Congress immediately after WWI, it was still able to justify more arrests and a 
mass deportation frenzy (Caso, 2008). Led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the Palmer 
Raids was the mass corralling and deportation of “radicals” and antiwar/antigovernment 
activists. The Palmer Raids were also successful in deterring the strike talks of labor unions 
(Caso, 2008). 
 In the decades following World War I, the strikes against “espionage” would wane, and 
the “clear and present danger” language employed by Justice Holmes was substantially loosened 
(Caso, 2008). In the present world of heightened security following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the Espionage Act of 1917 has taken a unique turn. Focusing on governmental officials 
and members of the media in regards to leaking classified intelligence information, formal 
indictments have risen significantly in recent years. Between World War II (WWII) and 2008, 
three people were indicted under the Espionage Act for leaking classified government 
information (Currier, 2013). President Barack Obama’s administration attempted to repress 
governmental whistleblowing and truth-telling however, and Edward Snowden was the seventh 
government employee, contractor, or subcontractor to have been charged with espionage 
(Currier, 2013). 
4.2.2 PATRIOT Act 
 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, or PATRIOT Act) of 2001, while a 




Progressively throughout the 20
th
 Century, and into the new millennium, the United States drew 
closer to such legislation. While 9/11 served as a catalyst, decades of increasing terrorist activity 
served to justify the passing of the PATRIOT Act. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) created a system where United States officials in the CIA and FBI could engage in 
foreign surveillance if approved by a FISA appointed court (Pohlman, 2008). The U.S. Congress 
passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act in response to the explosion of Pan Am 103, 
where a bomb was detonated forty minutes into a flight from London to New York. A joint 
resolution in 1993 authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop 
early detection systems for potential terrorist threats (Ball, 2004). The United States Congress 
passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in 1996, responding to the 
bombing of the summer Olympics in Atlanta that same year (Ball, 2004). The most integral piece 
of legislation to the forthcoming PATRIOT Act of 2001, however, was the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing on April 
19, 1995, this bill expanded the authority of the federal government. It allowed for increased 
wiretapping and extended sanctioned the United States military to assist with criminal 
investigations involving weapons of mass destruction (Ball, 2004). With the dissolution of the 
USSR, fears of communism in the West were gradually replaced with fears of terrorism. 
Ideological power structures began to build a system of legal safeguards against terrorism, much 
like they had done to combat communism. 
 While an independent piece of legislation, the PATRIOT Act can be seen as an extension 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Much of the PATRIOT Act was a formal 
extension of the powers afforded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. In 




and try suspected terrorists” (Ball, 2004, p. 17). Passed out of an atmosphere of terror, this 
legislation significantly increased the surveillance abilities of the U.S. government (Simone, 
2009). Legally, the PATRIOT act allowed the NSA to access not only telephone and email 
records, but also online search histories, online chat conversations, and presence on major 
internet companies like Google, Facebook, Skype, etc., all of which can be done in real time 
(Prior, 2015). In its totality, the PATRIOT Act is comprised of ten titles and amongst them, 1016 
sections. Of these titles, Title II and its subsections, is arguably the most relevant as it authorized 
the acquisition of private communications, whether oral, telephonic, or electronic (Smith, 2009).  
4.3 Surveillance and National Security 
 Within contemporary political discourse in the U.S., surveillance practices have been 
positioned as integral to national security. The state has argued that for the U.S. to be protected 
from threats to security, the government must be able to practice deep levels of surveillance. 
Ongoing surveillance in a society of fear transforms a citizenry from a freer democratic populace 
into a society where everyone is simultaneously watching and being watched. In effect, all 
citizens are simultaneously the police officer and the suspect (Haggerty and Samatas 2010). The 
George W. Bush Administration pushed hard for increased national security while repetitively 
affirming a supposed allegiance to democratic principles (Romano, 2012). U.S. presidents have 
constructed themselves as authoritarians in recent decades, with mediated assistance in 
appropriating the superhero mantra. This posture affords the President with an unquestioned 
secrecy, particularly in regards to intelligence and national security. While the state argues that 
these secretive measures are necessary for national security, these measures work against 
democracy by providing an information channel that surveils the masses, but is inaccessible to 




4.4  Surveillance and Civil Liberties 
 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act and the PATRIOT Act, claiming that such actions infringed upon 
the civil liberties of the American citizenry and created more harm than good (Ball, 2004). 
Through analysis of governmental websites, Simone found that the information is controlled like 
propaganda; it is a one-sided argument claiming that security, through legislation like the 
PATRIOT Act, is necessary for liberty (2009). The U.S. government, with the assistance of 
major media outlets, has perpetuated a state of fear in contending that the liberties of the 
American people, threatened by terrorists, need to be secured by state surveillance. Appealing to 
liberty is a means of justification for the state to invade the privacy of the populace (Simone, 
2009). 
5. Whistleblowing 
 Whistleblowing gives democratic theory an added layer of complexity. It is an exercise of 
one’s freedom of expression, yet calls into question institutions of power. While there has been a 
recent focus on the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy, the theoretical 
postulations regarding this relationship still require significant development. This section will 
outline some of the academic work that has been done on the rhetorical implications of this 
relationship. 
 Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011), in recognizing that whistleblowing is exercised 
freedom of expression, argue that whistleblowing is an essential element of democracy. 
Democracy, as a decision making process, requires a citizenry to be informed. Because the 
governmental proceedings are handled by the populace within a democracy, citizens must be 




thus is an important means of democratic progress. The act of blowing the whistle, regardless of 
intent, is an informative process. The argument made by Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011) 
contends that anything that is informative is beneficial for the democratic process, thus making 
whistleblowing a productive activity for democratic societies. Sauter and Kendall (2011) liken 
Foucault’s idea of parrhesia to contemporary whistleblowing. They assert that democracy and 
truth-telling are both conditions for, and threats to, one another.  
 Mansbach (2011) equated whistleblowing and truth telling in these instances to fearless 
speech. Mansbach argued that fearless speech is the process of publicly disclosing the illegal or 
unethical practices of powerful actors, despite the risks. These fearless speakers, or 
whistleblowers, adopt tenuous positions. Whistleblowers are inherently defenseless, speaking out 
against extremely powerful social actors or institutions (Mansbach, 2011). Whistleblowers risk 
their jobs, friends, and livelihoods. The risks are exponentially greater within the context of the 
nation state. Whistleblowers thus, challenge democratic ethics citizens as they exist in a situation 
of great social inequity. 
 Fearless speech, Mansbach theorized (2011), preserves and extends the value systems of 
democracy and further suggested that this position aligns with the theoretical postulations of 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) regarding radical democracy. While the actualization of democracy is 
not possible due to the inherent tension between democratic ideals, radical democracy stresses 
that the process is what is important. The space in which democratic discourse takes place 
between equal social actors is the space where Mansbach (2011) sees whistleblowing to have the 
greatest utility. Furthermore, Mansbach (2011) argued that actors within a democratic society 
must continually critique and discuss the fundamental principles of democracy. Radical 




equality, and justice remain at the forefront of the discourse within the state. Fearless speech is a 
means of ensuring those ideals are sought. This process helps keep democratic ideals from being 
solely ideological tools of the state. Fearless speech helps regulate the supervisory bodies of the 
state (Mansbach, 2011).  
 The outgrowth of fearless speech is at the crux of the radical democratic theory where 
argumentative discourse occurs (Mansbach, 2011). The debate between the public sphere and the 
private sphere is akin to the intrinsic debate Mouffe (2000) discussed regarding equality and 
liberty. The ongoing tension between the liberty and equality allows for productive democratic 
discourse. The whistleblower does not work against the democratic collective, despite speaking 
at the autonomous and singular level. The public and private spheres, existing in tension, 
intersect, concurrently desiring to coexist without actually being able to do it. This tension 
should not be reduced or avoided, but rather it is the strength of democracy. This reifies the same 
paradox Derrida described in The Politics of Friendship (2005). It is the tension between equality 
and identity. Whereas democracy requires a populace made up of equal parts, those parts are 
ultimately unique. Democracy desires a populace of unique citizens that make up the whole, with 
no one person having more political value than another. Derrida (2005) recognized that this 
unending alterity is fundamentally contradictory to the concept of equality. Mansbach (2011) 
expounded upon this concept, recognizing that truth-telling as an independent and autonomous 
action functions to promote the collective. 
5.1 Case Studies 
This section discusses acts of whistleblowing as they have occurred in American history, 
focusing on well-known cases of whistleblowers against the state. This will include a review of 




Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. The chapter will then discuss the truth-telling organization 
WikiLeaks, which pushes the conceptual boundaries of whistleblowing. 
5.2 Daniel Ellsberg 
Daniel Ellsberg began working for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1964 as a special 
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Ellsberg has 
described that he was primarily directed to generate ways to escalate the war in Vietnam. After 
spending considerable time in Vietnam, Ellsberg went back to work for the RAND Corporation 
in 1967, where he was commissioned to research and author a top-secret report on U.S. defense 
decision-making in Vietnam. The document exposed a barrage of objectionable practices by the 
U.S. government in Vietnam, including war crimes and the intentional fabrication of false news 
stories. Perhaps most damning of the revelations was the decision to continually send military 
troops to Vietnam despite the consensus of top U.S. officials that the Vietnam War was 
unwinnable. Ellsberg’s revelations became publicly known as The Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg 
first shared the information privately with certain members of Congress, but none of them would 
agree to make the matter public. Ellsberg then released the documents to the New York Times 
which began publishing the information until a federal court issued an injunction against them. 
When the New York Times was ordered to cease the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg 
provided the papers to The Washington Post. The New York Times eventually won its case 
against the federal government in the Supreme Court, and was able to resume publishing the 
information. 
Daniel Ellsberg was accused and tried under the Espionage Act. The presiding judge 
eventually threw out the case due to the amount of misconduct which had occurred on behalf of 




investigators to illegally gather information to be used against Ellsberg. The search included 
illegally wiretapping Ellsberg’s telephone and raiding offices where Ellsberg was associated. 
Since the dismissal of his trial, Ellsberg has been hailed by many as a hero of democracy for 
blowing the whistle on government malfeasance. 
5.3 Thomas Drake 
Former senior executive of the National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake also 
faced charges under the Espionage Act for releasing information to The Baltimore Sun on the 
fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake made attempts to share the information with 
supervisors and members of Congress to no avail. Drake was charged on multiple counts of 
espionage and illegal use of government information. Drake was the first U.S. citizen to be 
indicted under the Espionage Act since Ellsberg. Given the available details about government 
misconduct, Drake was able to strike a plea deal prior to standing trial. All charges against 
Ellsberg were dropped in exchange for a misdemeanor guilty plea for misuse of government 
property. 
5.4 Chelsea Manning 
As a member of the U.S. Army involved in war operation in Iraq, Chelsea Manning 
released hundreds of thousands of war documents to the public through WikiLeaks. Published in 
2010, the classified documents included war video footage, internal communications, and 
military strategies of the U.S. Department of Defense. Manning was apprehended and 
immediately imprisoned, often in solitary confinement. Manning faced trial for dozens of 
criminal charges and was convicted in 2013 for twenty counts, including misuse of government 
property, fraud, and most seriously, espionage. Manning was sentenced to 35 years in prison. 




actions align more with conceptions of truth-telling than whistleblowing, like that of Ellsberg 
and Drake. The difficulty in defining such actions highlights the paradoxicality of these actions 
within democratic discourse. 
5.5 WikiLeaks 
 WikiLeaks is a uniquely contemporary phenomenon that gives voice to truth-telling 
through a cyberspace medium. WikiLeaks exists as a response to the contemporary mediated 
society, where democracy is functionally inhibited as media access is granted almost exclusively 
to powerful elites (Marlin, 2011). Journalism in particular, a primary means by which the demos 
is informed, has been usurped by corporate interests (McChesney and Nichols, 2010). WikiLeaks 
is a productive response to corporatized journalism, which now largely functions to perpetuate 
power inequity (Rosner, 2011). With voice given back to the lower classes, democratic discourse 
can be reignited through WikiLeaks (Marlin, 2011). 
 As one might expect, WikiLeaks has not received a warm reception from institutions of 
power. To the detriment of these elite classes that hold plutocratic control, WikiLeaks and other 
truth-telling organizations encourage uninhibited discourse. Powerful elites fiercely oppose 
WikiLeaks in an effort to remain in power. Such political posturing is ideological and exposes 
the class power struggle (Fuchs, 2011). New media, like WikiLeaks, allow for power structures 
to be challenged in ways they never were before. These new media like WikiLeaks create chaos 
for institutions of power, and make the management of these institutions incredibly more 
difficult (McNair, 2012). In particular, WikiLeaks assists in reducing the ability for governments 
to keep secrets, which is can be seen as productive to radical democracy (Dreyfus, Lederman, 




 Yet, WikiLeaks presents an added layer of paradoxicality. WikiLeaks asserts itself as a 
borderless, stateless, truth-telling organization. This stance affords itself a level of fluidity that 
challenges the concept of the state. However, given the repercussions experienced by Manning, 
Assange, and others, it can be argued that organizations like WikiLeaks have only strengthened 
the power of the nation state (Christensen, 2014). 
6. Conclusion 
 Advancements in technology have significantly altered the ways information is created, 
stored, and shared. Citizens and institutions go to great lengths to protect their data from hackers 
and cyber threats. The “seize and share” tactics of hackers, pranksters, and truth-tellers have 
significantly blurred the lines of whistleblowing. The value of these actions is particularly 
difficult to assess within the democratic discourse. Ellsberg and Drake used calculated methods 
to release information to reputable news agencies to review and publish at their discretion. In 
using a system of checks and balances, Ellsberg and Drake arguably used the most ethical tactics 
that were available to them. Manning also exposed unethical practices of the U.S. government, 
but did so rather haphazardly through WikiLeaks. Truth-telling organizations like WikiLeaks do 
little to vet information prior to releasing it publicly, which raises serious questions about 
information ethics and privacy, even if the victim is a hegemonic state. Manning’s information 
undoubtedly illuminated unethical practices by the U.S. military, but other truth-tellers seem 
more inclined to pranksterism for the sake of pranksterism.  
 For the purposes of this study, Edward Snowden is recognized as a viable whistleblower 
for relying upon renowned news agencies to vet and release information with discretion. 
Snowden’s status as a whistleblower is based heavily upon the illegal and unethical activities of 




productive for democracy. While valid arguments can be made as to the value of unchecked 
truth-telling, especially in relation to institutions of power, this dissertation focuses solely on 
Snowden’s actions and the measured approach to whistleblowing. Informed by this perspective, 
rooted in the above literature, this dissertation moves into a discussion on methodology in order 





Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY:  IDEOGRAPHIC CRITICISM 
1. Introduction 
 The methodological approach to this dissertation constitutes an ideographic criticism, 
understood as a critical rhetorical analysis of ideographs, of the discourse regarding Edward 
Snowden and his exposition of United States surveillance practices. Affixed in the crux of a 
contemporary struggle over power relations between governmental bodies and <democratic> 
<citizens>, the political discourse surrounding Edward Snowden is primed for ideographic 
analysis.
1
 Methodologically speaking, this rhetorical analysis functions to better understand 
ideological power relations and how they are manifested and perpetuated through discourse. 
Operating from a critical perspective, this analysis identifies instances where language is used as 
an ideological tool to maintain chasmic power inequity between governmental authority and the 
mass populace. Ideological criticism is a form of academic inquiry in which texts and other 
artifacts are analyzed to reify underlying values and attitudes of a society (Gunn, 2009). The 
greater implications of this dissertation reify the inherent paradoxicality of <democracy>. In 
advancing a vibrant discussion on the obstructions that democratic theories face in meeting 
democratic actualization, this dissertation further exposes the lack of viability of <democracy> 
writ large. The seeming inevitability of democracy’s inability to realize itself is illuminated 
through this critical rhetorical analysis of known ideographs, namely <democracy>, <privacy>, 
<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice> and, it is further 
accentuated through the dissertation’s theorization of the term <Snowden> as ideographic. In 
sum, the methodology of this project, ideographic criticism, fits within the greater realm of 




 Of significant relevance to this project is the democratic element of <freedom> of 
expression and the problematization it actuates at the intersection of ideology and rhetoric within 
political discourse, particularly within the U.S. While this dissertation provides a rigorous 
ideographic criticism of the narrative surrounding Snowden in order to elucidate power 
imbalance, it does so within the scope of democratic theory and the critiques thereof. The 
element of <freedom> of expression, which is vital to American <democracy>, theoretically 
allows for a wide array of expressive acts, including that of whistleblowing. Yet, as the discourse 
surrounding Snowden demonstrates, the U.S., a self-proclaimed <democratic> society, finds 
itself in a conundrum. The relationship between whistleblowing and <freedom> of expression 
poses perplexing questions in relation to democratic theory writ large, especially within 
discussions on <security>. Whistleblowing, a form of <freedom> of expression, is exercised to 
the dismay of structures of power, as it can publicly reveal unethical and/or illegal institutional 
behaviors. Whistleblowing operates paradoxically however, as it maintains the potentiality to 
fortify agents who threaten democracy. In the case of Snowden, the exposure of surveillance 
information and the techniques and mechanisms employed to acquire that information, has led to 
a vigorous debate regarding the authority of <security> institutions like the U.S. National 
Security Administration (NSA). Covert surveillance begs questions regarding the relationship 
between governmental power and the populace as it relates to the tenets of democratic theory. 
The ideographic criticism employed here examines this conundrum of whistleblowing’s 
relationship to <democracy> on the grander theoretical scale. The process of exploring this 
relationship first begins by discussing the conception and development of ideographic criticism. 
 As a methodology within the realm of rhetorical criticism, ideographic criticism found 




employed, ideographic criticism can produce significant critical scholarship through two primary 
means. First, it advances argument and “endless talk”, or ongoing discourse, which function to 
continue essential academic discourse within primary topic areas (Brockriede, 1974). Here 
Brockriede contends that a primary function of rhetorical scholarship is the continuation of 
discourse on theories and concepts through “endless talk”. Secondly, such analyses contribute to 
the growth and validity of critical rhetorical theory (McGeough, 2014). Thus, ideographic 
criticism is integral to the development and legitimation of critical rhetorical scholarship. 
Ideographic criticism fits under the umbrella of ideological criticism, and is informed by a 
number of perspectives, including structuralism, Marxism, deconstructionism or 
poststructuralism, postmodernism, and cultural studies (Foss, 2009). Kuypers (2009) furthers this 
conceptualization, contending that ideographic criticism is heavily informed by rhetorical 
materialism, which assumes an inherent relationship amongst rhetoric, discourse, and ideology. 
 The patterns of public consciousness noted by the rhetorical critic signify the evolution 
and reiteration of power. Considered a method of value analysis (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001), or 
critical rhetorical analysis (McKinnon, 2009), ideographic criticism admits its subjective posture 
and seeks to make conclusions of judgment. “The definitions of values and their 
operationalizations in social activity become the communication critic’s entry, often, into the 
foundational notions defining a people, their orientations to the world outside their heads, and the 
relationships they construct among themselves” (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001, p.189). 
 Ideographic criticism is apropos at this juncture, given the unwavering intensity of the 
political climate in the United States and around the globe since <9/11>, especially as it relates to 
the ideas of <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, and <democracy>. Furthermore, the political 




underexplored by rhetorical critics. This dissertation helps fill that void, and in working with the 
concept of the ideograph, fundamentally adopts a critical posture as it examines the inequities of 
power within political discourse and the ideological impetus that discourse has on social and 
political relations in the U.S. 
 This methodological chapter consists of five primary segments. First, it examines the 
formulation of the ideograph as the intersection between rhetoric and ideology. Second, it 
discusses the theoretical construction of the ideograph. This overview discusses the conception 
and original postulations of the ideograph, and its place within the discourse regarding the 
relationship between rhetoric and ideology. Thirdly, this chapter explicates how ideographs serve 
as artifacts with significant utility for rhetorical critics. Herein, ideographic criticism as a method 
of academic inquiry is formalized. Fourth, varying analyses of the ideograph and the theoretical 
conceptions thereof are provided. This section examines relevant critiques regarding the 
ideograph and ideographic criticism with particular attention paid to the studies which lay the 
groundwork for this dissertation, notably publications which discuss the topics relating to 
democratic theory. Fifth, and finally, the application of this methodology is described as it 
pertains to the discourse surrounding Snowden’s disclosing of government documents pertaining 
to U.S. surveillance strategies. This concluding portion outlines the scope of this dissertation and 









 In discussing ideographic criticism as a methodology, we recognize how ideology uses 
symbolism to influence collective consciousness. Ideographic theory operates upon the basic 
premise that humans behave differently as a part of a collective than they do when they are in 
isolation (McGee, 1980). Prior to the conceptualization of the ideograph, Marxist critics focused 
on the false consciousness of the masses created by ideology, while rhetorical critics endeavored 
to explain human behaviors through narratives and cultural mythos (McGee, 1980). 
 Historically, Marxists have focused on the ideology of materialism, (McGee, 1980). This 
fundamental divide served to restrict the rhetorical scholar from analyzing ideology. Seeking an 
intersection of sorts, McGee theorized the ideograph, a means by which Marx’s materialism 
could be reconciled with the rhetoricians’ symbolism. The Marxist perspective on ideology left 
little room for agency within the sociopolitical realm. Although people think they have agency 
within a political discourse, it is really only a “trick of the mind” which has deluded humankind 
since the beginning of our individual cognitions (McGee, 1980). The interpellation processes of 
ideology cognitively manipulate subjects of authority (Althusser, 1971). From this perspective, 
our collective political consciousness is created and maintained by institutions and persons of 
power. Unknowingly, the masses partake in their own subjugation while thinking they have free 
will, a process generating false consciousness and a skewed collective reality. 
 While there are discernable differences in scholarly conceptualizations of ideology, 
generally it is assumed that ideology fashions intellectual boundaries, effectively shaping reality 
as it manipulates the cognitive capacity of the masses. Seeking ultimate control, ideology moves 
toward hegemony, creating an unquestionable worldview for the unsuspecting masses beholden 
to it. Force-feeding their ideals, institutions of power impart ideas of nationalism, moralism, etc. 




understand the world in particular ways, while fundamentally excluding other worldviews (Foss, 
2009). Dominant ideologies function by controlling what social participants understand as 
natural or obvious. Normal discourse helps maintain the ideology, and any challenges to those 
norms seem egregious to the controlled masses (Foss, 2009). As hegemony is desired, ideology 
is the crux of the struggle between the powerful and the powerless. Eagleton (1991) contends 
that the struggle between subjects and institutions of power exists at the point of signification 
and discourse. Rhetorical scholars posit that discourse is a primary means by which we come to 
understand reality (McKerrow, 1989), with dilemmas arising when discourse is manipulated in 
suppressive ways.  
2.2 Rhetoric 
 Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied mythos and the narratives therein when 
dealing with power relations (McGee, 1980). Critical scholars in this realm posit that power is 
manifested through these narratives and the symbols that comprise them (van Dijk, 2006). 
Narratives are constitutive in that they create and perpetuate a mass consciousness within the 
social realm (Jasinski, 2001). Thus, <citizens> of a state are generally unaware of their cultural 
roles within the grand mythos, and exist as social agents only insofar as is conceivable within the 
boundaries of their corresponding culturally constructed narratives. Distinctive of culture, 
narratives play significant roles in how people come to understand their relative realities 
(Kuypers, 2004). 
 Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied these realities through analyzing the 
pervasive symbolism which structures our worldviews (McGee, 1980). In critiquing this 
symbolism, rhetoricians do not focus their efforts on the intent of the author. Instead, attention is 




institutions of power benefit from this situation. Rhetorical critics focus on the ways that 
symbolism relates to relationships of power, and how these relationships create reality (Jasinski, 
2001). Such processes, while revealing, fundamentally kept the field of rhetoric outside of 
ideological studies. 
2.3 The Intersection of Rhetoric and Ideology 
 Prior to the ideograph, rhetorical scholars, entrenched in the creation, appropriation, and 
perpetuation symbols and meaning through discourse, fundamentally lacked the medium through 
which they could analyze ideology. The ideograph functions as a means to bridge the chasm 
between materialism and symbolism. McGee (1979) contended that the most advantageous 
linkage of rhetoric and ideology is methodological. Like Chinese symbols, ideographs signify 
ideological commitment as they are elemental in the construction and maintenance of an 
ideology (McGee, 1980). McGee was primarily concerned with analyzing the ways in which 
ideographs manage political consciousness and public motives. The ideograph operates as an 
extension of Weaver’s ideas on “God” terms and “Devil” terms, which address how political 
meaning is imparted into terminology (Jasinski, 2001). “God” terms and “Devil” terms help 
construct cultural identity, and the concept of the “other” within political discourse. In this 
manner, the term “freedom” acts as a “God” term or unifier, while the term “tyranny” acts as a 
“Devil” term and promotes exceptionalism by vilifying other societies (Weaver, 1953). While 
Weaver’s theoretical postulations failed to unearth the core of the relationship between discourse 
and ideology, it did move rhetoric closer to ideological analysis. 
 McGee’s concept of the ideograph created the theoretical link between rhetoric and 
ideology. As a linguistic tool, the ideograph assists an ideology in maintaining its supremacy, 




ideograph is rooted in the rhetorical scholarship of appropriated meaning. This form, manifested 
as an artifact for the rhetorical critic, transcends elements of space and time and acts in a manner 
which creates, perpetuates, and directs the ideology of a society. The ideograph then is a primary 
means by which institutions of power control the cognition of the masses (Delgado, 1995). The 
concepts of ideology and rhetoric can be linked without the need for poetic metaphors (McGee, 
1980). This linkage produces a complete description and explanation of a hegemonic ideology 
and helps elucidate the relationship between institutions of power and the consciousness of its 
people (McGee 1980). 
 Ortega (1957) argued that language inhibits cognition, and that while language helps 
citizens conceptualize reality, it paradoxically restricts free thought. Because reality is largely 
understood through language, our understandings of reality are limited (Ortega, 1957). For 
example, the history of the ideograph <liberty> fundamentally informs our contemporary 
conception of <liberty> (McGee 1980). Concepts like <liberty> cannot be taken out of their 
historical context. Language is intrinsically tied to culture, and the ideograph develops over time 
out of the ordinary lexicon of a specific culture. The public then engages and enacts the 
hegemonic ideology through language (Potter, 2014). While ideology acts through a variety of 
means, its linguistic manifestations link it specifically to the processes of symbolism. Hence, the 
rhetorical critic can locate specific artifacts, ideographs, for analysis. Ideographs are not 
artificially manufactured by social subjects to describe public behavior. Rather, they are artfully 
crafted ideological terms with significant political valence (McGee, 1979). Institutions of power, 
through ideology, use the language within political discourse as a means to defend the status quo, 




2009). While existing in ordinary discourse, ideographs are highly influential through multiple 
defining characteristics. 
3. Elements of the Ideograph 
 McGee (1980) postulated four primary features of ideographs, and authors such as Condit 
and Lucaites (1993) and Winkler (2012) have condensed and isolated these features for a more 
succinct understanding. Ideographs are largely understood according to how they function 
(Jasinski, 2001), and can perhaps best be understood through examples (McGee, 1980). Thus, the 
ideographs <liberty> and <equality> are used here to exemplify the conceptualization of the four 
features of an ideograph. 
 Ideographs are linguistic terms that exist within ordinary political discourse. An 
ideograph is a word or phrase that is well-known and often used by the masses in political 
discussions. This definition excludes jargon, words highly technical in nature, and common 
words that have minimal political valence. Ideographs work out of common political speech, as 
this practice facilitates hegemonic institutions to engage discursively with the populace (McGee, 
1980). This is a key means by which the ideology imposed by the institutions of power reaches 
the collective. In order for these ideographs to affect the collective consciousness, they must be 
easily accessible to the members of the society. Ideographs are the public vocabulary of an 
ideology (Kuypers, 2004). As an apparatus of power, the ideograph is a way that inequity is 
maintained unknowingly by the masses through their own iterations within their common 
political discourse. The terms <liberty> and <equality> undeniably exist within the ordinary 
political discourse of the U.S. These terms are core concepts within the American political 
system and are part of the normalized lexicon of American culture. Thus, they fulfill the first 




 Secondly, ideographic terms must be ultimately ambiguous. As Winkler (2012) states, an 
ideograph “must be a high order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular 
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (p.12). Ambiguity enables the ideographic term to 
have a multiplicity of meaning among the masses, but still work to perpetuate the overall 
ideology. Ideographs thus exist as terms which the collective broadly understands, but 
concurrently as terms that are all but impossible to specifically define. Ambiguity allows for the 
ideographs to purposefully and uniquely affect each individual within the citizenry. Thus, the 
ideological goals of the hegemonic ideologies become normative through the discursive power of 
the ideograph. This definitional fluidity allows for ideographs to transcend context within a 
society, and they can generally be utilized regardless of era. 
 <Liberty> and <equality> function in this manner. People generally understand the 
concepts of <liberty> and <equality>, but these terms are not so easily defined. As McGee 
(1980) explained, stating that no one has ever seen an <equality> walking down the street, but 
everyone has a general idea of what <equality> should look like. Even if a citizen can quickly 
articulate a definition of an ideograph, the nuances of that definition are undoubtedly unique. 
Condit and Lucaites (1993) noted specifically how <equality> as an abstraction is impactful and 
often calculated. These ideographs reference generally agreed upon ideals. The terms may be 
perceived in slightly different ways, but in the end social agents want <equality> and <liberty> 
as goals for the collective. Despite these shared goals, the populace lacks universal 
understandings of what these terms mean. 
 The third element of the ideograph is that it warrants institutions to wield their power 
(McGee, 1980). Ideographs excuse abnormal or unethical behaviors for the sake of the greater 




seem counterproductive to the ideas of <equality> and <liberty>. For instance, an institution of 
power can fundamentally infringe on the civil liberties of a population in the name of <liberty>. 
With help from such ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>, governmental institutions engage 
in otherwise egregious or odd activities, like killing (war, capital punishment, etc.) and 
confinement (incarceration, travel regulations, etc). Under normal circumstances, citizens are not 
authorized to kill or restrict the <liberty> of other citizens in this same manner. The state 
however, wields the power to restrict, arrest, imprison, and even kill in order to defend 
<equality> or <liberty>. It does so quite regularly in the name of counterterrorism (Winkler, 
2012), militarism (Hamilton, 2012), and American hegemony (Cloud, 2004). 
 Institutions of power can operate in ways that are destructive and eccentric, even 
antithetical to their systems of ideographs, for the sake of the greater ideology. These behaviors 
functionally allow the institutions of power, through ideology, to absolve themselves of any 
wrongdoing as the public is led to believe that the institutions are acting on behalf of the 
collective good. Examples of these measures include asset forfeiture, the monitoring of library 
records, and revocation of free speech, all of which have been exercised by the U.S. government 
(Winkler, 2012). The collective <citizenry>, having been cognitively conditioned to subscribe to 
the ideograph, cannot reasonably challenge the established order, and thus is willing to excuse 
abuses of power in the name of the ideograph. 
 Fourth and finally, while <liberty> and <equality> serve ideographic means in other 
cultures, they are uniquely entrenched within American culture. These two terms are embedded 
in the American narrative of American culture, and, unable to be separated from that narrative, 
they exist definitively within its context. This is the fourth characteristic of an ideograph; it is 




<equality> and <liberty> may change over time, but ideographs cannot escape their past 
connotations since present interpretations are intrinsically related to historical ones (Jasinski, 
2001). Language, as an integral element of culture, helps fuel cultural evolution. Definitions may 
change, but ideographic influence generally remains steady. To this end, while contemporary 
conceptions of American ideographs like <liberty> and <equality> may vary from their earlier 
manifestations, they are nevertheless entrenched within the narrative of American culture, 
wielding significant power. Indeed, it is imperative that the ideograph is understood in 
accordance with its cultural milieu (McGee, 1980). 
 While some elements of language transcend cultures, the ideograph is necessarily 
confined within a specific culture (Winkler, 2012). This is one of the primary ways in which the 
ideograph realizes its functionality. Culture works in ways which social actors must inherently 
understand their own seeming exclusivity. A culture can only be recognized in relation to the 
“other”. One can only feel invested in a culture if one understands how it is differentiated from 
other cultures. Ideographs help facilitate this difference and foster a feeling of belonging. Being 
culturally specific, ideographs cannot be applied from one culture to another. All ideologies have 
their ideographs, but ideographs cannot transcend ideologies. They are rooted in the specificities 
and historical contexts of the ideologies in which they were contrived. Members of society are 
conditioned to know these ideographs; it serves as a prerequisite for belonging as a part of a 
society and understanding a specific reality (Lee, 2009). While there is some tolerance for 
variables, generally the citizens have a good conception of the applicable ideographs (Lee, 
2009). 
 In review, ideographs are culturally bound terms within ordinary political discourse that 




sake of the ideology. These actions serve then to secure and maintain the imbalance of power 
wherein the ruling class is seemingly unchallenged by the general populace. It is also important 
to iterate that the word as a linguistic form, which can be conceived of as an ideograph, does not 
always function in an ideographic manner (Lee, 2009). The term liberty for instance can be used 
in a non-ideographic fashion. The ideographic critic is concerned only with the term as it relates 
to relationships of power and ideology. When ideographs exist within this relationship, they 
serve as artifacts for the rhetorical critic. 
4. Ideographs as Artifacts 
 Ideographs become artifacts for study through their regularity within the political 
discourse of a society. Because ideographs serve as foundational values for the identity of a 
culture, the political arena is a primary starting point for the identification of these artifacts 
(Winkler, 2012). Ideographs can be identified by testing them against the aforementioned 
characteristics. Kuypers (2009) stresses that ideographs, as artifacts, are data, and the patterns 
they generate over time and in relation to each other give the rhetorical critic analyzable material. 
In the case of the ideograph, it is traced across multiple texts which are informed by a much 
larger ideology (Gunn, 2009). As a method, ideographic criticism is more than simply mapping 
however; it is a means of examining and analyzing how terms within political discourse shape 
and organize cultural values. Using these artifacts, rhetorical critics examine how they function 
amongst each other to perpetuate the ideology. 
5. Analysis of Artifacts 
 McGee (1980) theorized that a full ideographic analysis of a culture requires three things: 
ideograph identification, diachronic analysis, and synchronic analysis. McGee contends that this 




complete description of a society’s ideology. Such an endeavor would be an insurmountable task 
for any researcher. Thus, these three elements of a full cultural analysis of ideology are broken 
down into more manageable tasks. Even in a condensed form, critical conclusions can still be 
drawn based upon the structures and patterns of ideographs (McGee, 1980). Condit and Lucaites 
(1993) see ideographs as the sites of ideological and cultural struggle as meanings shift and 
evolve. Describing and charting these most potent ideographs longitudinally, as well as within 
specific contexts, helps illuminate the presence and influence of ideology within discourse 
(Cloud, 1998).  
 The first task of ideographic analysis is identification. This requires an analyst to examine 
the depths of political discourse to find the potent ideographs within a specific culture (McGee, 
1980). In its complete form, this task constitutes the compilation of the entirety of a culture’s 
ideographs. An overwhelming task for a singular critic at any given time, this first step is 
typically condensed into the identification of only a small number of ideographs or artifacts. 
These artifacts can be found within the common political discourse of a given society. 
  Once identified, the researcher may then trace the history of the ideographs 
diachronically, or over time. This diachronic portion of the analysis requires the analyst to study 
the evolution of individual ideographs (Potter, 2014). When analyzing diachronically, the 
ideographic analyst can see how public discourse and public consciousness evolve with these 
ideographs (Kuypers, 2004). The ideographic critic analyzes these developing values, finding the 
ways in which a culture defines itself and how it constructs its attitudes regarding the external 
world (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001). Diachronic patterns look much like vertical structures 
mapped on a timeline. Ideographs expand, contract, and shift meaning over time and in regards 




etymologies in historical dictionaries, as well as through usages in media, textbooks, popular 
culture, and political discourse (Potter, 2014). 
 Rhetorical critics may also analyze the ideographs synchronically, or contextually, in 
accordance with one another (Potter, 2014). Once the relevant ideographic artifacts are 
identified, an understanding of a culture’s ideological directives can be found through a 
synchronic and diachronic evaluation of each ideographic term (McGee, 1980). Synchronic 
analysis examines the ideograph within a specific context and in relation to other ideographs in 
that same setting. This is done by analyzing the ideographs of a society and understanding how 
they are used in accordance with each other and cultural values (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001). 
Ideographic value is largely reliant upon contextual relationships, that is, ideographs get their 
meaning, in part, in relation to other ideographs within a specific period of time (Jasinski, 2001). 
<Liberty> is best understood when counterposed with ideographs like <security>. An ideograph 
cannot exist as such without the presence of other ideographs. Much of this project is a 
synchronic analysis of the ideographic artifacts present in the political discourse surrounding 
Snowden’s revelations. Due to the recency of Snowden, this dissertation does not engage a full 
diachronic analysis. The arguments made in this dissertation, however, can be utilized for a 
subsequent diachronic analysis. Through synchronic analysis, the dissertation analyzes known 
ideographs as they perpetuate ideology through discourse, specifically <democracy>, <privacy>, 
<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>, and as well 
postulates that <Snowden> functions ideographically. This postulation is shown through both a 
progression of ideographic theory and a synchronic analysis of <Snowden> as it interrelates with 




 Doing a full historical analysis of a culture’s ideographs provides vital information for 
understanding a culture’s ideology as a whole. As noted, ideographs, being fundamentally 
ambiguous and indefinite, do not maintain a fixed meaning over time. To the contrary, 
ideographs are inextricably fluid even within a particular context.  Nevertheless, tracing these 
meanings within their appropriate contexts can reveal a culture’s ideology by thoroughly 
exposing this framework (McGee, 1980). While the diachronic analysis is vital for this process, 
authors like McGee (1980), DeLuca (2012), and Hamilton (2012), have contended that the 
synchronic examination is paramount. They have argued that the shape of an ideology can best 
be revealed through a thorough analysis of a society’s ideographs within a particular context. 
 Outlining the entire diachronic and synchronic patterns of a society’s ideographs is 
unfathomably daunting. Thus, rhetorical critics have condensed this methodology into more 
attainable tasks. Connelly (2012) and Bridges (2008), for instance, have analyzed ideographic 
influences within specific contexts. This narrow approach covers the synchronic patterns of 
ideographs within a given framework. Other critics, such as Condit & Lucaites (1993) and 
Winkler (2012) unveil the diachronic patterns of a singular ideograph, tracing the lineage and 
cultural influence of the term. Meanwhile, certain scholars, like Hamilton (2012) and Potter 
(2014) look at a more specific artifact, the pattern of one particular ideograph in a specified 
context. These smaller scale analyses assist in describing the greater ideology of a society. They 
are not the extensive ideographic analysis McGee (1980) originally postulated, but they 
nevertheless contribute to the greater understanding of society and ideology. The patterns that 
these scholars have identified work to regulate power and construct the reality of the populace 




 In addition, Kuypers (2004) argued that while ideographic criticism does not offer any 
specific criteria which must be evaluated in accordance with the studied ideographs, such 
critiques can functionally illuminate how cultural values relate to power, how those cultural 
values shift, and lastly how those cultural values inform each other. The versatility of 
ideographic criticism is thus elucidated (Lee, 2009). Informed by Brockriede’s (1974) 
conception of rhetorical criticism, Lee (2009) discusses the implications of ideographic criticism, 
namely, how rhetorical critiques can provide the reification of political irony, false 
consciousness, and ideological-rhetorical trends. Ideographic criticism aims “to make us aware 
of how specific articulations of ideographic terms can assist in tracing the workings of ideology 
as it is instantiated into policy through rhetoric” (Stuckey, 2008, p.103).  
6. Applications of Ideographic Criticism 
 Miller (2004) and Cawley (2013) contributed to ideographic theory by examining the 
ways in which discursive ideological tools of the U.S. derive from the founding principle of 
individuality. Cawley (2013) asserted that the <autonomous individual> functions as an 
ideograph, helping to inform the public decisions of the United States since its inception. This 
revelation contends that the contemporary Tea Party movement is functioning out of that element 
of American ideology. Miller (2004) states that the ideographic <individual> differs from the 
Western humanist conception of the individual, and that the ideographic individual must remain 
diverse to maintain salience. Similarly, Connelly (2012), Hamilton (2012), and Hasian (2001) 
advance McGee’s ideas that <privacy> and <national security>, <patriotism>, and <right to 
privacy> respectively function as ideographs. As well, Winkler (2012) traces the diachronic and 
synchronic patterns of <terrorism>, noting its ideographic influence on American society. The 




2001, continues its international conquest for the sake of American <security>. Winkler (2012) 
contended that as this narrative has evolved, <terrorism>, and all of its variations, have become 
ideographic. 
 Stuckey’s (2008) analysis of presidential rhetoric notes that <human rights> is one of the 
ways U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush pushed 
an ideology of American exceptionalism and neoliberalism. Equating <human rights> with free 
markets and consumer citizenship, each of these Presidents found ways to justify their doctrines 
(Stuckey, 2008). As security threats like <terrorism> impose potential harm upon this conception 
of <human rights> surveillance initiatives become imperative for the sake of protecting the 
power structure (Winkler, 2012). Oppression as it exists in this American narrative is not the 
infringement upon civil liberties by the state. Rather, it counterposes this infringement as a 
necessary practice in the maintenance of neoliberal <human rights>, where free trade and 
consumer citizenship can be upheld through the constant surveillance of publics. These studies 
have been integral in the advancement of our understandings of the intersection of rhetoric and 
ideology. 
7. Evolutionary Applications 
 In addition to exploring the concept of the ideograph in its original construction, 
rhetorical critics have also begun to expand the breadth of the ideograph, and formulate it in a 
broader sense. Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008) have theorized that the ideograph 
can transcend ordinary discourse. They make the claim that September 11, 2001, stylized as 
“9/11” or “September 11
th”
, functions as an ideograph. The distinctive element of this 
progression is that this is not a term of historical significance prior to its denotation. As well, 




ideograph. While <9/11> moves outside of the confines of McGee’s initial postulation of the 
ideograph, the argument is made that it still functions in an ideographic manner. Events like 
<9/11> powerfully impact American culture, dynamically shift the political landscape, and are 
referenced in ordinary political discourse to perpetuate power inequity. 
 Similarly, Edwards and Winkler (1997) have demonstrated how imagery can function 
ideographically. While McGee’s (1980) concept of the ideograph did not account for visual 
rhetoric, Edwards and Winkler (1997) claimed that images, like that of the American flag being 
raised at Iwo Jima, can function in an ideographic manner. Images are fundamentally outside of 
political terminology, but can often appear as much within a greater political discourse as known 
ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>. As well, these images can be ambiguous yet 
significant, and are often used to justify the wielding of power (Edwards and Winkler, 1997). 
Thus, while images are not linguistic per se, they still function in an ideographic manner. 
8. Application to Snowden 
 This dissertation specifically analyzes the responses from U.S. government officials when 
directly discussing Edward Snowden. This analysis focuses on the operations of establishments 
of power. First, this dissertation functions upon the premise that institutions of power effectively 
manipulate mass consciousness, and is specifically concerned with the power of the U.S. 
government. The revelations of Snowden put U.S. government officials, particularly those 
presiding over surveillance practices, in a rhetorical exigency. Analyzing how these public 
officials, as the managers of the political hegemony, responded to this situation is essential in 
understanding relationships of power. Covert surveillance, a clear exertion of power by a 
hegemon over an unknowing population, when revealed, begs an explanation. The state’s 




ideographs are integral to the state response on this matter. Critical analysis of the U.S. 
government’s response illuminates how discourse is used to maintain power imbalance. 
 Ideographs, being intrinsically cultural, lack sound applicability at the international level. 
Thus, this dissertation looks only at the U.S. government’s response to <Snowden>. Specifically 
examined are messages and responses delivered to the press, which are intended for public 
viewing. These communications provide material regarding how the state, in a time of crisis, 
responds rhetorically to absolve itself of blame, circumvent situational guilt, and most 
importantly, use linguistic and rhetorical means in maintaining its dominant position of power. 
  The dissertation works to expose political irony and false consciousness within the 
American political spectrum through an analysis of power relations reified in the discourse 
surrounding <Snowden>. McGee (1980), in outlining the ideograph, and giving examples like 
<liberty>, <privacy>, and <rule of law>, lays the theoretical groundwork for this project, as these 
concepts are at the crux of the political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. Since Snowden’s 
releasing of government surveillance documents, the state and the public alike, in accordance 
with media coverage, have engaged in debates regarding the topics of individual <democracy>, 
<privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>. 
Snowden exposed political ironies and limitless exercises of power operating for the sake of 
hegemony. 
8.1 Artifacts of Study 
 The United States, as a mediated democracy, distributes information from government 
officials through press outlets. In these moments of information transfer, from government to 
media, the state works to control the narrative of any given situation. It is at the intersection of 




primary grounds on which this study is based. The posture of this dissertation fundamentally 
takes interest in the relations between state power and a <democratic> <citizenry>. This 
ideographic criticism focuses on the discursive manifestations of ideology within the mediated 
realm of distributed information as it is exchanged between state and media sources. 
 The dissertation analyzes the discourse between authorized U.S. government officials and 
members of the press, where Snowden is specifically mentioned. The occurrences studied in the 
dissertation are those of legitimate, government officials when they speak publicly with members 
of the press. While it is not argued that the texts analyzed in this study are exhaustive, extensive 
efforts were made to identify and examine as many of these occurrences as possible. The 
dissertation analyzes all such occurrences over a two year period, between June 5, 2013 and June 
15, 2015. This time frame assists in narrowing the scope of the project, but serves two primary 
functions as well. 
 First, the USA PATRIOT Act saw many of its provisions expire at the dawn of June 1, 
2015 as Congress opted not to approve the renewal of certain sections. Most notably of these 
expired clauses was Section 215, which had allowed for the bulk data collection <Snowden> 
brought to light. On June 2, 2015 Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring Act 
(USA FREEDOM Act). While this Act broadly renewed many expired portions of the PATRIOT 
Act, it specifically called for a ban on the activities allowed by Section 215. Regardless of the 
how these acts evolved, it is argued here that the <Snowden> situation directly affected 
legislation on government surveillance within the given time frame. 
 Secondly, this two year time span allows for the development of the narrative and the 




ample time for the ideology to find its way to mold the discourse. The dissertation will not be 
doing a full diachronic analysis, but it does monitor the development of the discourse over these 
two years which could inform a larger diachronic scope in future studies. Given the artifacts 
encapsulated by these specifics, this dissertation uses ideographic criticism to advance two 
primary arguments. First, it identifies and analyzes known ideographs as they exist within the 
<Snowden> discourse. In doing so, it formulates the term <Snowden> as an ideograph, 
identifying it according to the primary characteristics of an ideographic artifact. The reification 
of the <Snowden> abstraction develops ideographic criticism as a methodology as it 
demonstrates how political agents can be obfuscated for ideological purposes. This dissertation 
then subsequently analyzes <Snowden> artifact synchronically with other ideographs. The 
analysis articulates how the <Snowden> ideograph was utilized to paradoxically in defense of 
governmental surveillance. Secondly, this dissertation examines the interplay of ideographs and 
terms of whistleblowing within the discourse. Through synchronic analysis it is reified how U.S. 
officials utilized ideography to purge whistleblowing from the public forum and isolate it behind 
legislative initiatives in the name of national <security>. Through these processes, U.S. officials 
absolved themselves of culpability and engaged in measures antithetical to <democracy>. A 
complete list of the analyzed artifacts of this political discourse can be found in Appendix A. 
8.2 Analysis of <Snowden> Discourse 
This dissertation identifies and analyzes the usages of known ideographs within the 
political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. The ideographs of particular relevance here are 
<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and 
<justice>. These ideographs have already been recognized as such at the scholarly level (McGee 




identification of these ideographs serves a number of purposes. First, it advances the scholarship 
on ideographs as artifacts for rhetorical analysis. The continued usage of ideographs legitimates 
the theoretical conception of the ideograph. Second, the identification of these ideographs 
furthers the greater diachronic analysis of these terms. As noted, the understanding of a culture’s 
ideology can be found through diachronic and synchronic analysis of all of its respective 
ideographs. With the identification of these terms, this dissertation continues the ongoing 
analysis of these ideographs over time. It also aids in the theoretical and analytical development 
at the synchronic level. The ideographs will be examined and evaluated in accordance with each 
other within a specified context. This synchronic analysis also illuminates various nuances, such 
as political ironies, manipulation of terminology, and control of narratives, within American 
ideology as it addresses the minutiae of these ideographs and how they function collectively to 
perpetuate power imbalance. 
 This dissertation advances the theoretical development of the ideograph beyond the 
limitations of the American political lexicon. As Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008) 
have noted, events can also function in an ideographic manner. In their work regarding 
constructing <9/11> as an ideograph, they argue that ideographs can transcend specific instances 
of language. It is in accordance with this concept that the dissertation advances theoretical 
development. This project argues that <Snowden>, in transcending beyond the simple 
signification of a name to a person, functions at the ideographic level. As the ideograph develops 
a broader scope, becoming more inclusive of non-linguistic artifacts, the dissertation posits that 
<Snowden> can be conceptualized as functioning in an ideographic manner. While not all 
references to Snowden function ideographically, there is a distinct abstraction process of 




and the situation surrounding the NSA security leaks, transcend their immediate contextual 
meanings and connote broader, more fluid manifestations of power. <Snowden> becomes more 
than a term appropriated to a particular American citizen. Rather, it becomes a term that 
markedly alters the path of history. Common within American political discourse, yet 
nevertheless ambiguous, <Snowden> warranted governmental behavior which would otherwise 
have been deemed as bizarre and eccentric. The hegemonic power of the U.S. government is 
particularly evidenced in how officials methodically deprived U.S. citizens of whistleblowing 
power, a vital tool of <democracy>. 
 Better understanding of how institutions of power maintain hegemonic ideology and 
control mass consciousness allows for the collective to address inequity. As a piece of critical 
scholarship, this dissertation reifies ideological manifestations of power through symbolism. In 
the end, this piece serves not only as a means of identifying the inner workings of U.S. statist 
ideology, but also as a step toward alleviating the oppression of the populace by the state. The 
dissertation contends that the control of individual and collective cognition is a primary 
obstruction in the realization of a society where citizens can fully engage in the <democratic> 
process. Using ideographic criticism, this dissertation identifies, in the name of progress, the 





Chapter 4:  THE <SNOWDEN> IDEOGRAPH 
1. Introduction 
 Having revealed the covert surveillance tactics of the U.S., which violated laws and 
agreements, both domestic and abroad, the <Snowden> disclosures served as serious threats to 
U.S. hegemony. In order to combat these threats, U.S. officials labored to control the 
<Snowden> narrative in their favor. U.S. officials systematically began a controlled public media 
trial against <Snowden> wherein Snowden was transformed from a specific referent to a person 
to a political abstraction laden with ideological meaning. The discourse of the trial set the 
American public against itself as it assaulted certain fundamental tenets of <democracy> in the 
name of <security>. The subtexts of the paradox as constructed by U.S. officials absolved the 
U.S. of culpability, prosecuted <Snowden>, undermined American civil <liberties>, and 
perpetuated a state of fear of <terrorism>. This chapter identifies how U.S. officials imparted 
ideology into the term <Snowden> to transform it into a high order political abstraction. A 
synchronic analysis follows which extrapolates upon the subtexts of <Snowden> as an 
ideological construct. 
 Engaging in an exposition of the four qualifying elements of an ideograph as they relate 
to <Snowden> requires a contextual understanding of the evolution of the ideograph. As 
originally conceptualized, ideographs are ambiguously defined, culturally specific, ideologically 
powerful terms used regularly within political discourse (McGee, 1980). While McGee’s (1980) 
original postulations required ideographs to be linguistic, recent scholarship envisions that 
ideographs are far more expansive. Edwards and Winkler (1997) theorize that ideographs 
transcend the purely linguistic realm. As well, Armenic and Craig (2004) posit that significant 




rather the names of people, can evolve into ideographs. Despite the advancement in application, 
the criteria for ideographic construction remain the same. Ideographs have four distinct 
characteristics: regularity within political discourse, definitional ambiguity, cultural uniqueness, 
and they warrant ideological power (McGee, 1980). The following subsections apply these 
characteristics to <Snowden> to demonstrate how, while an outward referent to a particular 
person, <Snowden> functions at an ideographic level. Shortly after the revelations are made 
public, Snowden enters the narrative as the person responsible. As the narrative progresses, U.S. 
officials and media alike assist in fashioning the <Snowden> abstraction. It is common practice 
for rhetoricians to signify ideographs by placing them in carats. This chapter will contain two 
instances of Snowden:  Snowden and <Snowden>. References without carats are specific of 
Snowden as a person within the narrative. References with carats signify the <Snowden> 
ideograph. 
 As will be extrapolated within the analysis, the <Snowden> abstraction afforded the U.S. 
government significant control over the narrative. While Snowden’s actions were illegal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the domestic surveillance tactics of U.S. security agencies were 
also unlawful. As the narrative unfolded, U.S. officials methodically conflated Snowden with 
numerous antagonists of U.S. hegemony, and, enveloped <Snowden> within a palpable 
ambiguity. Through multiple process of abstraction, U.S. officials systematically indemnified 
themselves of wrongdoing and criminalized not only Snowden, but also, the ideological concept 
of <Snowden>. The abstraction process afforded U.S. officials the ability to maintain an ongoing 
fear of terrorism. As a result, government officials effectively defended governmental overreach 




ideograph, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> to sustain the illegal practices Snowden had 
reified.  
2. Constructing <Snowden> 
2.1 Political Regularity 
 In the immediate wake of the leaked documents The Guardian published in June 2013, 
which revealed the illegal surveillance practices of U.S. security organizations, <Snowden> 
existed almost exclusively as a referent to the person, Edward Snowden. Prior to the leaks, 
<Snowden> was entirely absent from the American political narrative.  Immediately after the 
revelations however, <Snowden> became a focal point within daily political discourse. A Lexis-
Nexis search specific to this study was conducted to populate any news report that mentioned 
“Edward Snowden” in the two weeks following the initial leaks on June 5, 2013. The search 
yielded 1,968 results. Quite clearly, <Snowden> rapidly became commonplace within the 
American political narrative. In a similar Lexis-Nexis search, “Edward Snowden” appeared in 
937 news media stories in the month of June, 2015, a full two years after the initial release of 
classified U.S. security documents. While the appearance of <Snowden> decreased over time, 
most certainly the relevance of <Snowden> as a topic of political discourse overall was 
maintained. 
 Vital to this dissertation is the recognition that <Snowden> not only existed regularly in 
mediated discourse, but that many of these instances were engagements with U.S. government 
officials. In the two years after the <Snowden> revelations, government officials publicly 
discussed <Snowden> in 126 press events, thus producing 126 artifacts for this dissertation. In 
each of the 126 artifacts analyzed, <Snowden> was directly mentioned at least once. Within the 




references to <Snowden>, sustained over time, indicates the importance of <Snowden> within 
the narrative. 
 These data demonstrate the fulfillment of the first ideographic requirement: consistency 
within political discourse. While <Snowden> was entirely absent from the political narrative 
prior to the <security> disclosures, with a certain immediacy, <Snowden> became commonplace 
within national and international politics. The regularity of <Snowden> within U.S. political 
discourse endured over time which further supports this first clause. As the <Snowden> story-
arch developed, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> as a rhetorical instrument to obscure public 
perception. The constancy of <Snowden> within the political discourse thus, directly relates to 
the ideographic characteristic of ambiguity. 
2.2 Ambiguity 
As the discourse developed, there was almost an immediate separation of <Snowden> the 
concept from Snowden the person. Thrust into the political narrative, <Snowden> quickly 
became the primary focus of intense political debate. Instantly, disputes arose as to whether 
<Snowden> should be considered a hero or a traitor (Hampson, 2013). <Snowden> rapidly 
became paramount in discussions of <terrorism> (Miller and Horwitz, 2013), was compared with 
whistleblowers like Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning (Bradsher, 2013), was falsely 
suspected of working with WikiLeaks (Feinstein, 2013, June 23) and was erroneously accused of 
operating as a Chinese spy (Fox News, 2013, June 14). The metamorphosis from Snowden as a 
person to <Snowden> as a malleable political concept began instantaneously. At the 
terminological level, <Snowden> invariably became entrenched within an already vehement 
political atmosphere. In this, the utility of <Snowden> within a political context became 




A primary indicator to the ambiguity of an ideograph is the ability of powerful political 
agents to use political abstractions regardless of public perception. As of July 28, 2015, 167,954 
signatures had amassed on the White House’s petition site asking for Edward Snowden to be 
pardoned of all potential crimes (Rhodan, 2015). The petition was created on June 9, 2013, 
immediately after the release of the NSA documents, and claims:  
Edward Snowden is a national hero and should be immediately issued a full, free, and 
absolute pardon for any crimes he has committed or may have committed related to 
blowing the whistle on secret NSA surveillance programs. 
Polls directly following the <Snowden> leaks indicated the deep complexities of the 
circumstance. A 2013 USA Today/Pew Research Poll showed that while 54% of Americans 
thought <Snowden> should be prosecuted, as opposed to 38% who did not, the public was torn 
49% to 48% as to whether they approved or disapproved of the American security practices 
<Snowden> revealed (Page, 2013). While the American populace remained uncertain regarding 
<Snowden> and surveillance, publicly, U.S. officials were markedly firm in their views. Rather 
than deliberate openly, U.S. officials worked swiftly to control the <Snowden> narrative. One of 
the most illuminative examples of the manufacturing of the <Snowden> construct was the 
engineering of the aforementioned debate as to whether <Snowden> should be deemed as a hero 
or a traitor.  
On Good Morning America on June 10, 2013, Speaker of the House John Boehner stated 
of <Snowden>: “He's a traitor….. the disclosure of this information puts Americans at risk. It 
shows our adversaries what our capabilities are and it's a giant violation of the law.” As well, on 
June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers 




citizens, and associated <Snowden> with North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia, all of 
whom have strained relationships with the U.S. This posture by U.S. officials was sustained 
throughout the narrative. On May 28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, Secretary of State John 
Kerry branded <Snowden> as a coward who betrayed his country.  
 In addition to the disassociation of <Snowden> from concerns of governmental 
overreach, the ways in which U.S. officials and media pundits referred to <Snowden> further 
fostered the ambiguity. <Snowden> was applied to numerous international political matters. 
Indicative of the interweaving of <Snowden> into international political discourse was an 
exchange between the press and State Department Press Office Director Patrick Ventrell on June 
25, 2013. Ventrell is asked “Patrick, a couple questions on China.” Before the reporter can finish 
the question another member of the press interrupted, asking if the question was going to be 
related to <Snowden>. When the initial reporter responded “Yes, on Snowden”, Ventrell asserted 
“It’s all related.” Ventrell’s affirmation indicated the conflation of <Snowden> with international 
politics writ large, demonstrating the extensive applicability of <Snowden> within the discourse. 
This conflation was again seen on August 12, 2013 in a press conference with State Department 
Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf. Harf asks to move the conversation away from Syria. The first 
reporter responded plainly “Russia, Snowden”. Such exchanges further accentuated the 
coalescence of <Snowden> with topics of perceived political significance. 
In a series of press conferences with White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in the 
summer of 2013, <Snowden> was referenced in numerous different ways within the discourse 
surrounding Russia’s relationship with the U.S. including the “Snowden situation” (2013, June 
24), the “Snowden case” (2013, July 17), the “Snowden matter” (2013, August 1), the “Snowden 




2013, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki was asked a “non-Snowden Russia 
question” as if to insinuate an inherent correlation between <Snowden> and U.S./Russia 
relations. Furthermore, in a press conference on August 6, 2013, Psaki was asked about the 
relationship between the U.S. and Russia with regard to “the Snowden thing.” This positioned 
obscurity of <Snowden> functioned to support the broad utility of the term in political discourse. 
In these references, there are no direct conversations regarding <Snowden>, as the respective 
questions and answers revolved solely around U.S. and Russia relations. 
Similarly in press conferences with Carney regarding U.S. and China relations, 
<Snowden> existed at the crux of international tensions as <Snowden> appeared as the 
“Snowden situation”, the “Snowden story”, and the “Snowden affair” on June 26, 2013, the 
“Snowden case,” the “Snowden circumstance,” the “Snowden issue” on July 12, 2013, and the 
“Snowden dispute” and the “Snowden matter” on August 1, 2013. Even in a discussion regarding 
LGBTQ rights, the term <Snowden> appeared multiple times. Harf was questioned on July 31, 
2013 regarding the calls to boycott Russia in the wake of Putin’s inflammatory comments on 
homosexuality when vague references to the “Snowden case” were made twice. In addition to 
the pertinence of <Snowden> in international relations, the applicability of <Snowden> existed 
in domestic politics as well. 
In discussions on national politics, regarding domestic surveillance, <Snowden> occurred 
with a significant level of vagueness. In a press conference on June 11, 2013, Carney admitted 
that the “Snowden incident” had sparked worthy discussion on government surveillance 
concerning who should be authorized with access to U.S. surveillance systems. In a Department 
of Defense press conference on June 26, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel mentioned the 




“one more Snowden thing” in regards to passport questions in a press conference on July 10, 
2013. There was a reference to the “Snowden saga” in the opening of Meet the Press on July 28, 
2013. Likewise, in a Hardball interview aired on December 5, 2013 with Chris Matthews, 
President Obama referred to the “Snowden disclosures” and how they relate to NSA procedures. 
As Obama expounded upon these “disclosures”, he elucidated a key underpinning of this project: 
the innate tension between <security> and <liberty>. The direct relationship between 
<Snowden> and this historic conundrum amplified the ideographic nature of <Snowden> as it 
was being used in the rhetorical posturing of powerful politicians. 
Political posturing by U.S. officials assisted in the <Snowden> abstraction process. 
Government officials regularly made broad, unwarranted accusations of <Snowden> in order to 
publicly associate <Snowden> with unfavorable concepts and concurrently indemnify U.S. 
officials of wrongdoing. On June 23, 2013 in an interview on Meet the Press, Rogers states 
“Well, it’s concerning. Obviously, what appears to be as of today that he is flying-- will-- will 
catch another flight from Moscow, many believe to Cuba. We know that there is air traffic from 
Moscow to Cuba, then on to Venezuela. And when you look at it, every one of those nations is 
hostile to the United States. I mean if he could go to North Korea and Iran, he could round out 
his government oppression tour by Snowden.” The assertions made by Rogers were nonsensical 
and never occurred. Yet, in associating <Snowden> with entities that have hostile relations with 
the U.S., Rogers obfuscated <Snowden>. 
Additionally, U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s passport revocation to blur public 
perception of <Snowden>. The U.S. government revoked <Snowden>’s passport when 
<Snowden> was in Hong Kong prior to departing for Russia. Ventrell stated in a press briefing 




had plenty of time to prohibit his travel.” U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s revoked passport as a 
means to further criminalize <Snowden> and deflect attention away from government 
surveillance. At a press conference in Tanzania on July 1, 2013, Obama said “Mr. Snowden, we 
understand, has traveled there without a valid passport, without legal papers.” Psaki also noted 
<Snowden>’s revoked passport on multiple occasions, including in a press briefing on July 10, 
2013: “he does not have a valid U.S. passport.” Carney scrutinized <Snowden>’s travels in a 
press briefing on July 12, 2013, saying “Mr. Snowden should be returned to the United States 
because of the charges filed against him and because -- which is normal practice when you've 
been charged with felonies and the revocation of his passport, because he does not have travel 
papers or a valid passport, that he ought to be returned to the United States, and where he will 
face justice in a system that affords defendants all the rights that every American citizen enjoys.” 
As a distraction maneuver, U.S. officials revoked <Snowden>’s passport and then publicly 
derided <Snowden>’s travel choices, criminalizing <Snowden> for being abroad without a valid 
passport. These rhetorical techniques by government officials deflected public attention away 
from illegal governmental surveillance, and, drowned <Snowden> in discourse ancillary to the 
informed packed within <Snowden>’s revelations. Overall, the existence of <Snowden> within 
these wide-ranging dialogues showcases the ambiguous functionality of the term, which in turn 
lent to the signification of its cultural context. 
2.3 Culturally Bound 
 Showcased in the references below, the revelations of <Snowden> reified inherent 
tensions within American <democracy>, as these disclosures resituated American political 
discourse within the <liberty>/<security> continuum. The <Snowden> discourse evoked intense 




<individual> has within the political realm. <Snowden> also provoked discussion on the 
difficulties a mediated <democracy> faces, particularly within a representative system of 
governance. 
 Revisiting the interview with George Stephanopoulos on Good Morning America on June 
10, 2013, Boehner was asked about the privacy of American citizens in the wake of the 
<Snowden> revelations. Boehner situated his response firmly within American political and 
historical narratives:  
George, throughout our history we've had this tug between our principle responsibility as 
the government to, to keep Americans safe and at the same time, protect their privacy. 
And so there's this balancing act that goes on. And I believe that when you look at this 
program and what it does, we, you'll find that we protect the privacy of the American 
people while at the same time, giving us tools to keep Americans safe and to go after the 
terrorists. 
In the June 23 broadcast of This Week, George Stephanopoulos questioned Director of the 
National Security Agency Keith Alexander on <Snowden> and the implications of the 
revelations. Alexander stated: 
It's clearly an individual who's betrayed the trust and confidence we had in him. This is 
an individual who is not acting, in my opinion, with noble intent. And when you think 
about what our mission is, I want to jump into that, because I think it reflects on the 
question you're asking. You know, my first responsibility to the American people is to 
defend this nation. And when you think about it, defending the nation, let's look back at 
9/11 and what happened. The intel community failed to connect the dots in 9/11. And 




business record FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court], what's sometimes called 
Section 215 and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] 702 -- two capabilities that 
help us connect the dots. The reason I bring that up is that these are two of the most 
important things from my perspective that helps us understand what terrorists are trying 
to do. And if you think about that, what Snowden has revealed has caused irreversible 
and significant damage to our country and to our allies. When -- on Friday, we pushed a 
Congress over 50 cases where these contributed to the understanding and, in many cases, 
disruptions of terrorist plots. 
Alexander’s comments placed the <Snowden> discourse distinctly within an American context. 
By employing the deeply entrenched ideographs of <terrorism> and <9/11>, Alexander 
associated <Snowden> with the primary ideological adversaries of the U.S. The subtext of 
Alexander’s commentary positioned <Snowden> as an antagonist to American culture by 
embedding <Snowden> within the narrative of <terrorism>. The public perceptions of 
<Snowden>, as well as the related political implications, were specific to the U.S. within this 
framework. 
U.S. officials contrasted <Snowden> with American cultural values throughout the 
discourse, particularly through the lens of <terrorism>. Kerry remarked in an interview on May 
28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, almost a full year after the <Snowden> leaks, that <Snowden> 
put Americans at risk and that <Snowden> is not a <patriot>. On January 16, 2015 in a joint 
press conference with the U.K., Obama linked <Snowden> with al Qaeda, a known adversarial 
entity of the U.S. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, who succeeded Jay Carney, in a 
press conference on April 23, 2015 contended that <Snowden> had given insight to <terrorists>, 




claims. The consistent assertion that <Snowden> functioned as an aide for al Qaeda operatives 
vilified <Snowden> within the American narrative. As the perpetrators of <9/11>, al Qaeda has 
resounding significance in American culture. Placing <Snowden> alongside al Qaeda, and 
<terrorism> generally, within the narrative tightly wove <Snowden> into the cultural 
underpinnings of the U.S. 
Demonstrably, <Snowden> has significantly shaped the political landscape of the United 
States. The sustained argument of U.S. officials juxtaposing <Snowden> with American values, 
like <liberty> and <individuality>, indicates the cultural relevance of <Snowden>. The story-
arch of <Snowden> fits within a greater narrative on <terrorism>, and thus the greater political 
narrative of the U.S. The entrenchment of <Snowden> within the cultural narratives of the U.S. 
undergirds the ideological leap that afforded U.S. officials with unassailable power. 
2.4 Warrant of Power 
 The fourth and final characteristic which signifies the ideographic metamorphosis of 
<Snowden> is the wielding of power by ideological institutions through the rhetorical 
manifestations of the <Snowden> terminology. This fourth element distinctively positions the 
ideograph at the intersection of rhetoric and ideology. Ideographs function rhetorically to assist 
ideological powers in controlling the political cognizance of the masses. Indeed, the first three 
elements discussed do not entirely separate ideographs from other political language. The 
ideograph becomes uniquely tied to ideology when it grants and perpetuates unyielding powers 
to institutional bodies, such as those of the state. The rhetorical magnitude of the fourth 
ideographic element behests more nuance than do the previous three. Vital to this distinction is 
the ability to indicate that <Snowden> is utilized to warrant manifestations of ideological power. 




<Snowden> alongside other notable ideographs. In particular, this last characteristic is 
discernable in how <Snowden> is molded into the narrative according to the state’s perspective. 
Pursuant of fortifying <Snowden> as a political abstraction, the discussion of the fourth 
ideographic element is broken down into the subsections of <security>, <liberty>, and 
<freedom>. 
2.4.1 <Security> 
While the unwarranted wielding of power can be seen throughout the entirety of the 
narrative in various ways, it was through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <security> that the 
concept was arguably most identifiable. Commonplace within the discourse was the argument by 
U.S. officials that <Snowden> served as a threat to American <security>. Indicative within these 
arguments was the desired control of the masses by statist institutions. Hence, the most important 
role of U.S. officials was to protect the <security> of the masses rather than protect the <liberty> 
of the masses, a clear shift away from <democratic> principles. 
Carney set a stark contrast between <Snowden> and the <security> of the American 
people on May 1, 2014: 
Well, I would refer you to the Justice Department for the case against Mr. Snowden. Our 
position on him and the fact that he should be returned to the United States where he will 
enjoy all the rights of defendants in this country has not changed. And our position on the 
fact that as senior national security officials have made clear, including intelligence 
officials have made clear, on the fact that those leaks were damaging to our national 
security remains unchanged. So I don't have an update beyond that. The case against him 




The contrast in this case was elevated as Carney heightened the rhetorical implications of the 
leaks by emphasizing the perspective of “senior national security officials”. Carney makes 
similar remarks in six other briefings: July 13, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 31, 2013, 
December 17, 2013, January 7, 2014, and May 29, 2014. In these utterances, Carney reinforced 
the assertion that <Snowden> functioned to the detriment of American <security>. Kerry 
reaffirmed this position stating that <Snowden> was a breach of American <security> on three 
separate occasions, all on May 28, 2014 (CBS This Morning, The Daily Rundown, Good 
Morning America). Thus, as the discourse continued over the period of two years, the position of 
the White House remained steady.  
The denigration of <Snowden> was crucial to the maintenance of power by U.S. 
government officials who placed <Snowden> into a false binary, where <Snowden> was accused 
of being antithetical American ideals. Consistently, U.S. government officials described how 
much damage <Snowden> had caused, particularly within narratives of <terrorism>. Rogers 
evoked elementary dichotomous rhetoric on June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, speaking in the 
literal terms of “good guys” and “bad guys”. He stated in regards to <Snowden>: 
He has jeopardized our national security….. Clearly, the bad guys have already changed 
their ways. Remember, these were counterterrorism programs essentially, and we have 
seen that bad guys overseas, terrorists who are committing and plotting attacks on the 
United States and our allies, have changed the way they operate. We’ve already seen that. 
To say that that is not harmful to the national security of the United States or our safety is 




In a press briefing on July 17, 2013 Carney claimed that <Snowden> caused great harm to 
American national <security>. Carney as well contended on August 1, 2013 that <Snowden> put 
American lives in danger.  
In a speech on U.S. intelligence operations on January 17, 2014, Obama asserted again to 
how disruptive <Snowden> had been to U.S. <security>. 
We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without some capability to penetrate 
digital communications -- whether it’s to unravel a terrorist plot; to intercept malware 
that targets a stock exchange; to make sure air traffic control systems are not 
compromised; or to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank accounts. We are 
expected to protect the American people; that requires us to have capabilities in this field. 
Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies. There is a reason why 
BlackBerrys and iPhones are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know 
that the intelligence services of other countries -- including some who feign surprise over 
the Snowden disclosures -- are constantly probing our government and private sector 
networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, and intercept our 
emails, and compromise our systems. We know that. 
Here, Obama set <Snowden> as the antithesis to the desires of American citizens, equating 
<Snowden> with <terrorism> and cyber-crime, contending that the <Snowden> “disclosures” 
threatened the everyday lives of Americans, from their bank accounts to their travel plans. 
 Despite the discourse, there was little change in the wake of the <Snowden> revelations 
regarding domestic surveillance. In fact, throughout the narrative, U.S. officials used 
<Snowden> to uphold their agenda. Throughout the political and social turbulence created by 




<Snowden> emphasized the interests of individual <privacy> and <liberty>, government 
officials asserted that <Snowden> was a threat to <security>. 
2.4.2 <Liberty> 
 The political contradictions existent within the discourse at the intersection of 
<Snowden> and <security> are particularly poignant when compared to that between 
<Snowden> and <liberty>. As has been mentioned, it is widely understood that the concepts of 
<security> and < liberty> exist in an inherent state of tension with each other. Advances in 
<security> are understood to negatively affect the realization of <liberty> and vice versa. In 
understanding this tension, it can be assumed that <Snowden>’s revelations could have had a 
destructive impact on either the general <liberty> of the American citizenry, or on the general 
<security> of the American citizenry, but not both. In their attempts to absolve themselves of 
culpability in response to the <Snowden> revelations, U.S. officials argued at length that 
<Snowden> severely endangered both the <security> and the <liberty> of the American people. 
Considering the theoretical implications of this position, U.S. officials created for themselves an 
illogical and perplexing position, ignorant of the <liberty>/<security> continuum. <Snowden>’s 
revelations most certainly resituated the American public within the <liberty>/<security> 
continuum; however, the inherent contrast between <security> and <liberty> makes the position 
of U.S. officials inconsistent as they contended that <Snowden> adversely affected both. The 
rhetorical strategy of U.S. officials, albeit irrational, was nonetheless commonplace within the 
narrative of a post-<9/11> America, where the tension between <security> and <liberty> is 
inescapably fervent. 
NSA Director General Keith Alexander claimed on June 23, 2013 on This Week that it 




Alexander contended, caused irreversible damage to that process, harming American citizens and 
their allies. Similarly, Obama asserted in a White House presser on December 20, 2013 that the 
U.S. operates under rule of law, and is a country that cares about <privacy> and civil <liberties>. 
In the same breath, while neither confirming nor denying the allegations of <Snowden>, Obama 
denigrated other nations, claiming that the surveillance tactics of more authoritarian regimes are 
far worse than that of the U.S. In essence Obama attempted to avert blame from the U.S. 
government to <Snowden> by claiming that other countries spy on their respective citizenries 
significantly more than the U.S., thus failing to not address the illegal spying done by the NSA. 
As a deflection tactic, Obama’s remarks counterposed American ideals with <Snowden> by 
affiliating <Snowden> with non-democratic states who have fewer civil <liberties>. 
On January 17, 2014 Obama publicly addressed the Department of Justice regarding the 
state of national security in the U.S., seven months after the <Snowden> revelations. 
Moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist 
networks, I believed a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary 
next step in our effort to get off the open-ended war footing that we’ve maintained since 
9/11. And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National Defense University 
last May that we needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between 
security and liberty. Of course, what I did not know at the time is that within weeks of my 
speech, an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark controversies at home and 
abroad that have continued to this day. And given the fact of an open investigation, I’m 
not going to dwell on Mr. Snowden’s actions or his motivations; I will say that our 
nation’s defense depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation’s 




hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our 
people safe, or conduct foreign policy. Moreover, the sensational way in which these 
disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light, while revealing methods 
to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we may not fully 
understand for years to come. 
This excerpt performs two notably conflicting functions. First, Obama worked to emphasize his 
own policy while making <Snowden> seem ancillary to the evolution of U.S. surveillance. 
Obama admitted that societally, American citizens needed to find the right balance between 
<security> and <liberty>, suggesting that the status quo was insufficient. Obama took credit for 
wanting the surveillance practices of the U.S. government revisited, effectively disregarding the 
impact of <Snowden> within that context, as he claimed that the changes to surveillance were 
being reviewed before <Snowden>. Although Obama attempted to delegitimize <Snowden> 
when he outwardly stated that he will not discuss <Snowden>, he was actively, in fact, 
discussing <Snowden>. Second, while Obama labored to diminish the value of <Snowden>, he 
justified the presence of <Snowden> within the narrative. In essence, Obama stated that although 
he admitted the U.S. needed to find the right balance between <security> and <liberty>, the 
answer could not be found via <Snowden>. In this, Obama fixates <Snowden> as oppositional to 
democratic discourse. 
2.4.3 <Freedom> 
 The political irony of U.S. officials is also conspicuous when dissecting the <Snowden> 
discourse in relation to the <democratic> ideal of <freedom>. <Snowden> illuminated the 
fluidity of these ideographs within the discourse, but as well, ignited a public debate as to the 




by exposing U.S. surveillance tactics, he was working in the best interest of American civil 
<liberties> (Starr and Yan, 2013). U.S. officials exerted the complete opposite, stating that by 
disrupting American <security> strategies, <Snowden> had caused grave harm to American 
<freedoms>. Carney claimed on June 24, 2013: 
Let me say this about that question, which is that Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused 
on supporting transparency, freedom of the press, and protection of individual rights and 
democracy is belied by the protectors he has potentially chosen -- China, Russia, 
Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these regimes suggest that his true motive 
throughout has been to injure the national security of the United States -- not to advance 
Internet freedom and free speech. 
Carney was adamant that <Snowden>’s usage of <free> speech was to the detriment of 
American <security>. Carney also contended that <Snowden> operated as a detriment to 
<freedom> and <free> speech. Relatedly on June 24, 2013, Ventrell, in a press briefing, 
forwarded contradictory statements as he condemned the actions of <Snowden> while 
simultaneously contending that the U.S. strongly supports the <freedom> of information: 
Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in 
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of 
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help 
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing 
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe. 
The sweeping statements of Ventrell both celebrated <free> communication and chastised 
<Snowden> for using it. Correspondingly, on July 12, 2013, Psaki fumbled through a press 




Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. Psaki iterated that the U.S. State Department “broadly 
believes in free speech”, but that <Snowden> should not have been allowed a public forum. 
Psaki thus forwarded an argument where <free> speech is only permissible if approved by statist 
powers. This contradictory argumentation of state officials was common throughout the 
<Snowden> discourse. The desired deprivation of <Snowden>’s <free> speech is indicative of 
layers of authoritarianism within the U.S. federal government. 
 The analysis of the rhetoric of U.S. officials within the <Snowden> discourse does not 
forward a normative argument as to what <freedom>, <liberty>, and <democracy> should look 
like. Rather, it is to, first, reify the political contradictions advanced by U.S. officials, and, 
second, to recognize the implications of those arguments. Thus, it is insufficient to say that 
<Snowden> appropriately exercised <freedom> of expression. Likewise, it is an overreach to 
contend that <Snowden> went too far. The most important element of the <Snowden> discourse 
as it relates to ideological manifestations of power is the outright contention by U.S. officials to 
renounce public discussion on the extensive and illegal surveillance overreach revealed by 
<Snowden>. Within the narrative, the U.S. government rejected any possibility that <Snowden> 
worked in the interests of the American citizenry. The irony of the greater discourse is the verbal 
commitment to <freedom> of expression by U.S. government officials, while unequivocally 
silencing the debate created by <Snowden>. U.S. officials pledged support to <democratic> 
discourse, but not if it involved <Snowden>, exacting a posture which was paradoxically non-
democratic. 
2.2.4 Justification 
 The condemnation of <Snowden> was only the beginning of the response by the U.S. 




means. <Snowden> was existent within, and inserted into, extant narratives on concepts like 
<liberty>, <security>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. The successful scapegoating tactics of 
<Snowden> by U.S. officials allowed for the further abstraction of <Snowden> into domestic 
and international political narratives. Through their speaking engagements, U.S. officials 
threatened <Snowden> with felonies and imprisonment, though they were mute on the illegality 
of the NSA’s activities. Certainly it was unlawful for <Snowden> to reveal classified documents, 
but the U.S. Court of Appeals found that the revelations regarding the bulk collection of 
telephone data by the U.S. government was also illegal (Roberts and Ackerman, 2015). 
 Rather than engage and foster <democratic> discourse on the NSA surveillance tactics 
and the information gathered, U.S. officials diverted public attention away from their 
transgressions and the fundamental discussion between <liberty> and <security>. Instead, 
officials promoted faux <democratic> debates focusing on <Snowden> as a political abstraction. 
The <Snowden> revelations ignited discourse on fundamental tensions within American society, 
but that discourse was heavily quelled within the public exchanges between U.S. officials and 
members of the press. Instead of using <Snowden> as a channel through which to engage in 
<democratic> discourse on the complexities of <security>, <liberty>, and <surveillance>, 
<Snowden> became the focal point of the discourse. Indicative of the hegemonic power of the 
U.S. governmental system, U.S. officials focused intently and exclusively on criminalizing 
<Snowden> rather than on the substantive topics that <Snowden> reified.  
The position of U.S. government officials was clear, albeit contradictory, and yet 
seemingly active in the perpetuation of its own hegemony. In part, U.S. officials exacted the 
perpetuation through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <democracy>. As well however, 




<Snowden>, and the associated fears therein, rather than on the substantive discourse 
surrounding the actualization of <democracy> in the U.S. The diversion of the discourse allowed 
for U.S. government officials to continue the preservation of power with little resistance, 
including their covert surveillance tactics. The dissemination of the narrative of fear of 
<terrorism> allowed the hegemonic institution of the U.S. to maintain, if not embolden, its 
totalitarian practices. In casting <Snowden> as the problem, U.S. officials were quietly able to 
continue covert surveillance to advance their greater global military complex. 
2.3 Summary 
 In sum, <Snowden> encompasses all four aspects of the ideograph. <Snowden> existed 
with regularity in American political discourse with far-reaching utility.  The ambiguity allowed 
for <Snowden> to be turned into a term with a negative valence, effectively permitting the U.S. 
government to continue its questionable surveillance practices. Engrained within the narrative of 
American society, officials framed <Snowden> as a threat to the American way of life, hence 
justifying the activities of U.S. surveillance programs. The identifiable evolution of <Snowden> 
throughout the discourse implores a synchronic analysis for the purposes of reifying the 
discursive outgrowths of ideological power. The synchronic analysis is conducted through the 
examination of how <Snowden> intersects with other established ideographs, namely 
<security>, <liberty>, <freedom>, <democracy>, <justice>, and <terrorism>, within the context 
of a propagated trial against <Snowden> as created by U.S. officials. 
3. Synchronic Analysis 
3.1 <Snowden> on Trial 
 The synchronic analysis of <Snowden> in relation to other common ideographs reveals 




legalism which would require Snowden to physically return to the U.S. and enter the judicial 
system. The second is not a trial of legalism, but of public perception. The first was regularly 
called for, yet never occurred through the entirety of the narrative. The second trial, was never 
overtly announced, but has been consistently disseminated by U.S. officials throughout the 
entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. The second trial, packaged through covert rhetorical 
tactics, was propagated by U.S. officials surreptitiously throughout the <Snowden> discourse for 
rights to control public perception. The consistent demands for the <Snowden> legal trial were 
used to distract the American public from the ongoing media trial U.S. officials were 
promulgating, and, more importantly, from illegal NSA surveillance behaviors. Throughout the 
covert trial, U.S. officials prosecuted <Snowden> through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> with 
the American values of <justice>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <democracy>, equating 
<Snowden> with <terrorism> and threats to U.S. <security>. 
3.2 <Snowden>, <Security>, and <Justice> 
 Commonplace throughout the <Snowden> narrative is the assertion by U.S. officials that 
<Snowden> return to the U.S. to face a trial by jury. Using phrases like “due process” and “fair 
trial”, notions that imply <democratic> <justice>, U.S. officials regularly impressed their trial 
against <Snowden> upon the public. On Face the Nation on June 23, 2013 Chair of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee Debbie Feinstein said: 
I want to get him caught and brought back for trial, and I think we need to know exactly 
what he has. He could have a lot, lot more. It may really put people in jeopardy. I don't 
know. But I think the chase is on. And we'll have to see what happens.” 




As you know, Mr. Snowden has been lawfully charged in U.S. courts. He is, as a routine 
matter, and I know we’ve talked about this but it’s very relevant here - persons with 
felony arrest warrants are subject to having their passport revoked. He remains a U.S. 
citizen. We welcome him back to the United States to face the charges against him in 
accordance with due process and U.S. law. 
Psaki again stated that <Snowden> “should return to the United States to face these charges that 
– where he will be accorded a fair trial” in a press conference on July 12, 2013. Carney uttered 
similar statements in a press conference on July 16, 2013: 
And it should be clear when we see discussions about -- or suppositions or discussions 
about the idea that Mr. Snowden is somehow being persecuted, he is a United States 
citizen who has been charged with crimes, and under our system of law, he should be 
afforded every bit of due process here in the United States, and he should return here to 
face trial. 
In fact, the message from U.S. officials that <Snowden> should return to the U.S. to face a “fair 
trial” or “due process” is repeated a total of 23 times throughout the discourse. On June 24, 2013 
Kerry stated in an interview with Elise Labott on CNN: 
Well, the United States, through various agencies, is reaching out to lots of countries in 
an effort to try to secure Mr. Snowden. He needs to come back to America and face the 
justice system based on the choices that he’s made. 
The rhetorical posturing of Kerry was strongly presumptuous of <Snowden>’s culpability. On a 
June 24, 2013 in a press briefing, Carney concurred: 
I would say that we are obviously in conversations and that we are working with them or 




to expel Mr. Snowden back to the United States to face justice for the crimes with which 
he is charged. 
The continued assertion of <Snowden>’s criminality worked to indemnify U.S. officials as it 
directed focus toward the illegalities of <Snowden>, which assisted in the public amnesia of 
unconstitutional U.S. <security> practices. The public trial of <Snowden> was intensified as 
U.S. officials demanded that <Snowden> face <justice>.  
 The claims that <Snowden> be brought to <justice> held rhetorical significance of a 
much greater magnitude than did the claims that <Snowden> face a “fair trial” or “due process”. 
While at the definitional level, such legal speak can have synonymy, rhetorically these 
phraseologies are work rather differently. While the phrases “fair trial” and “due process” served 
paradoxically as accusations against <Snowden>, the utterances that called <Snowden> to be 
brought to justice impose exaggerated guilt. Ventrell stated in a press conference on June 24, 
2013 that: “we hope that the Russian Government will look at all available options to return Mr. 
Snowden back to the U.S. to face justice for the crimes with which he’s charged”. Ben Rhodes, 
Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, emphatically reiterated this 
position eleven times on June 27, 2013 stating that <Snowden> should be brought to <justice> as 
did Obama on June 27, 2013. Correspondingly, Carney’s messages consistently mentioned 
bringing <Snowden> to <justice>, uttering the phrase ten times in five different press 
engagements (July 12, 2013, July 24, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 28, 2013, and February 10, 
2014). In fact, Dan Pfeiffer, Senior Advisor to the President (November 3, 2013), Kerry (May 
28, 2014, CBS This Morning, Today Show), Psaki (May 29, 2014), Harf (August 11, 2014, June 
1, 2015), and State Department Deputy Spokesperson Jeff Rathke (June 15, 2015) all iterated 




<justice>” functioned to project a guilty verdict upon <Snowden>. These connotations are 
particularly indicative of the ideological posturing of U.S. officials. Whereas U.S. officials use 
the definitional values to claim consistency throughout the discourse in regards to <Snowden> 
facing “due process” and <justice>, rhetorically the phraseologies indicate the public trial being 
propagated behind the façade of a requested formal legal trial. U.S. officials further indict 
<Snowden> by contrasting <Snowden> with American values. 
 In nearly every analyzed artifact within this discourse, U.S. government officials not only 
emphasized the criminality of <Snowden>, but set <Snowden> in stark contrast with American 
values to forward a prosecution case. U.S. officials regularly referred to <Snowden>’s felony 
charges throughout the narrative despite clear evidence reifying the illegality of U.S. surveillance 
tactics. The prosecutorial posture of the U.S. government is consistently maintained throughout 
the two years of discourse. On July 11, 2013, Carney contended:  
But let me say that our position on Mr. Snowden is what it was, which is that we believe 
that, and have communicated this to numerous countries, that he should be returned to the 
United States, where he faces felony charges and is accused of serious crimes. 
On May 29, 2015 Carney reiterated: “What I can say is there’s been no change in our position. 
Mr. Snowden is accused of leaking classified information, and he faces felony charges here in 
the United States.” Exemplified by Carney’s statements, the rhetorical posture of the U.S. 
government remained unchanged over the course of the first two years of the <Snowden> 
discourse. 
Rogers expanded the accusation of <Snowden> on January 19, 2014 on Face the Nation 





There's some security things that he did get around that were clearly above his 
capabilities. The way he departed and how he ended up in Moscow -- now, we still have 
some questions there, but I can guarantee you he's in the loving arms of an FSB agent 
right today, and that's not good for the United States and it's not good for the information 
to be shared with nation-states. That actually hinders and will cost us billions of dollars, 
by the way, Bob, to try to rectify the problems he's caused in the military operations. 
Not only was <Snowden> juxtaposed with <security> in these statements, <Snowden> was 
accused of using his privileges to escape the U.S. This is a rhetorical move by Rogers to 
disparage <Snowden> by counterposing <Snowden> with the average American. Although 
<Snowden> claimed to have worked in interests of the American public, Rogers contends the 
opposite, attempting to create a stronger prosecution case against <Snowden>. A devaluation of 
<Snowden> through the association with unwarranted privilege, coupled with an accusation of 
an intimate relationship with Russian intelligence (RSB), functioned to move the discourse and 
public perception in favor of U.S. government officials. Obama advanced himself as the catalyst 
for public debate on issues of national <security>, dismissing the efficacy of <Snowden>. By 
claiming to have created the debate, Obama disenfranchised <Snowden> in the political context, 
wrongly asserting that <Snowden> was an ancillary element of the discourse. Obama made 
similar claims in a White House press conference on August 9, 2013 in reference to the 
reevaluation of U.S. surveillance tactics as he acknowledged that while <Snowden> may have 
made the discourse more exciting for the press, Obama planned to create the same change 
“without putting at risk our national security”. Obama admitted that America needed to find a 
productive balance between <security> and <liberty>, but that <Snowden> served as an 




 The criminalization of <Snowden> was also used as a means to elevate the position of 
U.S. officials within the public debate between <security> and <liberty>. As <Snowden> was 
equated with criminality, <Snowden> was cast as a detriment to national <security> and was 
fashioned as an impediment to public discourse.  When used in consistent repetition, the strategy 
of U.S. officials indicted <Snowden> while muting both dissent against American systems of 
surveillance and <democratic> discourse regarding <Snowden> and American values. 
3.3 <Snowden> and <Democracy> 
 In functioning to criminalize <Snowden> and indemnify U.S. officials within the 
manufactured trial of <Snowden>, the discourse surrounding the disclosures also challenged 
inherent values of <democracy>. Analysis of the <Snowden> discourse reveals that U.S. 
government officials regularly juxtaposed <Snowden> with <democratic> ideals. 
On June 24, 2013 in a press conference, Carney discussed <Snowden> alongside 
<democracy> and other notable ideographs: 
…Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused on supporting transparency, freedom of the 
press, and protection of individual rights and democracy is belied by the protectors he has 
potentially chosen -- China, Russia, Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these 
regimes suggest that his true motive throughout has been to injure the national security of 
the United States -- not to advance Internet freedom and free speech. 
Carney’s categorization of political actors within this statement is indicative of the prosecutorial 
stance of the U.S. government. While <Snowden> claimed he had acted on behalf of the people 
for the betterment of American <democracy>, Carney paralleled <Snowden> with notable non-
democratic regimes (China, Russia, and Ecuador). The rhetorical posturing of the U.S. 




conflation of <Snowden> with countries deemed to lack <freedoms> of expression, like China, 
Russia, and Ecuador, postulated that <Snowden>, and in particular the ideals that informed 
<Snowden>, were un-American. The recognition of <Snowden> as a political abstraction is 
paramount here. The inference of Carney’s rhetoric attempted to place anyone, including 
American citizens who supported the mission of <Snowden>, in opposition to American 
<democracy>. 
 At an international press engagement in Senegal on June 27, 2013 Obama, exercised a 
rhetorical move which again presupposed <Snowden> as the antithesis to <democracy>. In his 
address, Obama counterposed <democracy> against <Snowden> as he transitioned from 
<democracy> to <Snowden>, and then back to <democracy>. The language used in these 
commentaries, in particular the transitions from topic to topic, was telling. In the relevant section 
of the dialogue, Obama was asked a two part question. The first inquiry was regarding the 2013 
Supreme Court decision to strike down provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, and the 
second was in regards to <Snowden>. While Obama responded in the order of the questions, the 
contrast which ensued was significant. 
But in the wake of this Supreme Court ruling, surely we can all agree that people should 
be able to vote. They shouldn't be restricted from voting or have to jump through a whole 
bunch of hoops in order to vote, and that there should be some uniformity in terms of 
how that right is upheld. It's the cornerstone of our democracy. It's what makes our 
democracy work. With respect to Mr. Snowden, we have issued through our Justice 
Department very clear requests to both initially Hong Kong and then Russia that we seek 
the extradition of Mr. Snowden. And we are going through the regular legal channels that 




personally or President Putin personally. And the reason is because, number one, I 
shouldn't have to. This is something that routinely is dealt with between law enforcement 
officials in various countries. And this is not exceptional from a legal perspective. 
Number two, we've got a whole lot of business that we do with China and Russia. And 
I'm not going to have one case of a suspect who we're trying to extradite suddenly being 
elevated to the point where I've got to start doing wheeling and dealing and trading on a 
whole host of other issues simply to get a guy extradited, so that he can face the Justice 
system here in the United States. 
Obama carried on regarding Snowden and was asked if there was any more damage that 
<Snowden> could do. 
In the meantime, we've got other business to do. For example, we're here in Africa and I 
don't want people to forget why we're here……We're seeing countries like Senegal that 
have sustained democracy and have sustained peace for many years who want to partner 
with us, who are making sacrifices in places like Mali to maintain regional stability. 
Within the entire discourse, Obama contested that <Snowden> was inconsistent with 
<democracy>. Advantageous to the prosecution of <Snowden>, Obama positioned <Snowden> 
as an inhibitor of <democratic> progress. The rhetorical implication of “In the meantime” was 
particularly significant, as it simultaneously emphasized <democracy> while destabilizing 
<Snowden>. It demarcated the <Snowden> actions as detrimental to the progress of 
<democracy> and adversative to <democratic> principles. Obama enveloped the discourse 
regarding <Snowden> with discourse on <democracy>, creating a stark contrast between the 
two. By moving from <democracy>, to <Snowden>, then back to <democracy>, Obama created 




The juxtaposition is evident not only through the analysis of the intersection of 
<Snowden> and <democracy>, but also through an analysis of the intersection of <Snowden> 
and <democracy>’s principles. On June 24, 2013 Carney, expressed contempt for <Snowden> 
and placed the <Snowden> abstraction as antithetical to <freedom>, a <democratic> principle. 
The claims here attested that <Snowden> was un-American by association. By Carney’s logic, it 
matters not what <Snowden> did, but rather who was keeping <Snowden> safe. “When it comes 
to Mr. Snowden, he’s been indicted for the unauthorized release of classified information. And, 
again, I think the point I made is that if his passion here is for press freedom and freedom of the 
Internet and the like, that he has chosen unlikely protectors.” 
Carney here admitted the tension between the U.S. government and <Snowden> although 
both of these entities claimed to be working in the name of <freedom> and <liberty>. Rather 
than engage the nuances of the dilemma, Carney employed a logically fallacious argument 
stating that in this matter, <Snowden>, through the states within which he has found asylum, was 
antithetical to <democracy>. Carney conflates <Snowden> and <Snowden>’s supporters with 
authoritarianism. 
 Ventrell, echoed Carney’s sentiments claiming that if <Snowden> was concerned about 
<freedom> of press and <freedom> of the internet, he chose some unlikely state asylums: 
I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that 
he’s about freedom of the internet and freedom of information, of course, would seek out 
some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow 
of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that. 




Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in 
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of 
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help 
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing 
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe. 
Ventrell’s flawed logic was similar to Carney’s in attesting that because <Snowden> had found 
asylum in non-democratic states, his motives must have been non-democratic. Claiming that the 
U.S. has always been a proponent of the <freedom> of information, Ventrell exposed an 
underlying political conundrum within the discourse. This propagation is, of course, hypocritical, 
as Ventrell is concurrently prosecuting <Snowden>, who, through freedom of information, 
exposed covert governmental surveillance. There was an operative chasm between the actions of 
<Snowden> and the constructs put forth by U.S. government officials, who, in denying the 
efficacy of <Snowden>, claimed identical actions as <democratic> when they did not relate to 
<Snowden>.  
The generated opposition between the abstractions of <Snowden> and <democracy>, 
further indicted <Snowden> within the manufactured public trial. Yet, contrary to the façade 
built by U.S. officials who contended that Snowden should return home to face trial, 
ideologically, U.S. officials were better served if Snowden remained abroad. In reality, officials 
did very little beyond lip service to have Snowden extradited. If Snowden was a true threat to 
U.S. hegemony, Snowden would have been sought with much greater fervor. Edward Snowden’s 
absence actually allowed for the perpetuation of <Snowden> as a political abstraction, which 




were able to continue to prosecute <Snowden> in front of the American people within the greater 
<terrorism> narrative. 
3.4 <Snowden> and <Terrorism> 
American political discourse saw an historic shift with the events of <9/11>. In the 
aftermath, <terrorism> immediately became one of the most prominent ideographs within the 
historical narrative of the U.S. While the American public had feared <communism> for 
decades, those fears progressively waned after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Without 
any impending threat to American hegemony at the turn of the century, <terrorism>, as an 
abstraction, had little interference as it quickly began to inform the cognizance of the American 
citizenry with the events of <9/11>. As <terrorism> gained salience within political discourse. 
<Snowden> fits distinctively within the post-<9/11> discourse on <terrorism>, <security>, and 
<counterterrorism> efforts. 
 In the immediate wake of <Snowden>, U.S. officials were quick to associate <Snowden> 
with <terrorism> and accuse <Snowden> of aiding “the enemy”. Boehner contended that U.S. 
surveillance programs were vital tools for fighting against <terrorists> and denounced 
<Snowden> as a traitor on June 10, 2013. On June 23, 2013, in an interview on Meet the Press, 
Rogers argued that because of <Snowden>, <terrorists> immediately began changing the ways 
they communicated. Rogers went on to say that <Snowden> had disrupted <counterterrorism> 
efforts to stop <terrorists> who were then plotting attacks against the U.S. and its allies (June 23, 
2013). That same day on Face the Nation, Feinstein asserted that <Snowden> had significantly 
damaged <counterterrorism> programs that had disrupted over fifty <terrorist> plots. In an 
interview as well on This Week on June 23, 2013, Alexander issued a similar argument as he 




further contended that <Snowden> had done irreversible damage to America and its allies, and 
made America vulnerable to <terrorist> attacks. On CBS This Morning on May 28, 2014 Kerry 
called <Snowden> disgraceful, and accused <Snowden> of telling <terrorists> what they could 
do to avoid detection. The relationship between <Snowden> and <terrorism> was further 
emphasized throughout the discourse as <Snowden> was often used as a discursive segue into 
<terrorism> and vice versa.  
 While <Snowden> and <terrorism> were often treated as separate talking points, the 
transitional regularity with which they were used reinforced the relational significance through 
rhetorical association, further criminalizing <Snowden> and enforcing public perception of the 
trial by media. On July 2, 2013, in a State Department press briefing, Psaki was asked a question 
about <terrorism> in Pakistan, after which Psaki was asked a question on <Snowden>. Likewise, 
Carney fielded a question on <terrorism> and unrest in Egypt at a press conference on July 8, 
2013. Directly after Carney’s response, a reporter asked to “switch” the conversation to 
<Snowden>. Carney briefed the press again on July 9, 2013 and was asked one question on 
<Snowden>, which was interestingly placed between a question regarding Guantanamo Bay, 
where Carney addressed <terrorism> <justice>, and a question on Afghanistan and the Taliban, 
staple entities within the <terrorism> narrative. 
It was as if that <Snowden> served only as a means through which to discuss 
<terrorism>. On the July 28, 2013 edition of Meet the Press, host David Gregory interviewed 
Rogers on the NSA and American <security> generally. Rogers responded by describing 
American surveillance programs, emphasizing them as <counterterrorism> efforts. <Snowden> 
was not mentioned in the entire discussion until Gregory signaled closure, stating: “Chairman, 




remarks on a variety of topics, predictably relating <Snowden> to Russia and <terrorism>. While 
<Snowden> and <terrorism> were treated as separate topics, they were conflated through 
association within the discourse. On August 5, 2013 Carney was being asked a long series of 
questions at a press briefing on <terrorism>, <counterterrorism>, and al-Qaeda. Almost naturally 
the discussion transitioned to <Snowden>: “And we are obviously continuing to gather 
information to work with our partners and allies as we do that to combat this threat and the 
overall threat posed by terrorist organizations that wish us harm”. A reporter then immediately 
responded “And on Edward Snowden”. After two statements by Carney on <Snowden>, the 
conversation shifts once again back to <terrorism>. As well, after answering a series of questions 
on <Snowden> in a press briefing on August 12, 2013, Harf signaled for a new subject. The next 
four questions were all distinctively about <terrorism>. These outlined exchanges, where two 
seemingly unrelated discussions on <terrorism> and <Snowden> occur successively, happened 
regularly over the course of the first two years after the <Snowden> revelations. Furthermore, in 
assessing the discourse within the entirety of the 126 artifacts, only 19 artifacts do not directly 
associate <Snowden> with <terrorism>, issues of national <security>, or political violence. 
Such segues showcase the informative power ideology has over discourse. Functioning to 
manipulate cognizance, ideological structures of American exceptionalism adamantly associated 
<Snowden> with <terrorism>. The regularity of discursive transitions from <Snowden> to 
<terrorism>, and vice versa, exhibit the ideological control over the progressions of thought 
among the media and U.S. officials, and thus, the American public. The conflation of 
<Snowden> and <terrorism> functioned not only as a scapegoating mechanism, but it created 




<terrorism>, debates were formulated which forcibly shifted discourse into faux <democratic> 
discourse. 
4. Discussion 
The recognition of <Snowden> as a facilitator the objectives of <terrorism> operated 
rhetorically to afford U.S. officials the ability to maintain their positions of power. As 
<Snowden> is accused of aiding <terrorist> organizations, <Snowden> allows U.S. officials the 
rhetorical leap to set <Snowden> as the antithesis to American ideals. Insofar as <terrorism> has 
been established as the enemy of American values, <Snowden> too is cast as the enemy of 
America. The mediated prosecution of <Snowden> juxtaposed <Snowden> against the welfare 
of the American citizenry. Discursive agents propagating the <Snowden> trial became quickly 
fixated upon the character concerns of <Snowden>. As the debate was steered toward 
<Snowden> within the greater discourse on <terrorism>, and effectively away from 
governmental surveillance, actual discussions on <terrorism> writ large were clandestinely 
suppressed. American citizens were made witnesses of a dialogue where <Snowden> was argued 
as a hero or a traitor. In result, the deeper conversations on the relationship between <liberty> 
and <security> within a <democracy> was largely ignored. For instance, debates on 
<Snowden>’s <patriotism> ignored the critical inquiries which engaged the structural elements 
of <terrorism>, and the basis for <terrorism> fears altogether. Centering the discourse on 
<Snowden> assumed the reality of <terrorism> and yet failed to critique capitalistic and statist 
structures that created, enabled, and perpetuated <terrorist> activities. 
The conflation of <Snowden> with <terrorism> reinforced the ideology of American 
exceptionalism, and effectively obstructed critical discourse which questioned American 




media trial, the prosecution team of U.S. officials worked to classify <Snowden> with arguably 
the most rebuked nomenclature of a post <9/11> world: <terrorism>. Successful rebranding of 
<Snowden> within the narrative of the trial worked as well to indemnify U.S. officials of 
governmental illegality, and granted U.S. officials carte blanche in the continued implementation 
of domestic surveillance practices. 
 Like any narrative, <terrorism> needs systematic reinforcement in order to maintain 
relevance. <Terrorism>’s power within the political arena can only be maintained if it is 
consistently elemental within the discourse. Acts of <terrorism> alone do not advance a narrative 
of <terrorism>. A strong narrative of <terrorism> does not need a <terrorist> attack so long as 
the fear of a <terrorist> attack is maintained. Contrarily, <terrorism>, even when exacted, only 
needs a mass medium in order to maintain relevance within the narrative. The perpetuation of the 
fear allows the state to garner greater powers through the dissolution of civil <liberties> in the 
name of <security> against <terrorism>, thus U.S. officials tied major events like <Snowden> to 
<terrorism> and exploited it. 
Throughout the 126 artifacts of the study, terms of <terrorism> (terrorism, terrorist, and 
counterterrorism) are mentioned 579 times. The artifacts of this study were chosen specifically 
because they were press engagements with U.S. officials where <Snowden> existed within the 
discourse. Within the two years after <Snowden>’s revelations, <Snowden> appeared 770 times 
within the discourse. In recognizing that the presence of <terrorism> was not a filter in 
compiling the artifacts, it can be argued that <Snowden> serves significant utility for the 
preservation of American hegemony within the <terrorism> story-arch. <Snowden> afforded 
institutions of power the ability to continue to perpetuate the narrative of <terrorism>. As 




propagation of fear grew in its salience. Since the centralized government in the U.S., a 
<democratic> institution, cut the basic civil <liberties> of its citizens in the name of <security>, 
such impacts are incontrovertibly substantial. 
The prosecution of <Snowden> generated a paradox for the American citizenry. 
<Snowden> represented American civil <liberties> and resistance to illegal governmental 
surveillance. U.S. officials, however, positioned <Snowden> through public discourse in a 
manner that put American civil <liberties> on trial. Unbeknownst to the American citizenry, it 
has been set up against itself. While Snowden represented the revolution against governmental 
overreach, U.S. officials have fabricated <Snowden> into the antithesis of American 
<democracy>. Rather than recognizing covert governmental surveillance as un-American, U.S. 
officials reproached <Snowden> and political dissidents broadly. The successful implementation 
of the <Snowden> mythos served the purposes of hegemonic ideology as it set the American 
public against itself. This position is particularly significant in the context of <freedom> of 
expression within a <democracy>. According to its theorization, <democracy> inherently allows 
for agonistic discourse. Ergo, <democratic> theorization sanctions, indeed welcomes, the 
contestation between <citizens> who feel their civil <liberties> have been violated, and their 
elected officials. The evocation of criminality in association with actors and actions like 
<Snowden> is markedly authoritarian. The political ironies identified in these analyses, along 
with the recognized perpetuation of authoritarianism within the <Snowden> discourse, are 
illuminative of the ideological powers of <Snowden> and ideographs generally. 
As was originally theorized by McGee (1980), ideographs function quite powerfully as 
tools of ideology. In this case, <Snowden>, and everything associated with <Snowden>, such as 




and enemies of American <democracy>. Within the narrative of the <Snowden> media trial, not 
only does the prosecution absolve U.S. officials of culpability, it justified the dissolution of 
certain civil <liberties> through the perpetuation of the myth of <terrorism>. Effectively thus, 
U.S. officials were able to turn Snowden, a civil <liberties> advocate, into <Snowden>, the 
antithesis to American <democracy>.  
 The ideographic utility of <Snowden> informs a multitude of non-<democratic> 
tendencies within U.S. governmental bodies. <Snowden> served as an illusion of <democratic> 
discourse, effectively deterring public attention away from increasing infringements upon civil 
<liberties> in the name of <security>. U.S. officials used <Snowden> to perpetuate faux 
<democratic> discourse through a covert media trial. As well, <Snowden> was propagated to 
preserve an authoritarian perspective, rooted in fear and perpetuated within a narrative of 
<terrorism>. Despite the illuminative powers of <Snowden> on the illegal and non-
<democratic> surveillance practices of the U.S. government, the narrative of <terrorism> 
forwarded by U.S. officials repudiated public dissent, effectively silencing <democratic> 
discourse surrounding <Snowden>. With substantive <democratic> discourse heavily restrained, 
U.S. government officials faced few impediments in the continuation of authoritarian practices, 
which expanded the propagation of American exceptionalism and hegemonic constructs like 
neoliberalism and neocolonialism. Thus, regardless of Snowden’s best intentions in actualizing 
<democracy> and <democratic> discourse, <Snowden> was utilized to forward the fears of a 
<terrorism> narrative and advance the authoritarian dominance of American hegemony. To this 
end, U.S. officials and their covert surveillance practices are best suited if Snowden never returns 




Although U.S. officials may claim they want a formal Snowden tribunal, they have 
already prosecuted <Snowden> through a public trial. So long as Snowden remains abroad, U.S. 
officials can continue to propagate the narrative of <terrorism> in the name of <Snowden>. 
Through the rhetorical postulations of <Snowden> within the execution of a media trial, the 
ideological institutions of the U.S. keenly used a whistleblower who publicized governmental 
infringement of civil <liberties> to justify the continuation of governmental infringement of civil 
<liberties> through covert surveillance. 
The continued demand by U.S officials that Snowden return to the U.S. functioned to 
conceal the public trial that was propagated against <Snowden>. At this juncture the embedded 
powers of statist ideology are exposed. Through the implementation of a <Snowden> 
prosecution, U.S. officials have been able to use unlawful <counterterrorism> efforts to exact the 
continuation of unlawful, authoritarian <counterterrorism> practices. In the end, neither the 
<security> of U.S. citizens in the face of <terrorism>, nor the protection of American civil 
<liberties>, are the accomplishments of <Snowden>. Rather, the result of the <Snowden> trial is 
the advancement of a statist ideology that functions not out of a <democratic> ethos, but solely 
out of the continued hegemonic domination of a statist ideology which operated unwaveringly to 
maintain the power imbalance of the status quo. Ideologically, <Snowden> functions to forward 
American exceptionalism and the abstract enemy of <terrorism>, within which the ideological 
structures of capitalism and statism are reinforced. As well, in response to <Snowden>, the 
discourse strongly suggests that U.S. officials operated as authoritarians working under the guise 
of <democracy>. Even through high profile dissent like <Snowden>, hegemonic institutions can 
usurp a narrative for the maintenance of their power. Counterbalancing <democratic> ideographs 




<terrorism>, U.S. officials used the revelation of covert governmental surveillance to further 
authenticate, with the approval of the majority of the American public, ongoing covert 
governmental surveillance. 
 Finally, this analysis formulates significant theoretical development for ideographic 
criticism. While scholars have soundly analyzed political terminology and imagery, rhetorical 
scholarship has not yet identified the ways in which social agents are transformed into 
manifestations of ideology. Methodologically, the Snowden ideograph proposes a rich path of 
scholarship for rhetoricians. From the outset, it is reasonable to theorize that a multitude of 
political actors are utilized in the same manner as Snowden. Recalling agents from recent 
history, the rhetorical valence of President Barack Obama is quite different than condemnatory 
allusions to “Obama”. Begrudging mentions of “Hillary” palpably extend beyond a reference to 
Hillary Clinton and the variety of public offices she has held. The Snowden ideograph fosters 
future rhetorical scholarship around the ideological abstraction of public agents. Through this 
analysis it is clear that public figures, particularly those within the political arena, transcend 
beyond corporal existence. Through heavily mediated discourse public persona can often become 
ideological constructs. In many instances, like in the case of Snowden, that construct operates in 
a manner antithetical to the intentions of the original person. In short, <Snowden> was used to 
undermine Snowden. In order to further understand ideology and the interpellation processes 
thereof, significant extrapolation of these phenomena is required. This analysis illuminates how 
institutions of power usurp and rhetoricize public figures for the purposes of their own 
hegemony. Additional, similar research can reify the rhetorical nuances of hegemonic ideologies, 





CHAPTER 5:  <SNOWDEN>, WHISTLEBLOWING, AND <DEMOCRACY> 
1. Introduction 
The development of the <Snowden> ideograph within an overarching whistleblowing 
discourse formalized a significant juncture in U.S. history. The Snowden disclosures occurred at 
a time when the events of <9/11> were becoming less salient and the subsequent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had aged beyond the threshold of a decade. As well, information technology was 
experiencing rapid development and with it a regularity of cybersecurity breaches. Additionally, 
rogue truth-tellers like Julian Assange and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning were garnering 
international attention. Manning, for instance, while serving in the U.S. military, was arrested in 
May, 2010 for releasing hundreds of thousands of war documents through WikiLeaks, which had 
become an entity known for revealing secret government information. 
The upsurge of challenges regarding the ethics of information <security> and the 
increased scrutiny of U.S. security agencies prompted the U.S. federal government to exercise a 
number of initiatives to protect its own systems of information and technology. One of those 
measures was the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012, which provided 
protected channels for federal employees who wished to expose governmental misconduct. The 
WPEA was passed to deter the continued release of top-secret government information. The 
Snowden revelations ignited public discourse on whistleblowing and the protective measures of 
the WPEA. 
Given the polemics over whistleblower distinctions throughout the discourse, this chapter 
constitutes a synchronic ideographic analysis of pertinent, recognized ideographs as they 
interreacted within the discursive tension of whistleblower classification. A synchronic 




synchronic analysis, this chapter first provides an overview of U.S. whistleblower protection 
laws and previous U.S. whistleblowers. The chapter considers Snowden within these contexts. 
The chapter also provides a brief comparative analysis of the whistleblower protection laws of 
other nation states. While whistleblowing can occur in any organization, this chapter focuses 
succinctly on whistleblowers, most notably Snowden, who illuminate government misconduct. 
Through synchronic ideographic analysis, this chapter progresses by discussing the discursive 
ideological manifestations of <Snowden> in accordance with whistleblowing vocabulary. The 
synchronic analysis is formulated into two primary sections. The first part engages the 
intersection of <Snowden> and whistleblowing terminology. In particular, this section 
recognizes the progression of how the U.S. government approached <Snowden> within the 
greater whistleblowing discourse. The second section analyzes the engagement between 
whistleblowing terms and other discursive ideological manifestations, namely <security>, 
<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. Critical valuations are then 
postulated regarding these findings as they relate to the relationships between the citizen and the 
state within the U.S. and <democracy> writ large. 
2. Whistleblower Legislation 
2.1 U.S. Legislation 
The first legislative effort by the U.S. to protect whistleblowers was in 1978 with the 
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). It was the first legislation to afford federal employees of the 
U.S. government with protection rights. In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection 
Act (WPA), which strengthened the CSRA by creating more explicit descriptions of the legal 
protections. The WPEA extended the protections of the WPA to include contractors of the U.S. 




Office of Special Counsel, it legally included protections for whistleblowers who disclose 
information to other sources as well, including the media. The WPEA did not, however, offer 
overt legal protection to subcontractors of the government or their employees. The National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2013 offered additional protection for governmental 
whistleblowers, and even extended those protections for subcontractors of the U.S. government. 
However, the NDAA of 2013, and all subsequent renditions (altered and approved annually), 
explicitly excluded whistleblower protections for employees, contractors, and subcontractors 
within the intelligence community. 
2.2 Comparative Analysis 
A comparative analysis of whistleblower protection laws around the globe indicates that 
the WPA and WPEA are on par with most of their <democratic> international counterparts. 
Iceland, for instance, is recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protection 
laws in the world. Drafted in response to the Icelandic financial crisis in 2008, 
the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI) legally protects whistleblowers and journalists 
alike. The IMMI offers explicit protections for the communication between whistleblowing 
sources and journalists. Furthermore, the IMMI protects journalists who publish information 
which illuminates the unethical or illegal activity of government officials and corporate 
executives. Based on a 2013 report published by Transparancy International, funded by the 
Directorate General of Home Affairs within the European Commission, a branch of the European 
Union (EU) system of governance, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) are all rated to have “comprehensive or near-comprehensive provisions and procedures 
for whistleblowers in the public and/or private sectors” (Worth, 2013, p8). The U.K. for instance, 




protected government employees who disclosed information of public interest directly to news 
media (Worth, 2013). 
All of these whistleblower protection statutes, including that of Iceland, suspend 
protections to whistleblowers who divulge information to outside sources if it is deemed vital to 
national security. This has served as a point of contention outside of just the Snowden case. The 
U.K., while recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protections in the world, 
regularly utilizes its Official Secrets Act (OSA) to protect classified information from being 
published. Originally passed in 1889, the OSA, akin to the U.S. Espionage Act of 1917, has been 
updated four times. The U.K. government has been criticized regularly for being too generous 
with classifying information as relevant for national security (Ala’i and Vaughn, 2014). The 
U.K.’s legislative efforts overrule whistleblower protection laws in favor of national security. 
2.3 U.S. Whistleblower History 
Snowden’s existence in U.S. history is unique, in comparison to other prominent 
whistleblowers. Daniel Ellsberg, former Special Assistant for the U.S. Department of Defense, 
publicly exposed the Pentagon Papers in 1971, long before formal legal protections had been 
outlined for whistleblowers against the U.S. government. Former senior executive of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake faced charges of espionage after he blew the 
whistle in 2005 on fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake’s correspondence occurred 
before the WPEA, but could have potentially qualified for protections under the WPA had they 
not been related to the NSA. Drake contended that he had attempted to follow the appropriate 
protocol but was shut down. Given the available details, Drake was exonerated of all charges 
except one misdemeanor. Manning’s release of classified information could arguably be 




Ellsberg, Drake, or Snowden. Manning’s unrestrained decision to release highly classified 
information pertaining to national security negated any opportunity for whistleblower 
protections. Choosing WikiLeaks as the medium, an organization famous for releasing massive 
amounts of classified information into the public forum, did not help Manning, and Manning was 
arrested, tried, and convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917. As well, as was demonstrated in 
Manning’s trial, whistleblowers are not able to use legal protections like the First Amendment 
(U.S.), the Fourth Amendment (U.S.) or the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967 (U.S.). 
Violations of the Espionage Act negate whistleblower protections, and Manning served seven 
years in federal prison before President Barack Obama commuted the sentence. 
2.4 Snowden and Whistleblower Protection 
 Snowden did not qualify for any whistleblower protections under the WPEA or the 
NDAA. As an employee of a subcontractor within the intelligence community, the U.S. 
government was not obligated to provide Snowden with any protections under U.S. law. 
Furthermore, the NDAA of 2011 authorized the U.S. government to indefinitely detain 
individuals without trial who were deemed as threats to national security. Each subsequent 
rendition of the NDAA maintained or strengthened that dictate. Thus, Snowden could have 
easily been detained without due process by those laws. 
Unlike Julian Assange of WikiLeaks, or Chelsea Manning, who used WikiLeaks, 
Snowden only communicated classified information with longstanding, reputable news agencies. 
Many democratic theorists argue in defense of WikiLeaks. Certainly the argument for freedom of 
information has its validity within liberal democracies, but it is also recognized here that 
WikiLeaks often operates quite haphazardly. Snowden, on the contrary, was methodical, and 




internationally known whistleblower after the passage of the WPEA. Snowden contended that he 
attempted to follow appropriate whistleblower protocol, but was ignored. Snowden then shared 
the information he had gathered with revered institutions of journalism, The Guardian and The 
Washington Post, for them to review. Both of the news outlets, and eventually others, 
systematically revealed information that illuminated surveillance overreach by the U.S. 
government. Given Snowden’s methods, Snowden certainly seems to fit within general 
conceptions of whistleblowing. U.S. officials argued, however, that Snowden violated the 
Espionage Act and threatened national security, and thus had recused himself of legal 
protections. Furthermore, U.S. officials contended that Snowden was not eligible for 
whistleblower protections as he did not follow the established protocol, despite Snowden’s 
admissions otherwise. Given the measures Snowden took, the content of the information that was 
revealed, and the international praise that followed the public disclosures, U.S. officials appear 
stubbornly recalcitrant in their position to deny Snowden whistleblower status. 
The complexities of the Snowden revelations reify a significant quandary in 
<democratic> theory as it relates to whistleblowing. Snowden insisted that he attempted to go 
through appropriate channels on at least ten occasions, but was silenced and ignored. Without 
legal protections as a whistleblower, but with information that served of significant public 
interest, Snowden chose to flee the U.S. to meet with journalists from The Guardian. While U.S. 
officials condemned Snowden for disclosing the information and fleeing the U.S., there is good 
reason to believe that had Snowden remained in the U.S., he would have been detained 
indefinitely and the information never released. Snowden’s decisions were defended by former 




the U.S. intelligence community “have become a criminal enterprise” and that releasing the 
information from a secure location abroad was Snowden’s only viable option (Nelson, 2013). 
 Snowden’s dilemma demonstrates a point of contention within <democratic> 
actualization. Snowden readily admitted that he illegally downloaded and released classified 
information to the media and that in so doing he violated his non-disclosure agreement. 
However, it was also ruled in 2015 that some of the NSA’s surveillance measures, like the bulk 
collection of phone records, were illegal. The Planning Tool for Resource Integration, 
Synchronization, and Management (PRISM), a problematic U.S. security program that collects 
real-time data on U.S. citizens from sites like Facebook and Google, has also been heavily 
scrutinized since Snowden’s disclosures. A public advocate appointed by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, to investigate PRISM concluded in 2016 that the program was patently 
unconstitutional for violating the Fourth Amendment. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board made similar assessments in 2014. Despite these assessments, PRISM was nonetheless 
defended by the FISC magistrate and was reauthorized by Congress in 2018 (Nakashima, 2016).  
 Snowden’s disclosures have shown to have significant value in <democratic> discourses 
on whistleblowing, civil <liberties>, <security>, and governmental surveillance. Public 
knowledge of these surveillance systems stems directly from Snowden’s revelations. The 
disclosures elucidated illegal and unethical behaviors of the U.S. government, yet, the legal 
structures of the U.S., or any nation state for that matter, prohibited and continue to prohibit 
political agents in Snowden’s situation to take action. Snowden’s actions have been defended 
and celebrated on countless fronts, including by prominent <democratic> organizations like 




U.S. government continues to criminalize Snowden and defend its surveillance tactics. 
Furthermore, U.S. officials refused to accept any level of accountability for their illegal actions, 
and have effectively done little to alter their surveillance measures. Perhaps most alarming is the 
refusal to address the shortcomings in whistleblower protections for agents like Snowden. The 
laws that created Snowden’s predicament have only been strengthened since Snowden’s 
revelations, further strengthening the inviability of whistleblowing against the intelligence 
community of the U.S. government. As the forthcoming synchronic analysis reifies, national 
defense is the measure by which statist ideology perpetuates itself.  
3. Whistleblowing and the Ideograph 
3.1 The Classification of Snowden 
Consistently throughout the Snowden discourse U.S. officials and members of the media 
grappled with the legal classification of whistleblowers. In the two public interviews by U.S. 
officials the day after the Snowden saga began, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney (June 
10, 2013) and Speaker of the House John Boehner (June, 10, 2013) were each asked about 
Snowden’s status as a whistleblower. Throughout the first six months of the discourse, press 
agents continued to inquire about Snowden’s whistleblowing status. A full reading of the 
dialogue illuminates three primary postures the U.S. government adopted in relation to 
Snowden’s whistleblower status. In the first phase, U.S officials abstain from discussions on 
Snowden and whistleblowing. Shifting into the second phase, U.S. officials directly address 
Snowden, and outwardly deny Snowden of whistleblower status. The final phase is signified by 
an aversion to discussions on Snowden and the formal purging of whistleblowing from the 
discourse. These three postures shift through the chronology, connoting three distinct phases 




3.2 Phase I: Refrain 
 In the first phase, U.S. officials refrained from forwarding whistleblower distinctions 
altogether, and avoided direct commentary related to Snowden’s distinction as a whistleblower. 
During this phase, the federal government remained publicly observational. While the U.S. 
government largely abstained from commenting on whistleblowing in the opening weeks of the 
Snowden narrative, the public and the press were not so reserved. Sparked by media attention, 
debates on <Snowden> captivated the public. Largely, the debates revolved around how 
Snowden should be classified. The posture adopted by U.S. officials helped in obscuring 
<Snowden> and demonstrates Goodnight’s (1982) private sphere, where political deliberation 
occurs outside of the public forum. Undoubtedly, officials were discussing Snowden behind 
closed doors, but those deliberations were not offered into the public forum during the first 
phase. 
Spanning the immediate two weeks following Snowden’s revelations, the U.S. 
government displayed a precautious posture during the first rhetorical phase. Only five artifacts 
exist in this first phase, despite the regularity with which Snowden appeared in the general news 
discourse. Of the five artifacts, four of them were press briefings with Carney. The other was an 
appearance by Boehner on Good Morning America. 
When asked in a press briefing on June 10, 2013 about public assertions that Snowden 
should be considered a whistleblowing hero, Carney refrained from any formal 
acknowledgement, stating “Well, I won’t comment specifically on an individual or his status.” 
Similarly in the White House press briefing the following day, Carney was asked if Snowden 
should be considered a traitor. Carney answered “Again, I won’t comment specifically on 




briefing, Carney delivered a prepared statement on whistleblowers and the protections afforded 
to them by the WPEA, which was enacted in November of the previous year. 
The Obama administration has demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting 
whistleblowers. The whistleblowers can play an important role in exposing waste, fraud, 
and abuse. There are established procedures that whistleblowers can employ that also 
protect -- rather ensure protection of national security interests. And I would -- if you 
look at the history here, the President appointed strong advocates to the Office of Special 
Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board, who have been widely praised. They 
have collectively issued an all-time high number of favorable actions on behalf of 
whistleblowers and have begun to change the culture so that whistleblowers are more 
willing to come forward. On November 27th, 2012, after four years of work with 
advocates and Congress to reach a compromise, the President signed the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act, which provides whistleblower protections for federal 
employees by clarifying the scope of protected disclosures, expanding judicial review, 
expanding the penalties imposed for violating whistleblower protections, creating new 
protections for transportation security officers and scientists, creating whistleblower 
ombudsmen, and strengthening the authority of the Office of Special Counsel to assist 
whistleblowers. Because it was clear that Congress would not provide protections for 
intelligence community whistleblowers, the President took executive action, issuing a 
landmark directive that extended whistleblower protections to the intelligence and 
national security communities for the first time. The directive prohibits retaliation against 
whistleblowers who report information through the appropriate channels and established 




retaliation does not occur. The President’s commitment on this issue far exceeds that of 
past administrations, which have resisted expanding protections for whistleblowers and in 
doing so have steered away from transparency. 
Carney’s statement articulated the U.S. government’s official position on whistleblowers and the 
protections afforded to them. The position publicly indicates the legal arguments that U.S. 
officials will begin forwarding in the campaign against <Snowden>. While Snowden is not 
directly addressed by Carney, the U.S. government was positioning itself to deny Snowden of 
whistleblower status. 
Immediately thereafter, Carney was asked if the White House viewed Snowden as “a 
whistleblower or a leader”. Carney responded by stating “I am not willing to comment on the 
status of the individual under investigation.” (June 11, 2013). Carney relayed the same message 
again the next day: “I've simply said what our disposition is on this, that we're not going to 
comment on the subject of a recently begun and ongoing investigation into the unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information” (June 12, 2013). Carney repeated this equivalent claim 
again the following day. 
 After Carney’s press conference on June 13, 2013, ten days passed before any U.S. 
official addressed <Snowden> again. The first phase includes these ten days of silence as it 
represents the initially cautious posture the U.S. government assumed regarding Snowden’s 
revelations and corresponding whistleblowing implications. The lack of artifacts in the first 
phase reveals the hesitancy with which U.S. officials approached <Snowden>. This silence 
demonstrates not only the ongoing investigation that Carney described, but also the attempts by 
the U.S. to apprehend Snowden abroad. As Snowden avoided international seizure, U.S. officials 




3.3 Phase II:  Denounce 
 The rhetorical shift into the second phase was initiated by Snowden’s move from Hong 
Kong to Moscow on June 23, 2013. Having failed to negotiate Snowden’s return to the U.S., 
governmental officials assumed a formal posture on Snowden’s whistleblowing status. The 
second phase highlights a rhetorical turn where U.S. officials adopted the perspective that 
Snowden was indeed not a whistleblower. Officials actively engaged in denoting the importance 
of this distinction. U.S. officials agree to enter the public phase of political deliberation 
(Goodnight, 1982), denouncing Snowden publicly and denying Snowden of whistleblower 
status. 
Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein (June 23, 2013) and 
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers (June 23, 2013) effectively 
launched the second phase of the discourse by openly stating that Snowden was not a 
whistleblower. In regards to Snowden’s status, Rogers contended that: 
He went outside all of the whistleblower avenues that were available to anyone in this 
government, including people who have classified information. We get two or three visits 
from whistleblowers every single week in the committee, and we investigate every one 
thoroughly. He didn’t choose that route”. Feinstein concurred, stating “Well, I don't think 
this man is a whistleblower. 
The second phase of the discourse is marked by an adamant denial of Snowden’s whistleblowing 
status by U.S. government officials, and justifications of felony charges due to accusations of 
irreparable harm to U.S. interests. The most detailed and pejorative remarks came from Jen 
Psaki, State Department Spokesperson, in a Department of State press briefing on July 12, 2013. 




press briefing was largely a direct response to the forum. When asked if the Department of State 
believed that Snowden should not have been allowed to speak publicly, Psaki stated “Our 
concern here is that he’s been provided this opportunity to speak in a propaganda platform” and 
that “Russia has played a role in facilitating this, that others have helped elevate it.” The press 
prodded further, asking “people who are accused of crimes are allowed their right of free speech, 
are they not?” Psaki eventually retorted “We certainly are upset that there was a platform for an 
individual who’s been accused of felony crimes.” 
The respective dialogue during Psaki’s public briefing is the quintessence of the 
overarching quandary surrounding the <Snowden> discourse as it reified governmental 
hypocrisy and exposed the unconditional self-interest of U.S. security agencies. Within the same 
conversation, Psaki defended the right to free speech, but condemned Snowden for being granted 
a public forum. The exploration of this quandary serves as a primary impetus for rhetorical 
inquiry into the contestation over the term “whistleblower”. Contentions analogous to that of 
Psaki manifested with Carney on August 1, 2014 as well. Carney asserted: 
Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and 
has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States 
as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections. 
After another question, Carney continued: 
When you take an oath to protect the secrets of the United States, you're bound to protect 
them and there are consequences if you don't. There are also procedures in place for 
whistleblowers that are available to those who would blow the whistle, if you will. The 
unauthorized leaking of classified information has and can do enormous damage to our 




In a Department of State press briefing on June 24, 2013, State Department Press Officer 
Patrick Ventrell, when asked of Snowden and whistleblowing, stated: 
Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in 
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of 
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help 
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing 
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe. So there’s really a 
pretty strong distinction there, and we feel pretty strongly about it. 
On July 28, 2013, Rogers heightened the <Snowden> rhetoric on Meet the Press: 
He has disclosed programs that make it easier for terrorists overseas. And the first people 
who are going to feel that damage are our soldiers in Afghanistan. We need to understand 
that. This is serious and it’s real. As well as empowering Chinese and Russian 
intelligence officials….He missed every opportunity to be a whistleblower when he 
missed every opportunity to talk to a whole host of avenues for him. 
Similarly, during the White House press briefing on August 1, 2013, Carney contended: 
Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and 
has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States 
as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections. 
It is no surprise that the U.S. government responded to Snowden in this manner. Historically, 
U.S. officials go immediately on the defensive against whistleblowers, like in the case of 
Ellsberg and Drake. While Ellsberg and Drake both understood their potential for extensive 





Having signed whistleblower protections into law, Obama contended that Snowden 
should have used the prearranged avenues set forth by the WPEA (August 9, 2013): 
If the concern was that somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the 
public, I signed an executive order well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that 
provided whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So 
there were other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and 
thought that they needed to question government actions. 
Obama asserted that by not using these protections, Snowden forfeited all whistleblower defense 
rights. Congruently, Feinstein suggested on the November 3, 2013 installment of Face the 
Nation, that by not following protocol, Snowden forfeited any opportunity for clemency: 
He had an opportunity, if what he was was (sic) a whistleblower to pick up the phone to 
call the House intelligence committee, the Senate intelligence committee and say, look, I 
have some information you ought to see. And we would certainly see him, maybe both 
together, maybe separately, but we would have seen him and we would have looked at 
that information. That didn't happen. And now he's done this enormous disservice to our 
country. And I think the answer is, no clemency. 
Rogers as well indicated disdain for Snowden on the December 22, 2013 episode of This Week:  
He has traded something of value for his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national 
security of the United States. We call that treason. And I think that letter -- I think very 
clearly lays out who this gentleman is and what his intentions were clearly. And so would 
I like him to come back? He should come back. He didn't use any of the whistleblower 




While government officials were emphatic that Snowden was not a whistleblower, the topic was 
regularly addressed throughout phase two, that is, through the end of 2013. The second phase is 
defined by the U.S. government outwardly contending, quite extensively, that Snowden was not 
a whistleblower. The third and final phase marks a distinctive shift away from comprehensive 
discussions on whistleblowing by U.S. officials, despite the continued regularity of 
whistleblowing discussions in the public forum. 
3.4 Phase III:  Purge 
 The final turn, denoted when governmental proceedings resumed in January of 2014 after 
the holiday break, also signified the U.S. government’s general averseness to public discussion 
on <Snowden> and whistleblowing. In this last stage U.S. officials maintained their few key 
talking points and deflected additional questions that pertained to <Snowden>. Whistleblower 
language was noticeably absent in the third phase. Whistleblowing was not mentioned in the first 
27 artifacts of 2014, and whistleblowing did not reappear in the <Snowden> discourse until May 
29, 2014. Instead, officials focused exclusively on the U.S. government’s request that Snowden 
return to the U.S. and face trial for three felony charges. Members of the press had regularly 
inquired about Snowden’s whistleblower status in phases one and two, but not in phase three. 
The purging phase moved whistleblowing discourse into Goodnight’s (1982) technical phase. 
U.S. officials refused to engage the topic of whistleblowing in the public forum, having defaulted 
to legalistic language throughout the second phase. The silent posture in the third phase marks 
the formal disassociation of the public from whistleblowing deliberations. Forcing deliberation 
into the technical sphere is a decidedly anti-democratic move as it disassociates the public from 




There was a clear shift by both the media and the U.S. government, when interacting with 
each other, away from whistleblowing terminology at the beginning of 2014. Of the eighty total 
occurrences of whistleblowing terms in the entirety of the discourse, 75 happen prior to 2014. 
The final phase effectively purged the concept of whistleblowing from the narrative. The 
rhetorical shift in phase three demonstrates the control that statist ideology has upon U.S. 
<democracy>. Whereas theories of <democracy> unequivocally agree that media should 
function as the fourth estate, U.S. news organizations yielded to the dictates of the U.S. 
government and stopped pressing officials about Snowden and whistleblowing. Despite the 
publication of Snowden’s disclosures, media outlets exposed their submissiveness by 
participating in the development of each phase. The development of three distinct phases 
throughout the <Snowden> discourse informs the subsequent synchronic analysis. 
4. Synchronic Analysis 
4.1 Phase I:  Refrain 
Through the discursive exchanges in phase one, U.S. officials established their 
definitional position on whistleblowing, affording themselves carte blanche in their eventual 
handling of <Snowden>.  Only once was Snowden directly addressed by U.S. officials in the 
first two weeks of the discourse when George Stephanopoulos of Good Morning America asked 
Boehner on June 10, 2013 if Snowden should be considered a “whistleblowing patriot” or a law 
breaker who betrayed the American people. Boehner then immediately used the question 
concerning whistleblowing to perpetuate the <terrorism> mythos by replying: “He's a traitor. The 
President outlined last week that these were important national <security> programs to help keep 




directly address the status of Snowden as a whistleblower, but insinuated that whistleblowing is 
counterproductive to American <security> interests. 
Carney issued the most extensive comment on whistleblowing during the first phase with 
a prepared statement in a press briefing on June 11, 2013. Within that statement, which mentions 
whistleblowing terms fourteen times, <security> is referenced three times. <Security> is the only 
other ideograph present within Carney’s statement. Carney defends the President’s authorization 
of whistleblower protections in the interest of protecting those who work in national <security>. 
While Carney never directly mentioned Snowden, the statement implied that Snowden’s actions 
were harmful to national <security>: “There are established procedures that whistleblowers can 
employ that also protect -- rather ensure protection of national security.” Although the discussion 
on whistleblowing was minimal in phase one, Boehner and Carney were laying the groundwork 
for the U.S. government’s position on whistleblowers. 
4.2 Phase II:  Denounce 
4.2.1 <Terrorism> and <Security> 
 The most evident relational interplay within the <Snowden> discourse between 
whistleblowing and relative ideographs was with that of <security> and <terrorism>. Throughout 
the <Snowden> dialogue, <terrorism> and <security> appeared with regularity and significance. 
<Terrorism>, one of the most prominent ideographs in the U.S. after <9/11>, was continuously 
reinforced throughout the discourse, and was juxtaposed against U.S. <security>. <Terrorism> 
and <security> operated not only in conjunction with the construction of the <Snowden> 
ideograph, but also worked to jettison whistleblowing from the narrative. U.S. officials did this 
by denying Snowden whistleblower status for not following WPEA protocols and threatening 




like <terrorism> and <security>, to concurrently obfuscate <Snowden> and usurp the power of 
whistleblowing. 
During phase two, federal officials constructed the <Snowden> abstraction and removed 
<Snowden> of all whistleblowing distinctions. In doing so, U.S. officials utilized the media 
attention to reiterate the ideological threats of <terrorism> and reemphasize the importance of 
secretive national <security> initiatives. Additionally, U.S. officials admitted that they were 
unaware of how much information Snowden had not yet released. The campaign against 
<Snowden> is also read as preemptive, in order to criminalize Snowden before the exposure of 
additional information. Anticipating the continued disclosure of classified intelligence 
information, especially during the beginning of the denunciation phase, U.S. officials publicly 
campaigned against <Snowden> as a measure of self-preservation. 
Throughout phase two, the state labored to protect itself against future public dissent. 
State officials continuously reduced the acceptable designation of the public whistleblower; they 
used their platform to misappropriate the discursive value of public whistleblowers writ large by 
confining whistleblowers to governmental mandates. In an interview on Face the Nation on June 
23, 2013, Feinstein stressed that Snowden was not a whistleblower, further asserting of Snowden 
“the damage he's done is essentially to reveal a program which has worked well and disrupted 
<terrorist> plots. And there are more than 50 <terrorist> plots that it has played a role in.” On 
July 28, 2013 Rogers stated on Meet the Press that Snowden had bypassed all opportunities to be 
a whistleblower and in doing so, had made it easier for <terrorists> overseas. In a press briefing 
on August 1, 2013 Carney contended of Snowden: “He’s not a dissident. He’s not a 
whistleblower.”, and further stated “The unauthorized leaking of classified information has and 




January 19, 2014 airing of This Week, Rogers reiterated that Snowden had blown every 
opportunity to be a whistleblower and “has traded something of value for his own personal gain 
that jeopardizes the national <security> of the United States.” Reaffirming the U.S. 
government’s position nearly a year after the initial Snowden revelations, Carney remarked on 
May 29, 2014 in a White House Press Briefing that Snowden failed to follow whistleblower 
protocol. In that same briefing, Carney also accused <Snowden> of supporting al Qaeda and 
other <terrorist> networks. 
The unreserved prosecutorial stance of the U.S. government remained throughout the 
<Snowden> discourse. Oftentimes, U.S. officials simply refused to engage in discussions on 
specifics saying, for instance, they will not comment on individuals in an “open investigation” 
(Obama, 2014, January 17). While U.S. officials largely refrained from discussing the particulars 
of Snowden, a review of the discourse indicates that officials were most concerned that Snowden 
revealed how U.S. security institutions surveilled the masses. U.S. officials stressed that 
Snowden compromised national security by exposing to potential enemies “the nature and 
methods of our intelligence collection” (Rhodes, 2013, June 27). However, those methods were 
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals. Phase two illuminates the campaign by 
U.S. officials to dismiss public debate on <Snowden> and whistleblowing by pushing the 
discourse eventually into the technical sphere. 
 U.S. officials redirected the discussion of whistleblowing to the ideological perpetuation 
of fears of <terrorism> to assist in the denial of whistleblowing within the narrative. Thus, in the 
same way that <Snowden> functioned to maintain ideological fears, terms of whistleblowing 




asked about Snowden and blowing the whistle on state sponsored surveillance, Ventrell 
defaulted to <terrorism> rhetoric, stating: 
Well, it is, and it is for a reason, because we’re talking about very different things here. 
On the one hand, you’re talking about some of our intelligence programs, which again, I 
can’t always get into detail, but broadly speaking are to help keep us safe, to go after 
terrorists, and that are done in a legal way through our different branches of government, 
including with judicial oversight, including through the Congress (June 24, 2013). 
Obama articulated that signing off on protections for whistleblowers allowed the U.S. to 
continue to safeguard itself against <terrorists>: 
I’ve got a problem with what’s going on here, I’m not sure whether it’s being done 
properly. If, in fact, the allegations are true, then he didn’t do that. And that is a huge 
problem because a lot of what we do depends on terrorists networks not knowing that, in 
fact, we may be able to access their information. 
At times, government officials were asked specifically about the weakness of whistleblower 
protections for intelligence community subcontractors, like Snowden. In those instances, U.S. 
officials skirted interrogation and reiterated fears of <terrorism>. For instance, in a press 
conference on May 29, 2014, Carney was asked “Do you acknowledge that the whistleblower 
protections in the intelligence community are essentially much weaker than in any other part of 
government?”  Averting the question, Carney responded: 
What I can tell you is that there are avenues available to somebody like Mr. Snowden to 
raise those kinds of concerns and whistleblower allegations.…I think that it is fair to say 
that it is the view of the U.S. government that what Mr. Snowden did was a violation of 




apparatus have attested to, damaging to our national security, made it easier for or gave 
insight to our enemies, to terrorists that makes it harder for the United States and our 
allies to go after them….Unauthorized disclosures of classified information harm U.S. 
and allied efforts to identify, track and disrupt the activities of our adversaries, including 
terrorists. Many of these efforts are born of years of carefully managed intelligence 
efforts. As a result of these disclosures, our adversaries, including terrorists and their 
support networks, now have a better understanding of our collection methods and are 
taking counter measures. 
In addition to this avoiding the concept of whistleblowing, federal officials reiterated their 
appeals for power as they pressed the <terrorism> narrative. 
 Throughout the discourse, U.S. officials used whistleblowing both as a keyword prompt 
to proliferate a fear of <terrorism> and as a platform to contrast whistleblowing against the 
interests of national <security>. While whistleblowing terms themselves did not authenticate 
ideological manifestations of power, they functioned as linguistic mechanisms which recurrently 
preempted ideological posturing. Recognizing the context and the public awareness of the 
whistleblowing discourse, U.S. officials used keyword language to reinforce the predominant 
fear of terrorism in the wake of <9/11>. The ideological hegemony of the state was largely 
maintained through consistent discussions of external <security> threats. While this posture is 
not uncommon for hegemonic states, Snowden’s revelations of illegal governmental surveillance 
placed the U.S. government in a precarious position. Given that there were no legal ramifications 
for any U.S. official in the wake of <Snowden>, it appears that U.S. government officials were 





4.2.2 <Liberty>, <Freedom>, <Privacy>, and <Democracy> 
In addition to being synchronically analyzed with <security> and <terrorism> discourse, 
whistleblowing utterances will also be analyzed alongside the ideographs <liberty>, <freedom>, 
<privacy>, and <democracy>. Unlike <terrorism> and <security>, these ideographs were almost 
entirely absent from discussions on whistleblowing in all three phases. The absence is striking 
considering the regularity of these terms within the greater political discourse outside of 
interactions with U.S. officials. For instance, of the examined artifacts, the term <democracy> 
appeared 180 times. None of these utterances were in regards to whistleblowing conversations 
between the press and state officials. <Liberty> only appeared 12 times, but never within the 
context of whistleblowing discourse. The term <liberties>, as an ideographic variant of 
<liberty>, was uttered 66 times within the <Snowden> discourse. Like the utterances of 
<liberty>, not once was this term mentioned in the context of whistleblowing. <Privacy> was 
mentioned 256 times in the entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. None of these occurrences 
existed in the same comment from a U.S. official as the term whistleblowing. 
The only examined ideograph to exist directly within conversations between state 
officials and members of the media was the term <freedom>. It appeared 176 times within the 
entire discourse. However, only 3 of these utterances occurred within relevant whistleblowing 
conversations. In each of these 3 occurrences, <Snowden> was juxtaposed against the concept of 
<freedom>. On June 24, 2013 Ventrell conflated <Snowden> with heavy governmental oversight 
stating: 
I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that 




some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow 
of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that. 
The aforementioned exchange between Psaki and the press on July 12, 2013 contained the 
second utterance. Psaki never mentioned the word <freedom>, but in response to a question as to 
whether or not Snowden should forfeit the right to <freedom> of speech, Psaki stated “He’s not a 
whistleblower. He’s not a human rights activist. He’s wanted in a series of serious criminal 
charges brought in the eastern district of Virginia and the United States.” Lastly, Rogers, on 
December 22, 2013, made claims similar to that of Ventrell, asserting of Snowden: “He didn't 
use any of the whistleblower protection avenues laid out before him. None. Zero. He went to the 
press. Then he went to the bastion of internet freedom, China, and then Russia.” In each of these 
three occurrences, <Snowden> and the practice of whistleblowing are postulated as antithetical 
to the concept of <freedom>. 
The presence of whistleblowing terms were not moderated in the mediated public forum, 
signifying the value of the whistleblowing’s absence within media interactions with U.S. 
officials. Through a variety of news media searches, media outlets congruently discussed 
<Snowden>, whistleblowing terms, and democratic concepts like <liberty>, <freedom>, 
<privacy>, and <democracy>, with an incredibly high regularity. LexisNexis searches were 
conducted to measure the frequency of the analyzed ideographs within news media. Searches 
were performed within specific date ranges as the two years of discourse provided an 
innumerable amount of results. Searches were conducted for mediated stories that included 
“Snowden” and any whistleblowing term which also included either <democracy>, <freedom>, 
<privacy>, or <liberty>. From June 5, 2013 through July 5, 2013, LexisNexis populated 2571 




analyzed discourse, from May 15, 2015 through June 15, 2015 which populated 398 results. For 
all searches, new publications of high similarity were excluded to avoid redundancy. The sheer 
volume of results demonstrates the regularity of discussions at the intersection of <Snowden>, 
whistleblowing, and democratic ethos. Clearly, news media and the public were grappling with 
these concepts. The avoidance of this discursive intersection by U.S. officials further indicates 
their attempts to purge whistleblowing, control the narrative, and silence government dissent. 
 Historically, one of the paradoxes of <democracy> is striking a publicly amenable 
balance between <security> and <liberty>. Contemporarily, that discussion has been 
concentrated to a debate between concerns of <privacy>, as a conflated subsidiary of <liberty>, 
and <terrorism>, as a threat to <security>. While Snowden’s whistleblowing actions were a 
primary catalyst for public discourse, the U.S. government sought to ensure that Snowden did 
not provide the public with the impetus for further deliberation. While mediated public discourse 
regularly admitted the importance of Snowden within the debate between <security> and 
<liberty>, U.S. officials refused to acknowledge the connection. Whistleblowers are granted 
narrative power when referenced as stimuli for public dialogue. Thus, while U.S. officials 
frequently addressed public concerns of <privacy> and <security>, the discussions occurred at a 
considerable distance from whistleblowing discourse. U.S. officials treated Snowden’s 
whistleblowing in the same way they treated Ellsberg, Drake, and Manning, reducing them to 
their criminal accusations and stripping them of any importance within the narrative. Within the 
<Snowden> discourse U.S. officials contended that they were sincerely concerned with finding 
the right balance between <security> and <privacy>, but the relative deliberative processes were 






U.S. officials regularly diminished the role of <Snowden> within the context of the 
debate, which afforded the state control over the discourse. Carney was asked on June 10, 2013: 
There’s a petition on the White House website saying, ‘Pardon Edward Snowden 
immediately,’ calling on the President to issue a pardon -- 12,000 signatures last time I 
saw. What is the White House reaction to such a notion and to the sense that he is a hero? 
Some are calling him a hero for being a whistleblower on this. What does the White 
House say to that? 
The question by the press specifically asked about Snowden and whistleblowing within the 
context of governmental surveillance. Regardless of the intent of the petitioners, Carney showed 
no interest in directly addressing Snowden or Snowden’s growing public support. Instead, 
Carney instantly disassociated Snowden and whistleblowing from the narrative, and rebranded 
Snowden’s actions as disastrous, reckless, and criminal. “When it comes to the petitions, we 
obviously await a threshold being crossed before we respond to it, and that threshold has not 
been crossed.” Carney further stated: 
I think Director Clapper has spoken about this, I think the President has, that in general, 
leaks of sensitive classified information that cause harm to our national security interests 
are a problem -- a serious problem. And they’re classified for a reason. And as I said I 
think to Jessica, when you -- and I’m basically paraphrasing Director Clapper -- that 
when you divulge information that provides a playbook, if you will, to how we -- to 
efforts that this government undertakes to counter the efforts of those who would kill 
Americans or attack the United States in some way, or our allies, you’re assisting them in 




The following day (June 11, 2013), Carney strengthened the rhetoric, and further articulated that 
Obama had already emphasized the importance of publicly addressing the relationship between 
<privacy> and <security>. 
As you heard the President say on Friday, he believes that we must strike a balance 
between our security interests and our desire for privacy. He made clear that you cannot 
have 100 percent security and 100 percent privacy, and thus we need to find that balance. 
He believes as Commander-in-Chief, that the oversight structures that are in place to 
ensure that there is the proper review of the kinds of programs that we have in place, 
authorized by Congress through the PATRIOT ACT, and FISA do strike that balance. He 
also said that he understands and believe it is entirely legitimate that some may disagree. 
Some may believe that that balance ought to be shifted in one direction or the other from 
where it currently is, and he welcomes the debate about that. He mentioned this very 
explicitly in his speech to the National Defense University several weeks ago on the 
broader topics of our counterterrorism programs, but he spoke specifically about 
surveillance and the balance that we need to strike between security and privacy, between 
security and inconvenience. And that is a worthy discussion to have in public and he 
welcomes that debate, because it’s an important debate. And I think it’s important to note 
that we have had this debate every time the PATRIOT ACT has come up for passage and 
reauthorization. And it has been a spirited debate with strongly held opinions expressed 
by people who are opposed to the structures that are in place that have been authorized by 
bipartisan majorities in Congress, that are overseen by the courts, as well as internally by 





Governmental control of the narrative continued throughout the second phase of the <Snowden> 
saga wherein U.S. officials assumed ownership of the debate and downplayed <Snowden> and 
whistleblowing in general. In a White House press conference on August 9, 2013, Obama 
exemplified such governmental control. As Obama proposed actions to address the public 
concerns regarding illegal surveillance, he minimized the federal government’s culpability while 
subversively acknowledging fault, and further stressing the ideological enemy of <terrorism>.  
And that's why, over the last few weeks, I’ve consulted members of Congress who come 
at this issue from many different perspectives. I’ve asked the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board to review where our counterterrorism efforts and our values come into 
tension, and I directed my national security team to be more transparent and to pursue 
reforms of our laws and practices. And so, today, I’d like to discuss four specific steps -- 
not all inclusive, but some specific steps that we’re going to be taking very shortly to 
move the debate forward. First, I will work with Congress to pursue appropriate reforms 
to Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT, the program that collects telephone records. As 
I’ve said, this program is an important tool in our effort to disrupt terrorist plots. And it 
does not allow the government to listen to any phone calls without a warrant. But given 
the scale of this program, I understand the concerns of those who would worry that it 
could be subject to abuse. So after having a dialogue with members of Congress and civil 
libertarians, I believe that there are steps we can take to give the American people 
additional confidence that there are additional safeguards against abuse. 
Obama carefully framed Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act in a manner that recognized the legal 




Obama’s rhetoric, in a convoluted manner, afforded himself the credit for reforming the 
illegal practices that he adamantly defended. Principally, this was done by discursively 
convicting <Snowden> and purging whistleblowing from the narrative. Obama claimed that he 
would work with Congress to “improve the public’s confidence in the oversight conducted by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”, create more transparency for these programs by 
directing “intelligence community to make public as much information about these programs as 
possible”, and foster additional oversight by “forming a high-level group of outside experts to 
review our entire intelligence and communications technologies”. Obama assumed the onus for 
the development of the contemporary debate as he assured the public he would provide “greater 
assurances that the court is looking at these issues from both perspectives -- security and 
privacy”, but did so by devaluing <Snowden> both directly and indirectly. He first alluded to 
Snowden by stating: 
The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to keep us 
safe because they love this country and believe in our values. They're patriots. And I 
believe that those who have lawfully raised their voices on behalf of privacy and civil 
liberties are also patriots who love our country and want it to live up to our highest ideals. 
Obama was then directly asked about Snowden and his status as a whistleblower, to which 
Obama responded, 
So the fact is, is that Mr. Snowden has been charged with three felonies. If, in fact, he 
believes that what he did was right, then, like every American citizen, he can come here, 
appear before the court with a lawyer and make his case. If the concern was that 
somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the public, I signed an 




whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So there were 
other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and thought that they 
needed to question government actions. 
Later, Obama directly referenced Snowden as well by stating: 
And there’s no doubt that Mr. Snowden’s leaks triggered a much more rapid and 
passionate response than would have been the case if I had simply appointed this review 
board to go through, and I had sat down with Congress and we had worked this thing 
through. It would have been less exciting. It would not have generated as much press. I 
actually think we would have gotten to the same place, and we would have done so 
without putting at risk our national security and some very vital ways that we are able to 
get intelligence that we need to secure the country. 
Obama’s rhetoric defended covert governmental surveillance while downplaying whistleblowers, 
like Snowden, within the narrative. In essence, while Obama admitted that the debate between 
<security> and <liberty> was important, Obama devalued Snowden’s tactics. The subtext of 
Obama’s statements imply that U.S. citizens would be better off not knowing that they were 
being illegally surveilled. Obama’s posture deprived <Snowden> and whistleblowers of narrative 
power, despite the obvious catalytic relationship between whistleblowing and the relevant 
debate. Obama achieved this by pointedly rejecting whistleblowing as an integral element to the 
deliberations. Obama negated the significance of whistleblowing when he contended that 
Snowden failed to use the appropriate protocol. Whistleblowing thus, as designated by Obama, 
was delegitimized when executed outside of statist interests. Obama accosted Snowden, and 





4.3 Phase III:  Purge 
4.3.1 Discourse 
 Officials in phase three seemingly eliminated the concept of whistleblowing from the 
discourse. Having delegitimized whistleblowing and obfuscated <Snowden>, U.S. officials 
halted the elaboration of the <Snowden> narrative and avoided discussions on whistleblowing 
almost entirely. With only five mentions of whistleblowing in the third phase, it seems the 
concept was successfully avoided. Governmental officials certainly did not initiate discussions 
on whistleblowing, and press officials stopped engaging U.S. officials on the matter. Having 
reemphasized the ideological manifestations of <terrorism> and <security>, U.S. officials 
utilized the <Snowden> discourse to position public whistleblowing as destructive to American 
society. The extraction of whistleblowing from the narrative in the third phase symbolized the 
federal government’s covert control over the <Snowden> discourse and public whistleblowing 
writ large. <Snowden>, having been fabricated by U.S. officials as a political abstraction, 
assisted in the dismantling of public whistleblowing against the state. 
4.3.2 Legalism 
Snowden and a host of legal experts contended that because the Whistleblower Protection 
Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 both explicitly deny 
protections for subcontractors of the intelligence community, whistleblower protection laws 
would not have applied to Snowden. Yet, U.S. officials continuously asserted that Snowden 
would have been ensured whistleblower protections had the appropriate protocol been followed. 
The difficulty for legal defense in this case is that Snowden publicly admitted to exposing 
classified information. The U.S. federal government deemed the exposed information vital for 




charges of espionage supersede any possibility for whistleblower protection. In sum, Snowden 
never had formalized whistleblower protection and cannot at this juncture be retroactively 
granted whistleblower protection. 
The unwavering position of the U.S. government was informed by two key legal 
premises. First, U.S. officials recognized that by dropping the felony charges against Snowden or 
offering Snowden amnesty, could have spurred legal trouble for U.S. <security> agencies. As it 
was, the NSA had already faced multiple legal battles regarding its surveillance tactics. The NSA 
narrowly escaped legal culpability in the Supreme Court case Clapper v. Amnesty in February 
2013. Charged with illegally surveilling on U.S. citizens and organizations, the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the NSA on a count of 5 to 4, stating that the plaintiffs could not prove that the 
NSA had spied on them. Snowden has cited this Supreme Court case as a reason he disclosed the 
NSA tactics, so as to give proof of illegal surveillance. The ACLU filed a lawsuit on June 11, 
2013 in the wake of Snowden’s revelations. The lawsuit was later dismissed, but the ACLU won 
an appeal to reopen the lawsuit. The case was again dismissed in October of 2015, but was 
ongoing during the analyzed discourse. In June, 2017 the plaintiffs won an appeal of the 2015 
dismissal. By upholding the criminalization of <Snowden>, the U.S. government can avoid 
culpability. The public exoneration of <Snowden> would likely have bolstered legal cases 
against the NSA. Thus, maintaining a steadfast position against <Snowden> was a protective 
measure by the U.S. government for its own interests.  
Second, sustaining the denial of Snowden’s whistleblower status effectively guaranteed 
that Snowden would not immediately return for trial. Rejecting Snowden’s whistleblower status 
strengthened the political abstraction process of <Snowden>. While Snowden stayed abroad and 




in the perpetuation of the overarching <terrorism> narrative. With the salience of <9/11> fading, 
<Snowden> could be used to revamp fears of <terrorism> and silence dissent on governmental 
surveillance practices. The government’s denial of whistleblowing protections for Snowden thus 
served as more than just a legalistic stance. It was also a discursive distinction that advanced the 
operative control of statist ideology. This can be seen through the perpetuation of the 
<terrorism> narrative and the general disregard for governmental overreach, but also through the 
precedent U.S. officials set on the act of whistleblowing. 
5. Whistleblowing and <Democracy> 
The <democratic> citizen exists in a realm of discursivity, which ultimately engages and 
reflects its inherent paradox. U.S. <democracy> is still largely symptomatic of modernist 
thinking as it innately engages in a classification system of false binaries. The whistleblower, as 
a complex societal role, does not fit comfortably into any such dichotomy and the practice of 
whistleblowing exposes the inherent paradoxicality of <democracy>, notably between <liberty> 
and <security>, and <equality> within a representative government. Snowden’s revelations, in 
existing after the enactment of the WPEA, placed U.S. officials in a precarious position. While 
Snowden was not legally protected by the WPEA, U.S. officials contended otherwise. The 
governmental reaction to Snowden indicated that whistleblower distinctions would now be 
dictated by the government, and that as a concept, “whistleblower”, became a legal distinction. 
On several occasions, U.S. officials heralded Ellsberg for the Pentagon Papers, but berated 
Snowden, despite the incredible similarity between the two cases. One could argue that by 





Using <Snowden> as their public example, U.S. officials have installed the WPEA to 
protect themselves from public dissent and litigation. As per the arguments of U.S. officials 
within the <Snowden> discourse, the WPEA provides the U.S. government with legal authority 
over whether or not someone is considered a whistleblower. The binary created by U.S. officials, 
especially as it relates to U.S. security agencies, dictates that whistleblowers are only recognized 
and protected if their grievances are purged from the public forum. With this posture, the 
democratic public unjustifiably loses all reasonable access to the grievances of whistleblowers. 
The only option for whistleblowers who wish to call public attention to governmental 
malfeasance is to go rogue, and risk their lives as Snowden did. The <Snowden> discourse 
vividly demonstrated this multifaceted relationship. The press consistently interrogated U.S. 
officials with an undergirding desire to classify <Snowden> and whistleblowing as either 
destructive or productive. U.S. officials were adamant that public whistleblowing was 
destructive. Rather than address the internal tension that whistleblowing creates for 
<democracy>, U.S. officials suppressed the theoretical construct of whistleblowing and purged it 
from the narrative. The unsettling nature of whistleblowing goes beyond the elucidation of illegal 
activity and abuse of power. Whistleblowing challenges the ideologies that maintain the status 
quo. U.S. institutions of power thrive upon ideological posturing. Power imbalance is maintained 
through perpetual discursive manifestations of ideology. 
 Whistleblowing exists exclusively within a relationship of power imbalance. The nature 
of whistleblowing implies that a vulnerable political agent is exposing the illegal and/or 
unethical behavior of another, more powerful political agent. The existence of a whistleblower 
thus reifies a destabilization <democracy> in that it necessarily admits an anti-democratic power 




While institutions of U.S. ideology may grandiloquently assert <America> as the beacon of 
<democracy>, the existence of Snowden reifies a much harsher, authoritarian reality. Snowden’s 
existence as a whistleblower revealed the power structures existent beyond the façade of 
American <democracy, which in turn holds greater significance than the revelations themselves. 
The forced expulsion of the whistleblower from the <Snowden> discourse by U.S. officials 
illuminated the difficulty that <democratic> institutions perpetually face. The very existence of 
whistleblowing innately challenges the ideologies that maintain the status quo. 
 While it arguably functions as free speech within a liberal <democracy>, whistleblowing 
can expose undergirding societal authoritarianism. Any such authoritarianism is antithetical to 
<democracy>. Thus, beyond the legal ramifications of affording Snowden the whistleblower 
label, the acknowledgement of Snowden as a whistleblower allows the practice to become a part 
of state sanctioned <democratic> discourse. Media outlets and public polls largely agreed that 
Snowden was indeed a whistleblower for carefully exposing unconstitutional surveillance tactics 
by the U.S. government. The precedent set by U.S. officials in denying Snowden’s whistleblower 
status severely threatens <democratic> ethics. Additionally, not once did U.S. officials positively 
associate whistleblowing with any other <democratic> ethos. Affirmative discursive association 
of relevant ideographs with the concept of whistleblowing would connote an intricate 
relationship, effectively giving whistleblowing a place within <democratic> discourse. 
Throughout the <Snowden> discourse however, there was a conspicuous aversion by U.S. 
officials to the establishment of this relationship. 
6. Whistleblowing and Ideography 
 One of the research questions guiding this analysis addressed the possibility that, like 




discourse. While the term was used regularly within political dialogue and has rhetorical utility 
in support of ideology, it failed to satisfy all requirements of ideography. First, within the 
discourse, there was not enough evidence to indicate that whistleblowing terms held the required 
cultural nuance. Secondly, while there was an obvious confliction within the discourse as to 
whether or not Snowden should be considered a whistleblower, there was little recognized 
ambiguity regarding the term “whistleblower” itself. The general public and media largely 
agreed that Snowden functioned as a whistleblower and while U.S. officials strongly contended 
otherwise, both positions were succinctly articulated. While these entities defined 
“whistleblower” differently, they were able to forward coherent definitions, meaning that 
whistleblowing terminology lacked the full measures of ideography. 
7. Discussion 
By their nature, <democracies> must afford themselves the tools of their own destruction. 
The restriction of those tools, while potentially articulated via <democratic> means, operates in a 
manner antithetical to <democracy>. The U.S. government has roundly rejected appropriate 
protections for whistleblowers against its intelligence community. In fact, U.S. officials have 
labored to disqualify the potential for whistleblowing to even occur in this realm. By purging 
whistleblowing from the narrative, U.S. officials have forcibly excluded a necessary and viable 
avenue of public dissent against the state.  The position of U.S. officials demonstrates the 
fundamental authoritarian posture of state institutions. In effect, the maintenance and protection 
of the state take precedent over <democratic> ethics. Only in matters of national security is 
whistleblowing unprotected. In effect, the U.S. government is valuing its existence over 
<democratic> principles. While this posture is not unique to the U.S., in fact all nation states 




prominent paradox that all contemporary <democracies> must face. States must either adhere to 
<democratic> principles and defend whistleblowing within <security> agencies, or, default to 
authoritarianism out of their own self-interests. 
U.S. officials touted the WPEA and its internal channels as the means for whistleblowers 
to actively protect themselves and the security of U.S. citizens in general. However, it is 
counterintuitive to the concept of whistleblowing to exclusively support government-sanctioned 
whistleblowing protocols. By denying Snowden whistleblower distinctions, the U.S. government 
holds Snowden in exile as an accused felon. <Snowden> represents the ultimatum for future 
whistleblowers. In essence, all future whistleblowers against the state must either blow the 
whistle according to the state’s terms or risk their respective lives. While the dictates of the 
WPEA are democratically derived, they are destructive to democracy. The whistleblower, 
already in a contentious position, is now thrust into a perilous conundrum. By maintaining their 
posture on <Snowden>, the government can now funnel all whistleblowers through their own 
discreet system to avoid public humiliation and accountability. With the WPEA, the U.S. 
government set itself up with tangible recourse for future whistleblowers. 
The U.S. government’s denial of Snowden’s whistleblower status elucidated covert 
ideological power. Systemic ideologies maintain their hegemony when their subjects are divided. 
The polemics of the <Snowden> discourse were indicative of Stasis theory and the taxonomy of 
Western thought (Golden, Berquist, Coleman, and Sproule, 1976). Within the taxonomy, a social 
actor must first understand the facts of a case in order to correctly define the subject. Only when 
the subject is classified can the social agent move onto arguments of quality and policy. As U.S. 




Snowden as a whistleblower, the topics of policy and quality were largely avoided and ignored 
by U.S. officials.  
The <Snowden> discourse demonstrates how whistleblowing is the quintessence of 
<democracy>. It is simultaneously destructive of <democratic> institutions and productive for 
<democratic> discourse. Whistleblowing against the government disparages the 
<democratically> constructed state with the actualization of <democratic> <free> speech. It is a 
<democratic> weapon of the demos that can only be exercised to counteract manifestations of 
authoritarianism. Whistleblowing, existing both within, and outside of, <democracy>, 
necessarily functions paradoxically, and the recognition of this is vital to the conceptualization of 
<democracy>. Certainly, as with all <democratic> ethics, whistleblowing should be approached 
with appropriate caution. Unrestricted <freedom> of information requests, for instance, 
necessarily infringe upon <privacy> and civil <liberties>. As with all <democratic> ideals, there 
is no single resolution for whistleblowing. <Democracy> is evolutionary and potentially self-
destructive by its nature. <Democracies> must necessarily concede to ongoing challenges to their 
existences. The Snowden disclosures afforded the institutions of the U.S. the opportunity to 
assist in the progression of democracy. However, as U.S. officials hid behind the shield of the 
WPEA, democratic discourse was largely abandoned. 
 A primary utility of whistleblowing is the initiation of public deliberation. The 
compulsory reliance upon modernistic thinking, as existent within <Snowden>’s society, 
demonstrated how public deliberation often occurs within a state of faux <democracy>, which, 
for instance, cared more about the classification of Snowden, and classifying whistleblowing writ 
large, than it did the actualization processes of <democracy> and NSA tactics. As U.S. officials 




whistleblowers, they effectively suppressed the very discussion they were so adamant to endorse. 
The more significant revelation surrounding the U.S. government’s response to Snowden was not 
the disclosure of covert government surveillance, nor the emphatic denial of governmental 
culpability by state officials, but rather the painfully evident crises that <democracy> innately 
creates for itself. <Democracy> struggles mightily in accepting that it is symptomatic of itself. In 
response, <democracy> purges whistleblowers, like Snowden, from the narrative as they expose 
<democracy>’s deficiencies. 
The U.S. government’s position on Snowden as a whistleblower serves as an impasse for 
the progression of <American> <democracy>. The WPEA insulates whistleblowing, an 
inherently public apparatus, from public exposure. While the WPEA may provide personal 
measures of security for whistleblowers, it functions, arguably with greater favor, to protect 
ideological structures of power and its elites. Whistleblowing, as a <democratic> utility, dies 
when it yields to statist interests. As U.S. officials funnel whistleblowers through governmentally 
protected channels, whistleblowers, and the <democratic> populace writ large, become further 
discursively neutralized. 
By publicly suppressing whistleblowing operatives, U.S. officials neutralized the 
discursive power of a <democratic> citizenry. Thus, while all <democratic> ethoses exist within 
a perpetual paradox, the authoritarian shift to purge any of these principles from the discursive 
realm is conspicuously destructive of <democracy>, and is read wholly as an oppressive, 
survivalist motion by hegemonic ideology. Whistleblowing connotes non-democratic power 
imbalance, and its existence should be heavily protected by <democratic> institutions. The three 
distinct phases of the <Snowden> discourse connote not only the control by the U.S. government 










CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation performed an ideographic analysis of the discursive exchanges between 
the press and U.S. officials in regards to the disclosures of Edward Snowden. The Snowden 
revelations exposed covert, illegal domestic and international surveillance tactics by U.S. 
security agencies and generated passionate public discourse in the U.S. and abroad. The 
dissertation sought to identify newly constructed ideographs with regard to the Snowden 
discourse. It conducted a synchronic ideographic analysis within the Snowden discourse, and 
examined how whistleblowing interacted with the identified ideographs. 
The dissertation first assessed prominent ideographs within the discourse and 
demonstrated how the concept of <Snowden> became a political abstraction. The interplay of the 
<Snowden> ideograph was then analyzed among other prominent ideographs within the 
discourse, namely <liberty>, <security>, and <democracy>. The <Snowden> ideograph became 
increasingly apparent as the discourse developed. Existing with high regularity within U.S. 
political discourse, U.S. officials obfuscated the term <Snowden> over time. Paradoxically, 
<Snowden> was then utilized to defend the surveillance measures exposed by <Snowden>. 
Thus, <Snowden> was operationalized as a rhetorical tool of interpellation. The U.S. 
government used the <Snowden> ideograph to continue covert surveillance, perpetuate a fear of 
<terrorism>, and absolve itself of culpability. 
 One of the prominent means of abstraction was the conflation of <Snowden> with 
politically undesirable entities. <Snowden> was associated with foreign states like Russia and 
China, which are both known to have strained relationships with the U.S, and <Snowden> was 





 U.S. officials furthered the abstraction process further by consistently positioning 
<Snowden> as an enemy of U.S. security. <Snowden> was regularly juxtaposed against 
freedom, privacy, security, democracy, and justice, all established ideographs which assist in the 
interpellation processes of a U.S. ideology of statism. Regularly associated with <terrorism>, 
<Snowden> was constructed as the antithesis of <democracy>. U.S. officials further demanded 
that Snowden face appropriate justice for endangering U.S. security, despite the illegal and 
unethical practices of the U.S. government that <Snowden> reified. In sum, the continuous 
accusatory posture of the U.S. government and fabrication of a vast array of falsehoods 
undermined the public’s ability to formulate a coherent understanding of <Snowden>. 
The <Snowden> ideograph serves as a significant methodological development. 
Previously recognized iterations of ideography include terms, images, and events. This 
dissertation demonstrated how public figures, often political agents, can function 
ideographically. Thus, rhetorical scholars are provided with an additional avenue of ideographic 
criticism. The extended postulation contends that through ongoing discursive exchanges, 
“names” transcend beyond simple symbolic processes. Social agents entrenched within political 
discourse can evolve into rhetorical manifestations of ideology. 
The dissertation also examined the interaction of the relevant ideographs with the concept 
of whistleblowing. Through synchronic analysis, it was determined that U.S. officials 
operationalized <Snowden> to deprive the citizenry of an essential democratic tool, 
whistleblowing. Snowden’s status as a whistleblower was a primary point of contention 
throughout the discourse. Citing the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 




protocol. While Snowden would not have benefitted from whistleblower protections under the 
WPEA, U.S. officials consistently claimed otherwise. 
 As a practice, whistleblowing functions paradoxically within a democracy, much like all 
of democracy’s ideals. Although whistleblowers expose legal and ethical violations, especially 
against a state, they can create public harm by inciting violence or abetting enemies. The 
parameters of acceptable whistleblowing practices vary depending upon the desires of the 
populace; hence, it is antithetical to democratic principles for government officials to dictate 
whistleblower protocol. In practice, whistleblowing serves as a check against authoritarian 
overreach of a governmental entity when the chasm of power has grown too wide. It is 
antithetical to a democratic system of governance to negate the citizenry of its right to 
whistleblowing, especially as it relates to infringements upon <democratic> civil <liberties>. In 
dictating the regulation for whistleblower protections, U.S. officials purged whistleblowing from 
the narrative and significantly decreased the likelihood that governmental malfeasance could be 
publicly exposed. Subsequently, whistleblowers can be pushed into private channels and away 
from media coverage, which then safeguards the state from agents of dissent. In purging 
whistleblowing from the Snowden narrative, U.S. officials protected themselves and deprived the 
populace of an essential tool of democracy. This move pushed the U.S. system of governance 
away from democratic progression and further toward authoritarianism. 
 Perhaps the most unsettling consequence of the Snowden discourse is the unchanged 
system of surveillance by the U.S. government. It is well-documented that humans are more 
reserved and constrained when they believe they are being monitored. Thus, it matters not if the 
state has actually ceased its domestic surveillance; the public is nonetheless cognitively 




 While seemingly destructive to the state, the Snowden revelations subversively assisted 
in augmenting statist power. Through a variety of rhetorical maneuvers, U.S. officials navigated 
public backlash, distracted the populace from the NSA’s wrongdoing, and perpetuated their 
authoritarian power. Snowden thus, as an abstraction, functioned as a paradox of itself. 
Snowden’s existence was nullified through the rhetorical processes of U.S. officials, and in the 
process, officials substantially increased their control over whistleblowing and public dissent 
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Snowden, the whistleblower who exposed illegal and unethical surveillance tactics of the 
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development to ideographic analysis as it demonstrates how a political figure can become a 
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